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. . . scientific method, like science itself, defies 
definition. It is made up of a number of operations, 
some mental, some manual. Each of these, in its time, 
has been found useful, first in the formulation of 
questions that seem urgent. . . and then in the finding, 
testing, and using the answers to them.
J. D. BERNAL
Tax Research in 
Perspective
This study is designed to provide a working knowledge of tax 
research methodology for the certified public accountant who is not 
already a tax specialist. It introduces its readers to the research proc­
ess utilized in the tax-related work commonly performed by ac­
countants in public practice and it notes, in passing, the kind of 
research used to determine tax policy recommendations.1 After a 
careful reading of this study and many hours of experience in im­
plementing the procedures suggested here, the reader should be 
capable of solving most of the tax problems encountered in a public 
accounting practice. 1
1 Accountants generally have not ventured far into the realm of tax policy. 
Because of their practical experience in tax matters, accountants could play 
an important role in improving our tax system. If they were to assume an 
active role in policy deliberations in the future, many of the research pro­
cedures simply noted in passing later in this chapter would have to be in­
vestigated at length.
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This study also introduces the reference volumes necessary for a 
tax library. It suggests both minimal library requirements and meth­
ods of utilizing the more important tax reference works. This study 
is not primarily intended to increase knowledge of specific substan­
tive tax provisions per se, but, as a secondary benefit, it may teach 
readers more than they previously knew about some tax provisions 
as they study the examples offered as problem-solving illustrations. 
When solving a similar problem of their own, however, readers 
should not rely upon the conclusions reached in these examples 
without updating them. Although some of the AICPA tax studies 
are periodically revised, they were never intended as a substitute 
for a current tax-reference service.
Meaning of Research in General
Ideally, a book devoted to tax research would begin with an un­
ambiguous definition of the word research. Unfortunately, no such 
definition has come to the authors’ attention; therefore, we will have 
to be satisfied with a general description rather than a precise defi­
nition. This general description should adequately reveal the nature 
of the process envisioned within the phrase tax research as it is 
used here.
The word research is used to describe a wide variety of diverse 
activities. For example, at one extreme it can include the search for 
anything not presently known by the person making the search. In 
that context, looking up an unknown telephone number in a direc­
tory would constitute research. At the other extreme, a scientist 
might restrict his use of the word research to exhaustive experimen­
tation under tightly controlled conditions solely for the purpose of 
revising previously accepted conclusions in light of recently deter­
mined facts. Between the extremes he infinite alternative definitions.
Thus, this tax study does not purport to deal with all forms of 
tax research; except for a few introductory comments in this chap­
ter, this study is restricted to a description of the procedures com­
monly utilized by a diverse group of professionals—including cer­
tified public accountants, lawyers, enrolled agents, and Internal 
Revenue Service personnel—to determine a defensibly “correct” 
(and in some instances an optimal) conclusion to a tax question. 
Totally different kinds of work undertaken by these individuals or 
by other persons might be properly included within the meaning of
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the phrase tax research, but our objective is neither to define nor 
to reconcile conflicting definitions. We desire only to place the gen­
eral characteristics of the different types of tax research in perspec­
tive. Very few persons become expert in each of the research method­
ologies noted. Nevertheless, anyone deeply engaged in any facet of 
tax work should at least be generally aware of what other individuals 
working in the same field are doing. With increasing frequency, 
those expert in one facet of taxation are asked to express an in­
formed opinion on a wholly different aspect of taxation. In these 
circumstances it is especially desirable that the expert be aware of 
what others have done so that he might move with appropriate cau­
tion in dealing with tax matters with which he is not intimately 
familiar.
Perhaps the easiest and most desirable way to place the different 
types of tax research in meaningful perspective is to create a gen­
eral classification system based on the purpose of the inquiry. Al­
though other possible classification systems are evident—for ex­
ample, one could easily construct a classification scheme based on 
the character of the methodology employed—one based upon the 
purpose behind the research effort seems to be most useful for this 
statement of perspective. At least three distinct purposes for tax 
research come immediately to mind: implementation of rules, policy 
determination, and advancement of knowledge.
Research for Implementation of Rules
Much tax research is undertaken to determine the applicability 
of general tax laws to specific fact situations. After a tax law is 
enacted, implementation of the law is the responsibility of the tax­
payer. Although we have what purports to be a self-assessment tax 
system in this country, both tax rules and business practices have 
become so complex that many taxpayers seek the assistance of 
specially trained individuals to assure not only their compliance with 
the tax rules, but also their achievement of that compliance at mini­
mal tax cost.
Five elementary steps constitute a total research effort: (1) estab­
lishing the facts, (2) from the facts, determining the question, (3) 
searching for an authoritative solution to that question, (4) deter­
mining the import of the frequently incomplete and sometimes con­
flicting tax authorities located, and (5) communicating the conclu­
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sion to the interested party. Although a thorough examination of 
what each of these five steps involves must be deferred to later 
chapters, we can briefly describe each step at this juncture.
Establishing the Facts. Most tax laws and related administrative 
regulations are necessarily written in general terms. Effective rules 
must be stated in terms that adequately describe the vast majority 
of factual circumstances envisioned by those who determine the 
rules. Rules stated too broadly invite conflicting interpretation; 
those stated too narrowly often fail to achieve their intended objec­
tive. However, no matter how carefully the words of a statute are 
selected, general rules cannot possibly describe every conceivable 
factual variation that might be subject to the intended rules. Con­
sequently, the first step in implementation-oriented research neces­
sarily involves the process of obtaining all of the facts so that the 
researcher can determine which tax rule or rules might apply to 
those particular events.
Determining the Questions. Questions arise when specific fact 
situations are examined in light of general rules or laws. Complex 
tax questions frequently evolve through several stages of develop­
ment. Based on his prior knowledge of tax rules, a researcher usu­
ally can state the pertinent questions in terms of very general rules. 
For example, he may ask whether the facts necessitate the recog­
nition of gross income by the taxpayer. Or he may ask whether the 
facts permit the taxpayer to claim a deduction in his determination 
of taxable income. Or he may ask whether a gain should be reported 
as ordinary income or as capital gain. After making an initial search 
of the authorities to answer his general question, the researcher 
often discovers that he must answer one or more specific technical 
questions of interpretation before he can answer his general ques­
tion. These secondary questions frequently involve the need to de­
termine the exact meaning of certain words and/or phrases as they 
are used in particular tax rules. For example, the tax researcher 
may have to determine if the fact situation he has under considera­
tion is “ordinary,” “necessary,” or “reasonable” as those words are 
used in various sections of the code. Alternatively he may have to 
determine the meaning of the word “primarily” or, perhaps, the 
meaning of the phrase “trade or business.” Once he has restated his
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general question in this more specific way, the researcher often 
must return briefly to the process of collecting more facts. From his 
study of the authorities, he learns that facts he initially did not con­
sider important may be critical to the resolution of his now revised 
question. After obtaining all necessary facts and resolving the more 
technical questions, the tax researcher may discover that he has 
also resolved his general question. If, however, the answer to his 
general question is negative, he very often must seek an answer to 
a related question before he can proceed to a conclusion. For ex­
ample, even if the tax researcher determines that a particular ex­
penditure is not tax deductible, he may have to determine whether 
or not the expenditure can be capitalized ( that is, added to the tax 
basis of an asset) or whether it must simply be ignored in the tax 
determination procedure.2 In effect, raising collateral questions re­
turns the researcher to the beginning of the second step in the re­
search process. This procedure continues until all pertinent ques­
tions have been satisfactorily answered.
Searching for Authority. Authority in tax matters is legion. It 
nearly always begins with the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as 
amended, but it quickly expands to include Treasury regulations, 
judicial decisions, administrative pronouncements, and sometimes, 
congressional committee reports. Judicial decisions in federal tax 
disputes are rendered by U.S. district courts, the Tax Court, the 
Court of Claims, the several circuit courts of appeals, and the Su­
preme Court. Administrative pronouncements are issued as revenue 
rulings, revenue procedures, technical information releases, and 
general counsel memoranda. Reports of the House Ways and Means 
Committee, the Senate Finance Committee, and the Joint Commit­
tee may be pertinent to the resolution of a tax question. Obviously 
the task of locating all of the potential authority before reaching a 
conclusion can be a very demanding and time-consuming task. As 
previously explained, the search for authority often raises additional 
questions that can only be answered after the determination of ad­
ditional facts. Thus the research process often moves back from
2 In a tax-planning situation, of course, the tax adviser may recommend an 
alternative way of structuring the transaction so as to achieve the most desir­
able tax result.
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step three to step one before it proceeds to a resolution of the gen­
eral question.
Resolving the Question. After locating, reading, and interpreting 
all of the pertinent authority, a tax adviser must be prepared to 
resolve the many questions he has raised. His client (the taxpayer) 
must make the final decision on what course of action to take, but, 
in most circumstances, the taxpayer’s decision is guided by and 
even dependent upon the conclusions reached by the adviser. The 
taxpayer looks to his adviser for guidance. Even when working 
with questions to which there appear to be no ready answers, a tax 
adviser must be prepared to say to his client, “If I were you, I 
would do this.” Thus a tax adviser really must resolve the questions 
to his own satisfaction before he can recommend action to anyone 
else.
Communicating the Conclusion. Having thoroughly researched 
the tax problem and having reached a conclusion, a tax adviser 
must communicate all pertinent factors to the interested parties. 
Drafting tax communications is unusually difficult. Very often, 
highly technical questions must be phrased in layman’s language. 
Positions sometimes must be carefully hedged without omitting or 
misstating any critical fact or any applicable rule. At the same time, 
a tax adviser must take sufficient care to protect his own rights and 
professional integrity. These considerations sometimes are conflict­
ing constraints in drafting an appropriate communication; therefore, 
great care must be exercised in this final step of the implementation- 
oriented research procedure.
The arrangement of the material in this tax study follows the se­
quence of steps suggested above. That is, chapter 2 is concerned 
with the search for facts; chapter 3 is a discussion of the process 
by which a tax researcher prepares his statement of the pertinent 
questions. Chapter 4 explains how a researcher can systematically 
go about locating possible authority; chapter 5 suggests what he 
might do if the authority he finds is incomplete or conflicting. Chap­
ter 6 describes the many factors that must be considered in draft­
ing the communication that will convey the results of the research 
effort to the concerned persons. Finally, chapters 7 and 8 each give 
a detailed example of this tax research process under two different
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circumstances: chapter 7 illustrates the research process in a com­
pliance setting, chapter 8, in a planning situation.
Research for Policy Determination
Our tax laws are enacted by Congress to produce federal revenues 
and to achieve designated economic and social objectives. For ex­
ample, the general objectives of the investment credit and the rapid 
depreciation provisions include stimulating investment spending 
and economic growth. The domestic international sales corporation 
provisions are intended to stimulate foreign sales of domestically 
produced goods and thus to aid in the solution of U.S. balance of 
payments (currency) problems. These and many other tax provi­
sions should be investigated thoroughly to determine whether they 
are efficiently achieving the intended objectives. The research meth­
odology common to such investigations draws heavily from the 
discipline of economics. Econometric models must be constructed 
and much data obtained to formulate tax policy.
Similarly, our government representatives should have factual in­
formation about voter preferences. They should know, for example, 
whether a majority of the voters prefer to deal with problems of 
pollution through fines and penalty taxes, through incentive pro­
visions in the tax laws, or through wholly non-tax legislation. Simi­
larly, those who enact laws should know how the voters feel about 
funding public medical care, employee retirement programs, mass 
transit systems, interstate highways, and a host of other govern­
ment projects. The research methodology common to determining 
voter preferences draws heavily on survey techniques best under­
stood by sociologists, demographers, and other social scientists.
Every change in tax law has a direct impact on the federal budget 
and on monetary policies, the magnitude and direction of which 
should be determined as accurately as possible before the law is 
finalized. Operations research techniques and computer technology 
are most useful in making such determinations. Some of the research 
techniques used to make these predictions are similar to those used 
by the econometrician in building models that tell us whether or 
not a law can achieve its intended objectives; in other ways the 
techniques utilized are quite different. The point is simply that, even 
within the confines of the work which must be undertaken to pro­
vide tax policy prescriptions, the procedures that must be utilized
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to make those determinations vary substantially. Yet all of these 
diverse procedures are commonly referred to as tax research.
Research for Advancement of Knowledge
Another purpose for undertaking tax research is the advancement 
of knowledge in general. Research undertaken to determine a pref­
erable tax policy, as well as that undertaken to implement tax rules, 
has a pragmatic objective. The researcher in each instance has a 
very practical reason for wanting to know the answer he seeks. Some 
research, on the other hand, is undertaken solely for the purpose 
of disseminating general knowledge. There is, however, no single 
common methodology for such research. Rather, the methodology 
selected depends entirely upon the nature of the investigation being 
undertaken. If it involves economic predictions, economic modeling 
is necessary. If it involves taxpayer attitudes and/or preferences, 
surveys based on carefully selected statistical samples are equally 
mandatory. And if it involves compliance consideration, a studied 
opinion of pertinent authority is just as essential.
Tax practitioners, as well as academicians, government employ­
ees, and foundation personnel, often engage in tax research work 
intended solely for the advancement of knowledge. The results are 
published in journals and presented in proceedings that appeal to 
two fundamentally different audiences. Policy-oriented journals and 
proceedings primarily attract persons who are economists by edu­
cation and training. Implementation-oriented journals and proceed­
ings primarily attract those who are either accountants or lawyers 
by education and training. Academicians are found in both camps.
Examples of Tax Research
Chapter 7 is an example of implementation-oriented tax research. 
The objective of chapter 7 is simply to illustrate how a tax re­
searcher might determine the “correct” tax treatment of the act of 
incorporating a sole proprietorship under stated fact conditions. 
Chapter 8 demonstrates how tax planning can be utilized to mini­
mize the tax dangers and maximize the tax opportunities implicit in 
a different fact setting. Before we turn all of our attention to the 
details of this form of research in subsequent chapters, however, let 
us pause very briefly to note a few examples of policy-oriented tax
8
research. Some knowledge of this literature should be helpful to 
any certified public accountant undertaking a policy-oriented re­
search project. Although individual CPA firms tend to do little of 
this work, a few accountants may be in for a new adventure be­
cause of the expansion of the AICPA’s role in tax policy, approved 
by the executive committee in the fall of 1969. Several task forces 
have been appointed and research begun. The first Statement of 
Tax Policy was issued by the AICPA in 1974.3
A relatively recent example of a policy-oriented tax study is the 
report of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
entitled Financing Schools and Property Tax Relief—A State Respon­
sibility.4 Their report is an interesting compilation of statistical data, 
position papers, and a survey of taxpayer attitudes. It demonstrates 
well the multidimensional quality common to most tax policy issues.
An example of a more theoretical study is found in the recent 
work of Joseph Pechman and Benjamin Okner entitled Who Bears 
the Tax Burden?5 This effort is one of a long and distinguished se­
ries of studies in government finance. It attempts to determine the 
distribution of all taxes combined by income classes. It demonstrates 
nicely the complexity of tax policy studies by presenting its results 
under eight different assumptions of tax incidence. Further, the 
authors do not express a preference for any one result, in recogni­
tion of the fact that no conclusive empirical evidence has been 
found which would justify making a single selection.
A third example of policy-oriented research can be found in 
Stanley Surrey’s recent book, Pathways to Tax Reform, which intro­
duces the notion of a “tax expenditures” budget.6 In it the author 
attempts to demonstrate, in terms of lost revenues, the cost of many
3See Taxation of Capital Gains (New York: American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, 1974), 28 pages. Further policy statements by the AICPA 
are expected in the areas of estate and gift tax reform and the value-added 
tax, in the near future.
4The 261-page report (No. A-40, January 1973) is available from the Ad­
visory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Washington, D.C. 20575, 
for $2.50.
5 This 119-page booklet, published in 1974, is available from The Brookings 
Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20036, for $2.50 
in paperback and $5.95 in clothbound editions.
6Stanley S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1973).
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exemption, exclusion, and deduction provisions in the income tax 
law. Based on these estimates, the author points to what he sees 
as the preferred route to tax reform.
A thorough review of an important segment of tax research was 
made by Carl Shoup in “Quantitative Research in Taxation and 
Government Expenditure.”7 In this work, Shoup appraises the need 
for further quantitative research and suggests outlets for such work. 
Literally hundreds of other excellent examples of tax research could 
be cited here, although to do so would lead far afield from the ob­
jectives of this study.
In summary, the phrase tax research is commonly used to refer 
to widely divergent processes. All are legitimate, socially produc­
tive endeavors that may be included in a definition of tax research. 
A broad outline of the different processes are mentioned in this per­
spectives chapter for two reasons: first, to give the reader some 
idea of what is and what is not to be described in the study and 
second, to suggest to accountants and others, who by their own 
inclination are implementation-oriented, the kinds of efforts that 
should be included in policy-oriented projects they might under­
take.
In closing this chapter, the authors join many others who have 
called for a broader participation of tax-interested persons in the 
determination of tax policy. In the past, the tax research efforts of 
theoreticians have all too often wholly ignored all practical conse­
quences, including the behavioral adaptation of those most directly 
affected by their recommendations. On the other hand, the policy 
prescriptions rendered by the implementation-oriented groups have 
often overlooked important empirical evidence accumulated in the 
more theoretical studies. Stanley Surrey, a Harvard law professor 
interested in taxation and a former assistant secretary of the treas­
ury for tax policy, made these observations in 1966:
We must be aware that the apparent certitude offered by the mass 
of numbers computers can generate or the conclusions that the 
ranks of econometric equations can produce do not lull us into a 
false security. There is still room, as the computer technology de­
velops, for a constructive two-way dialogue between the computer
7Shoup’s paper was published as “Public Expenditures and Taxation” (Col­
loquium IV), (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1972), 
16 pages.
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technologists and those whose insights come from experience and 
accumulated wisdom. Working together they can offer great hope 
and promise for an improved tax system capable of fully bearing 
its share of responsibility for achieving the Great Society we are 
seeking.8
An important first step in this hoped-for working together is the 
acquaintance of each with the aims and the methodologies of the 
other. This volume should help to describe the tax research method­
ology commonly utilized by the more implementation-oriented 
group.
8 Stanley S. Surrey, “Computer Technology and Federal Tax Policy,” Na­
tional Tax Journal, September 1966, pp. 257-58.
11
2
The Moving Finger writes; and having writ,
Moves on; nor all your Piety nor Wit 
Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line,
Nor all your Tears wash out a Word of it.
OMAR KHAYYAM
The Critical Role of Facts
A tax result is dependent upon three variables: facts, applicable 
law, and an administrative (and occasionally judicial) process. An 
accountant not trained in the practice of law is apt to underestimate 
the significance of facts to the resolution of a tax question. Most lay­
man’s study of law, including an accountant’s study of business law, 
tends to concentrate on general rules. For the accountant turned tax 
adviser, however, general rules will not suffice. It is essential that 
every tax adviser understand why a thorough knowledge of all the 
facts is critical to the resolution of any tax question.
The Importance of Facts to Tax Questions
As used here, the word fact means an actual occurrence or an 
event, a thing having real existence; facts are the who, what, when, 
why, where, and how of daily existence. From the facts, questions 
arise. A tax adviser must be able to distinguish a conclusion from 
a fact. For example, a statement that an individual is married really 
is a conclusion rather than a fact. The facts that support such a con­
clusion may include such real-world events as these:
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• On June 9, 1956, that person appeared with a member of the 
opposite sex before a third person duly authorized to perform mar­
riages.
• That person exchanged certain oral vows with the specified 
member of the opposite sex.
• The person authorized to perform marriages made certain dec­
laratory statements to those persons present.
• The exchange of vows and the declaratory statements were 
made in the presence of a designated number of witnesses.
• Certain documents were signed by designated parties to this 
ceremony and those documents were filed in a specified repository.
• No events which might change this relationship have subse­
quently transpired.
Change any one of the above facts and the conclusion—that is, that 
a person is married—may no longer be valid. A statement of perti­
nent facts is virtually always much longer and clumsier than is a 
simple statement of the conclusion drawn from them. Consequently 
most of the time we tend to converse in words, sentences, and 
thoughts based on conclusions rather than on elementary facts.
In tax work it often is necessary to pursue facts at length to be 
certain of the validity of a particular tax conclusion. To continue the 
foregoing illustration, a person cannot file a “joint income tax re­
turn” unless he or she is married. Obviously, most people know if 
they are married or not, and most tax advisers accept their client’s 
word on this important conclusion. If, in the course of a conversa­
tion or in an investigation related to the preparation of a tax return, 
it becomes apparent that there is reason to doubt the validity of the 
client’s conclusion, then a full-scale investigation of all of the facts 
is necessary. For example, a client may state that he has recently 
gotten a divorce. This simple statement should be sufficient to cause 
an alert tax adviser to make further investigations, because a per­
son may be deemed to be married for tax purposes even after he 
believes that he once again is single. By the same token, the tax ad­
viser must know that persons who never in their life have exchanged 
marriage vows may be deemed to be married for tax and other pur­
poses by virtue of their actions (that is, by virtue of “the facts”) 
and the  law of the state in which they reside. The tax adviser also 
knows that persons married to nonresident aliens are not eligible to 
file joint income tax returns even though they are obviously married.
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One of the things that makes tax work both difficult and risky is 
the fact that the taxpayer often does not understand the significance 
of the pertinent facts, and a tax adviser often cannot take the time to 
determine each of these facts or to investigate their significance if 
he is to perform his consultative role without charging an exorbi­
tant fee. When the tax adviser is alerted to the possibility that a 
further investigation of the facts may lead to a significantly different 
conclusion in a tax determination, however, it is his professional 
obligation to investigate those facts in sufficient depth to permit a 
correct determination of their tax import. In situations involving 
aspects of the law beyond the confines of taxation—as in the mar­
riage example—the accountant will find it necessary for his client to 
obtain a related legal opinion from a qualified attorney before he 
can proceed with his client’s tax problem.
No one engaged in tax practice should ever underestimate the 
importance of factual detail. Virtually every authoritative reference 
on tax practice stresses this important conclusion. Bickford says, 
“It would be impossible . . .  to overemphasize the importance of 
knowing all the facts of a case, down to the last detail, figure and 
date.”1 Freeman and Freeman put it this way: “Facts determine the 
law. Law is really facts. Shape the facts and you have planned the 
law. Facts have to be found. Be a detective. Find not some of the 
facts but all of the facts.”1 2 Implied in the latter quotation is the im­
portant distinction between events that have already taken place 
and those that are yet to occur. Tax planning is based on this criti­
cal distinction.
Facts— Established and Anticipated
Taxpayer compliance and tax planning constitute two major por­
tions of any successful tax adviser’s work. The initial and critical dif­
ference between these two phases of tax practice is simply a differ­
ence in the state of the facts. In compliance work, all of the facts 
have already transpired and the tax adviser’s only task—assuming 
that he already knows what the facts are—is the determination of
1 Hugh C. Bickford, Successful Tax Practice, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 14.
2Harrop A. Freeman and Norman D. Freeman, The Tax Practice Deskbook 
(Boston: Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 1973), p. 2-1.
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the tax result implicit in those facts. In planning work, the tax ad­
viser researches alternative ways of achieving established goals and 
recommends to his client those actions that will—considering all 
operational constraints, personal and financial objectives, and per­
sonal and business history—minimize the resulting tax liability. In 
other words, the tax planner must determine an optimal set of facts 
from the standpoint of tax results, given certain personal and finan­
cial constraints. The operational procedures applied in these two 
phases of tax practice are quite different.
After-the-Facts Compliance
The first step in taxpayer compliance work is a determination of 
the facts that have already taken place. The procedures used to de­
termine facts differ significantly depending upon the relationship 
existing between the tax adviser and the taxpayer. The less personal 
the relationship, the greater the amount of time that must be de­
voted to a discovery of facts. In most instances, the fact discovery 
process can be divided into at least four distinct steps: initial in­
quiry, independent investigation, additional inquiry, and substanti­
ation.
Initial Inquiry. At one extreme, the tax adviser will not have 
known the taxpayer prior to the request for services. In that event, 
if the initial request is for tax return preparation services, it is com­
mon for the tax adviser to complete a predetermined checklist of 
facts during (or immediately following) an initial interview. Many 
firms have devised their own forms to facilitate this information 
gathering process; others utilize standard forms prepared by tax 
return computer services or other agencies. If the initial request is 
for assistance in an administrative proceeding, a less structured in­
terview is typically used. In every instance the objective of the in­
quiry is the same: To establish all of the facts essential to an accu­
rate determination of the tax liability.
Tax advisers who are intimately familiar with their client’s affairs 
often are able to extract sufficient factual information from existing 
files and personal knowledge to allow them to avoid extended per­
sonal contact with the taxpayer while making an investigation com­
parable to the initial inquiry. For example, the certified public ac­
countant who regularly maintains and/or audits all of a client’s fi­
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nancial records will require only minimal additional contact with 
the client to establish the information necessary to determine the 
correct tax liability.
Independent Investigation. Regardless of the extent of personal 
contact involved in the initial inquiry, all but the simplest taxpayer 
compliance engagements require some independent investigation on 
the part of the tax adviser. The specific reason for undertaking such 
an independent investigation varies from one situation to another, 
but all stem from the need for additional facts to determine a tax 
result. Sometimes the impetus for getting more facts comes from 
something the client said; at other times, from what he did not say. 
At still other times, the need for further facts becomes apparent 
when the tax adviser begins to examine the client’s financial records. 
For example, a canceled check made payable to an unknown Dr. 
Jones may or may not be tax deductible. The return preparer must 
determine what kind of doctor Jones is and what service was ren­
dered to the taxpayer before he can determine whether or not the 
payment can be deducted.
Whatever the cause, the tax adviser frequently engages in what 
might be described as detective work to determine necessary facts. 
An independent investigation may involve a detailed review of fi­
nancial records, old files, correspondence, corporate minutes, sales 
agreements, bank statements, and so forth; it may involve interviews 
with friends, family, employees, business associates, or others; and, 
in some cases, that search may extend to reviews of general business 
conditions and practices. Because of the relatively high cost of some 
investigations, it is common to defer incurring those costs until such 
time as they are absolutely necessary. Usually this means deferring 
them from the time of the initial act of taxpayer compliance to the 
time of a dispute, that is, from the time of filing the tax return to the 
time at which the Internal Revenue Service challenges a tax conclu­
sion previously reported by the taxpayer on the basis of rather tenu­
ous facts. Because less than 3 percent of all tax returns filed are 
challenged in an average year, the reason for delaying a costly in- 
depth investigation is obvious. Nevertheless, the competent tax ad­
viser should always be alert for situations that are apt to require 
further investigation later. Often it is easier and cheaper to ob­
tain facts and to assemble related evidence at the time events trans­
pire than it is to construct them at a later date; occasionally facts may
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become impossible to determine if too much time has elapsed be­
tween the events and the inquiry. A tax adviser’s services are often 
more efficient and less costly if the client himself collects much of 
the necessary evidence to support the facts. Again, the probability 
of the client’s doing this successfully is much greater if facts relate 
to recent events. Deferring an investigation of pertinent facts nearly 
always increases the costs. The trade-off is clear: Incur a smaller 
cost now at the risk of its being unnecessary, or incur greater cost 
later in the unlikely event that it is needed.
Additional Inquiry. Even in those situations in which an in-depth 
investigation of the facts has been completed, the tax adviser fre­
quently will need to make further factual inquiries after he begins 
his search of the law. A search for the tax law applicable to a given 
set of facts often uncovers the need for information not originally 
deemed relevant by the taxpayer or the tax adviser. By reading 
revenue rulings and judicial decisions in situations similar to that of 
his client, the adviser may become aware of fact considerations he 
or his client originally failed to consider. Being alerted to their pos­
sible importance, the tax adviser must return to the fact determina­
tion process once again. In highly complex situations, this process 
of moving between fact finding and law determination may repeat 
itself several times before the tax question is finally resolved.
Substantiation of Facts. Determining what the facts are and prov­
ing those facts are two entirely different things. The nature and 
quality of proof required varies significantly depending upon who is 
receiving proof. In tax matters, the person who must be convinced 
of the authenticity of the facts can be anyone from an Internal Rev­
enue Service agent to a Supreme Court justice. The methods used 
to substantiate facts vary tremendously. Generally, fact substanti­
ation procedures are much less formal in dealings with an admin­
istrative agency such as the IRS than in dealings with a court, and 
even within the judicial system, the rules of evidence vary from one 
court to another. Obviously, the closer one moves to formal litiga­
tion the greater the need for the opinion and the assistance of a 
qualified trial attorney. Only such a professional can adequately 
assess the hazards of the litigation procedure, including the rules of 
evidence and the burden-of-proof problems.
The certified public accountant engaged in tax practice should 
not lose sight of the fact that the vast majority of all tax disputes 
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are settled at the administrative level.3 Therefore it is necessary for 
him to be fully prepared to determine, present, and substantiate all 
of the facts critical to the resolution of a tax dispute in any admin­
istrative proceeding. In doing this, the CPA must exercise due cau­
tion to avoid stipulation of any fact that might prove to be detri­
mental to his client in the unlikely event that the dispute should 
move beyond administrative hearings and into the courts. Because 
of this ever-present danger, the CPA should consult with a trial at­
torney at the first sign of significant litigation potential.
Before-the-Facts Planning
If events have not yet transpired, the facts have not yet been es­
tablished and there is opportunity to plan anticipated facts care­
fully. As noted earlier, tax planning is nothing more than determin­
ing an optimal set of facts from the standpoint of tax results. The 
procedures followed in making such a determination differ signifi­
cantly from the procedures utilized in taxpayer compliance work.
Determination of the Preferred Alternative. The first step in the 
determination of the tax-preferred alternative involves a client inter­
view. In this instance, however, the purpose of the interview is not 
to determine exactly what has happened in the past but, rather, to 
determine (1) the future economic objectives of the client and (2) 
any operative constraints in achieving those objectives. If he is to 
perform his task successfully, the tax planner must be privy to all 
of his client’s hopes, dreams, ambitions, and prejudices, his present 
circumstances, and his history. That kind of information can seldom 
be obtained in a single interview. Ideally, it is derived through a 
long, open, and trusting relationship between client and tax adviser. 
When tax planning is based on such an on-going relationship, any 
particular client interview may be brief and directly to the point. 
Even relatively major plans can sometimes be developed, at least 
initially, with no more than a simple telephone conversation.
When the tax adviser fully understands his client’s objectives and 
constraints, he should spend a considerable amount of time simply 
thinking about alternative ways of achieving the objectives speci­
fied by the client before beginning his research. Generally there are
3 Government publications fail to provide precise data on the percentage of 
settlements at different levels. However, according to the 1973 Annual Re­
port of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, approximately 99 percent of 
all proposed adjustments are settled outside the courtroom.
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diverse ways to achieve a single goal; failure to spend enough time 
and effort in creative thinking about that goal usually results in tak­
ing the most obvious route to the solution. In many instances the 
most obvious route is not the preferred alternative. A vivid imagi­
nation and creative ability have their greatest payoff in this “think­
ing step.”
Although in all probability no one can do much to increase his 
native imagination or creative ability, many people simply do not 
take advantage of that which they already possess. By far the most 
common cause of unimaginative tax planning is the failure of the 
adviser to spend sufficient time thinking about alternative ways to 
achieve a client’s objectives. A common tendency is to rush far too 
quickly from the initial inquiry to a search of the law for an an­
swer. By rushing to a solution, we very often completely overlook 
the preferred alternative.
An example of creative imagination appears in John J. Sexton, 
42 TC 1094 (1964), where the taxpayer successfully defended his 
right to depreciate a hole in the ground. The facts of the case are 
both interesting and instructive. The taxpayer was an operator of 
refuse dumps. He acquired land with major excavations primarily 
to use in his dumping business, and he allocated a substantial por­
tion of his purchase price of the land to the holes. As the holes were 
filled, he depreciated the value so allocated. Because the taxpayer 
carefully documented all the pertinent facts in his case, the court 
allowed his deduction. Many less imaginative persons might have 
totally overlooked this major tax advantage simply because it is un­
usual and because they did not spend enough time just thinking 
about the facts of the case.
After a tax adviser has determined a client’s objectives, and after 
he has thought about alternative ways of achieving those objectives, 
he should systematically go about researching the tax rules and 
calculating the tax result of each viable alternative. The preparation 
of a “decision tree” often is very helpful in determining which of 
several alternatives is the tax-preferred one (see chapter 8, page 
217). It forces the adviser to think through each alternative care­
fully, and it demonstrates vividly the dollar significance of the tax 
savings in the preferred set of facts. Obviously, however, it is up to 
the client to implement the plan successfully.
Substantiation of Subsequent Events. The client and the tax 
adviser, working together, must take every precaution to accumu­
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late and preserve sufficient documentation of the facts to support 
the tax plan selected. In relatively extreme circumstances, a court 
will not hesitate to apply any one of several judicial doctrines— 
most notably the doctrine of substance-over-form—to find that an 
overly ambitious tax plan is not a valid interpretation of the law. 
If, however, the tax adviser exercises reasonable caution against 
plans that lack substance, and if he takes sufficient care to docu­
ment each step of the plans, the chance of succeeding is consider­
ably improved. Of course, the process of substantiating carefully 
selected facts is primarily the responsibility of the taxpayer. The 
tax adviser, however, should supervise the process of implementa­
tion to make certain that the intended events actually transpire in 
the sequence intended, and that the proof of these events will be 
available when and if it is needed.
Some Common Fact Questions
Most tax disputes involve questions of fact, not questions of law. 
In working with fact questions, a tax adviser’s job is to assemble, 
clarify, and present the facts in such a way that any reasonable 
person would conclude that they conform to the requirements out­
lined in the tax law. Demonstrating that degree of fact clarity is 
often next to impossible. Some fact questions are necessarily much 
more involved and difficult to prove than others. Following are brief 
examples of common but difficult questions of fact.
Fair Market Value. The determination of the fair market value 
of a property is probably the most commonly encountered fact ques­
tion in all of taxation. It arises in connection with income, estate, 
and gift taxes. The applicable law common to many of these situ­
ations is relatively simple if we could but determine the fair market 
value of the properties involved. For example, Section 61 of the 
code provides that “. . . gross income means all income from what­
ever source derived,” and Treasury Regulations Section 1.61-2(d) ( 1) 
goes on to state that . . the fair m arket value of the property  or 
services taken in payment (for services rendered) must be included 
in income.” Generally, the application of this law is simple enough 
once the valuation question is settled.
The legal definition of fair market value stated concisely in Estate 
Tax Regulations Section 20.2031-1(b) follows.
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The fair market value is the price at which the property would 
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither 
being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having 
reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts.
Fact problems are involved in making that brief definition opera­
tional. What is a willing buyer? A willing seller? A compulsion to 
buy? A compulsion to sell? Reasonable knowledge? A relevant fact? 
Only in the case of comparatively small blocks of listed securities 
and in the case of selected commodities do we have access to an 
organized market which will supply us with ready answers to those 
questions. In all other instances we must look to all of the surround­
ing facts and circumstances to find an answer.
Books have been written in attempts to delineate the fact circum­
stances which must be considered in determining fair market value. 
Unfortunately, even a cursory review of those books must remain 
outside the scope of this tax study.4 Suffice it to observe here that 
valuation is a fact question and that, ordinarily, the party to any 
tax valuation dispute who does the best job of determining, clari­
fying, and presenting all of the pertinent facts is the party who wins 
that dispute.
Reasonable Salaries. The fact determination of what constitutes a 
reasonable salary has long been a troublesome tax problem. With 
the recent introduction of the maximum tax on earned income, this 
question promises to become of even more critical significance in 
the immediate future.5 Once again, in many cases the applicable 
law is relatively simple if we could but determine what is reasonable 
within a particular fact setting.
In determining reasonableness, the Internal Revenue Service agent 
and the judge often look, for comparison, to such obvious facts as 
salaries paid to other employees performing similar tasks for other
4See G. D. McCarthy and R. E. Healy, Valuing a Company (New York: 
Ronald Press, 1971) and J. R. Krahmer and T. D. Henderer, Valuation of 
Shares of Closely Held Corporations, 221 Tax Management Portfolio, 1973.
5 The increase in the effective marginal tax rate to 48 percent on owner-man­
aged corporations, previously conducted in multiple corporate entities, should 
serve to encourage the owner-managers to distribute a larger proportion of 
the corporate income in the form of salaries, paid to the owner-managers, 
because there is very little extra tax cost associated with such a distribution 
and it provides the owner with a maximum degree of financial flexibility.
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employers, any unique attributes of a particular employee, the em­
ployee’s education, the availability of other persons with similar 
skills, and prior compensation paid to the employee. In addition, tax 
authorities trying to determine the reasonableness of salaries also 
look to the dividend history of the employer corporation, the rela­
tion between salaries and equity ownership, the time and method 
of making the compensation decision, the state of the economy, and 
many other facts. Again, we cannot examine here all of the detailed 
facts which have been important to reasonable salary decisions in 
the past.6 We need only observe that the question of reasonableness 
is a fact question. The taxpayer who marshals all of the pertinent 
facts and presents them in a favorable light stands a better chance 
of winning an IRS challenge of unreasonable salaries than does the 
taxpayer who ignores any one or more critical facts. The best reason 
for carefully studying regulations, rulings, and cases in such a cir­
cumstance is to make certain not to overlook the opportunity to 
determine and prove a fact that could be important to the desired 
conclusion.
Casualty and Theft Losses. Noncorporate taxpayers frequently 
lose their right to claim a casualty or theft loss deduction for in­
come tax purposes because they did not take sufficient care to estab­
lish the facts surrounding that loss. The law authorizes a tax deduc­
tion for losses sustained on property held for personal use only if 
such property is damaged or destroyed by a casualty or theft. Thus, 
the loss sustained because of the disappearance of a diamond ring 
will not give rise to a tax deduction unless the taxpayer can prove 
that the disappearance is attributable to a casualty or theft, rather 
than to carelessness on the part of the owner. If the taxpayer has 
photographs, newspaper accounts, police reports, testimony of im­
partial persons, and/or other evidence that a casualty or theft has 
occurred, he will have relatively little trouble in convincing a skep­
tical Internal Revenue agent or a judge of his right to that deduc-
6 See C. C. Halsey and M. E. Peloubet, Federal Taxation and Unreasonable 
Compensation (New York: Ronald Press, 1964) for an excellent survey of 
nearly 200 cases on this topic. See also H. Steutzer, Jr., “Reasonable Compen­
sation,” New York University Twenty-Fifth Annual Institute on Federal Taxa­
tion (New York: N.Y.U., 1967), pp. 49-508; E. L. Kellett, “Reasonableness of 
Compensation Paid to Officers or Employees, so as to Warrant Reduction 
Thereof in Computing Employer’s Income Tax,” 10 ALR 3d 125 (1966).
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tion. It is the facts that count, and the taxpayer generally has the 
burden of proving the facts in a tax dispute.
Gifts. Section 102 provides that receipt of a gift does not consti­
tute taxable income. In many situations, however, it is difficult to 
determine whether a particular property transfer really is a gift or 
compensation for either a past or a contemplated future event. 
Once again it is the facts surrounding the transfer that will control 
that determination. Facts that demonstrate the intent of the trans­
feror to make a gratuitous transfer—that is, one without any expec­
tation of something in return—are necessary to the determination 
that the transfer was a gift. Relationships existing between the 
transferor and the transferee may be important; for example, it gen­
erally will be easier to establish the fact that a gift was made if the 
two involved persons are closely related individuals (for example, 
father and son). On the other hand, if the two are related in an 
employer-employee relationship, it will be especially difficult to 
establish the presence of a gift. Although the broad outline of many 
other abstract but common fact questions could be noted here, let 
us consider in somewhat greater detail a few examples of some real- 
world tax disputes that were based on fact questions.
Illustrative Fact Cases
In an attempt to better illustrate the critical role of facts in the 
resolution of tax questions, an examination of four previously liti­
gated tax cases follow. The four cases can be divided into two sets 
of two cases each. One set deals with the question of distinguishing 
between a gift and income for services rendered; the other set deals 
with the propriety of deducting payments made by a taxpayer to his 
parent. None of the four cases is particularly important in its own 
right, but together they serve to illustrate several important conclu­
sions common to tax research and fact questions. The court deci­
sions in these cases are relatively brief, and the facts involved are 
easy to comprehend.
Gift or Income?
Both the 1939 and 1954 Internal Revenue Codes include a rule 
providing that gifts do not constitute an element of taxable income. 
The present rule is stated in Section 102 of the 1954 code as fol­
lows: “(a) General Rule.—Gross income does not include the value
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of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance.” The 
first two cases to be examined consist largely of a judicial review 
of the facts necessary to determine whether or not particular trans­
fers or property constitute gifts or taxable income for services 
rendered.
The first case involves a taxpayer named Margaret D. Brizendine 
and her husband, Everett. The case was heard by the Tax Court in 
1957 and the decision, rendered by Judge Rice, reads in part as 
follows.
Everett W. Brizendine,
Findings of Fact
Petitioners were married in 1945 and throughout the years in issue 
were husband and wife and residents of Roanoke, Virginia. They 
filed no returns for the years 1945 through 1949, inclusive, but did 
file returns for 1950 and 1951 with the former collector of internal 
revenue in Richmond.
Prior to the years in issue, petitioner, Margaret D. Brizendine, was 
convicted and fined on five separate occasions for operating a house 
of prostitution, or for working in such a house. Petitioner, Everett 
W. Brizendine, prior to the years in issue, had served a term in the 
penitentiary. During the years in issue, he was convicted and fined 
seven times for violation of the Roanoke City Gambling Code, for 
operating a gambling house, and for disorderly conduct.
Prior to the years in issue, petitioner Margaret D. Brizendine, met 
an individual in a Roanoke, Virginia, restaurant with whom she be­
came friendly. The individual promised her that if she would dis­
continue her activities as a prostitute he would buy her a home and 
provide for her support. In 1945, the individual paid Margaret 
$2,000 with which sum she made the down payment on a house; he 
also arranged for her to secure a loan to pay the balance of the 
purchase price. From 1945 and until the time of his death in March 
1950, the individual provided money with which Margaret made 
payments on such loan. In addition, he paid her approximately $25 
per week in cash and also paid her money to provide for utilities, 
insurance, furniture, and clothing. In 1946, he paid her $500 which 
she used to buy a fur coat.
In determining the deficiencies herein, the respondent arrived at 
petitioners’ adjusted gross income by adding annual estimated liv­
ing expenses in the amount of $2,000 to the known expenditures 
made by them. The amounts of adjusted gross income so determined
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were as follows:
1945 ...............................................$4,784.80
1946 ..............................................  3,300.70
1947 ..............................................  2,645.00
1948 ....................................   2,978.62
1949 ..............................................  2,763.37
1950 ..............................................  4,812.82
1951 ..............................................  3,641.57
Petitioners' living expenses did not exceed $1,200 in addition to 
the known personal expenditures made by them during each of the 
years in issue.
Petitioners’ failure to file returns for the years 1945 through 1949 
inclusive, was not due to reasonable cause. The deficiencies in issue 
were due to petitioners’ negligence or intentional disregard of rules 
and regulations. The petitioners’ failure to file declarations of esti­
mated tax was not due to reasonable cause and resulted in an under­
estimate of estimated tax.
Opinion
Petitioners contended that the amount received by Margaret from 
the individual, with which she made a down payment on a house, 
as well as all other amounts received from him until the time of his 
death in 1950, were gifts to her and, therefore, did not constitute 
taxable income. The respondent, while accepting petitioner’s testi­
mony as to the source of the sums, argues that she has not estab­
lished that the amounts received from the individual were really 
gifts. He further points out that Margaret testified that the pay­
ments received from the individual were in consideration of her 
forbearance to refrain from engaging in prostitution, and to grant 
him her companionship, and argues that her promise constituted 
valid consideration for the payments which causes them to be tax­
able as ordinary income.
Both petitioners testified at the hearing in this case. Their demeanor 
on the stand, coupled with their long criminal records, leaves con­
siderable doubt in our mind that the payments from the individual 
to Margaret were the only source of petitioner’s income during the 
years in question, or that such amounts as the individual paid to 
Margaret were gifts. Since petitioners thus failed to establish that 
those amounts were in fact gifts, we conclude that such amounts 
were correctly determined by respondent to be taxable income 
which petitioners received during the years in issue. We further
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think that there is considerable merit to the respondent’s argument 
that Margaret’s promise to the individual to forbear from engaging 
in prostitution, and to grant him her companionship, constituted 
sufficient consideration for the money received from him to make it 
taxable to her.
We think, on the basis of the whole record, that respondent’s es­
timate of personal living expenses in the amount of $2,000 was ex­
cessive. Many of the known expenditures which petitioners made 
during the years in issue were for living expenses, and pursuant to 
our findings we are satisfied that an additional $1,200 adequately 
covers all of their personal living expenses.
The second case involved a taxpayer named Greta Starks. The 
case was heard by the Tax Court in 1966 and the decision, rendered 
by Judge Mulroney, reads in part as follows.
Greta Starks, TC Memo 1966-134
Findings of Fact
Petitioner, who was unmarried during the years in question, lives 
at 16900 Parkside, Detroit, Michigan. She filed no Federal income 
tax returns for the years 1954 through 1958. She was 24 years old in 
1954 and during that year and throughout the years 1955, 1956, 
1957 and 1958 she received from one certain man, amounts of money 
for living expenses, and a house (he gave her the cash to buy it in 
her name), furniture, an automobile, jewelry, fur coats, and other 
clothing. This man was married and about 55 years old in 1954.
Respondent in his notice of deficiency stated that he determined 
that the property and money petitioner received each year consti­
tuted income received by petitioner “for services rendered” and in 
his computation he held her subject to self-employment tax. He ex­
plained his computation of the deficiency for each year by refer­
ence to Exhibit A which was attached to the notice of the defi­
ciency. Page 13 of this Exhibit A is as follows:
Analysis of Living Expenses and Assets Received for Services
Rendered
Year 1954
1955 Oldsmobile automobile $ 3,000.00
Weekly allowance ($150.00 x 20 weeks) 3,000.00
Total $ 6,000.00
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Year 1955
16900 Parkside $22,211.08
Roberts Furs 5,038.00
Saks Fifth Avenue 828.18
Piano and furniture 6,000.00
Weekly allowance ($150.00 x 52 weeks) 7,800.00
Total $41,877.26
Year 1956
Roberts Furs $1,570.00
Saks Fifth Avenue 3,543.17
Miscellaneous household expense 1,500.00
Total $ 6,613.17
Year 1957
Furs by Roberts $ 121.00
Saks Fifth Avenue 1,353.19
Living expenses 4,000.00
Total $ 5,474.19
Year 1958
Furs by Roberts $ 35.00
Saks Fifth Avenue 978.79
Living expenses 4,000.00
Total $ 5,013.79
The money and property received by petitioner during the years 
in question were all gifts from the above described man with whom 
she had a very close personal relationship during all of the years 
here involved.
Opinion
The question in this case is whether the advancements made by 
respondent’s witness were gifts under section 102, Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954, or in some manner payments that would constitute 
taxable income. The question is one of fact.
There were two witnesses in this case. Petitioner took the stand 
and testified she was not gainfully employed during the years here 
involved except for an occasional modeling job in 1954 for which 
her total receipts did not exceed $600. She said she had no occu­
pation and was not engaged in any business or practicing any pro­
fession and had no investments that yielded her income during the
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years in question. She in effect admitted the receipt of the items of 
money and property recited in respondent’s notice of deficiency but 
said they were all gifts made to her by the man she identified as 
sitting in the front row in the courtroom. She testified that this man 
gave her money to defray her living expenses, and about $20,000 
cash to buy the house at 16900 Parkside in 1955. She testified that 
she mortgaged this house for about $9,000 and she and this man 
lived for a time off of the proceeds of this loan. She said that this 
man gave her the furniture, jewelry, and clothing but she never con­
sidered the money and property turned over to her by this man 
as earnings. She said she had during the years in question, love and 
affection for this man and a very personal relationship.
The only other witness in the case was the alleged donor who 
sat in the courtroom during all of petitioner’s testimony. He was 
called to the stand by respondent. He admitted on direct examina­
tion (there was no cross-examination) that he had advanced peti­
tioner funds for the purchase of a house, clothes, fur coat, and fur­
niture for the house. He was asked the purpose of the payments and 
he replied: “To insure the companionship of Greta Starks, more or 
less of a personal investment in the future on my part.” The only 
other portion of his testimony that might be said to have any bear­
ing on whether the advancements were gifts or not is the following:
Q. In advancing Greta Starks monies to purchase the properties 
I previously mentioned, what factors did you take into considera­
tion pertaining to your wish or desire of securing the permanent 
companionship of Greta Starks?
A. The monies were advanced as I considered necessary. The pur­
chase of a house was considered a permanent basis to last ten, 
twenty years not for a short while.
Respondent, of course, asks us to believe the testimony of his wit­
ness for respondent’s counsel stated he was not to be considered a 
hostile witness. The witness was only asked a few questions. He had 
heard all of petitioner’s testimony to the effect that the money, home, 
car, furniture, clothing, etc. were gifts by him to her. It is somewhat 
significant that he was not asked the direct question as to whether 
the advancement of money and property, which he admits he made, 
were gifts by him to her. We have quoted the only two statements 
he made that throw any light at all on the issue of whether the ad­
vancements were gifts or earnings. Such passages in his answers to 
the effect that he was making a “personal investment in the future” 
or the house purchase was “considered a permanent basis” are in-
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comprehensive and rather absurd as statements of purpose. His 
testimony, in so far as it can be understood at all, tends to corrobo­
rate petitioner. He gives as his purpose for making the advancements 
“to insure the companionship” of petitioner. This can well be his 
purpose for making the gifts. It certainly serves no basis for the 
argument advanced by respondent on brief to the effect that her 
“companionship” was a service she rendered in return for the money 
and property she received. Evidently respondent would argue the 
man paid her over $41,000 for her companionship in 1955 and $5,000 
or $6,000 for her companionship in the other years.
We are not called upon to determine the propriety of the rela­
tions that existed between petitioner and her admirer during the five 
years in question. He testified he had not seen her for five or six 
years. Petitioner was married in 1961 and is now living with her 
husband and mother. It is enough to say that all of the circum­
stances and the testimony of petitioner and even of respondent’s 
witness support her statement that she received gifts of money and 
property during the five years in question and no taxable income.
A Comparison of Facts. Even a cursory examination of these two 
Tax Court memorandum decisions reveals that the two cases have 
many facts in common. In both instances a female taxpayer received 
substantial sums of money and other valuable property each year 
for several years, from a specific male person, in exchange for the 
taxpayer’s companionship.
On the other hand, the two decisions also suggest several fact dif­
ferences between the two cases. For example:
1. The names, dates, and places of residence of the principal par­
ties differed in each instance.
2. The woman involved in the one case was, throughout the 
years in question, married; the other woman was single.
3. One of the male companion/transferors had died prior to the 
legal action; the other was alive and testified at the trial.
4. One of the taxpayer/transferees had a criminal record as a 
prostitute prior to the years in question; the other had no such 
record.
Because the pertinent tax issue is the same in both cases, the ques­
tion is whether the facts common to the two cases are sufficiently 
alike to demand a common result or whether facts are sufficiently 
dissimilar to justify opposite results in each case. Ms. Brizendine had
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to report taxable income; Ms. Starks was found to have received 
only gifts and, therefore, had no taxable income to report. The law 
was the same in both instances; therefore, the different results must 
be explained either by the differences in the facts or by differences 
in the judicial process. Theoretically, the judicial process should 
work equally well in every case; if so, the different results can only 
be explained by different facts.
An Analysis of the Divergent Results. The published decision ren­
dered by any court is, quite obviously, much less than a complete 
transcript of judicial proceeding. It is, at best, a brief synopsis of 
those elements of the case deemed to be most important to the 
judge who has the responsibility of explaining why and how the 
court reached its decision. A review of the two judicial decisions 
under consideration here suggests at least two hypotheses that 
might explain adequately the divergent results reached in these two 
cases.
On the one hand, the fact that Margaret Brizendine was found to 
have received taxable income rather than gifts may be attributable 
primarily to the fact that she had a record of prior prostitution. The 
fact that during the years 1945 through 1951 she elected to “dis­
continue her activities as a prostitute” may suggest that the taxable 
status of her receipts really had not changed all that significantly. 
Prior to 1945 her receipts apparently were derived from numerous 
parties; thereafter, from one individual. If the same explanation for 
the receipts is common to both time periods, the tax results should 
not differ simply because of the number of transferors involved. If, 
however, the explanation for those transfers differed materially dur­
ing the two time periods, a history of prostitution should have no 
material impact on the present decision.
An alternative hypothesis that might also adequately explain the 
divergent results in these two cases would emphasize the differ­
ences in the judicial process rather than the differences in the facts. 
In most tax litigation the taxpayer has the burden of proving that 
the tax liability determined by the Commissioner of Internal Rev­
enue is incorrect. If the taxpayer fails to present such proof, the 
contentions of the IRS are deemed to be correct. Perhaps the at­
torney for Ms. Brizendine simply failed to prove his client’s case.
Two adjacent statements in Brizendine support each of the above 
hypotheses. Judge Rice first says, “. . . since petitioners thus failed 
to establish that those amounts were in fact gifts, we conclude that
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such amounts were correctly determined by respondent to be tax­
able income which petitioners received during the years in issue.” 
This sentence clearly suggests that Ms. Brizendine’s primary prob­
lem was one of inadequate proof. In the next sentence, however, the 
judge suggests the alternative hypothesis in the following words: 
“We further think that there is considerable merit to the respondents’ 
argument that Margaret’s promise to the individual to forebear 
from engaging in prostitution, and to grant him her companionship, 
constituted sufficient consideration for the money received from 
him to make it taxable to her.”
The ultimate basis for a judicial decision often is not known with 
much certainty. Any impartial reading of Brizendine could not pass 
lightly over the judge’s observation that the taxpayers’ “. . . demea­
nor on the stand, coupled with their long criminal records, leaves 
considerable doubt in our mind that the payments from the indi­
vidual to Margaret . . . were gifts.” Although initially it may be 
difficult to understand how courtroom behavior or criminal records 
relate to the presence or absence of a gift, those facts may help to 
establish the credibility of any statements made by a witness. The 
process of taxation is, after all, not a laboratory procedure but a 
very human process from beginning to end. Any attempt to mini­
mize the significance of the human element at any level of the tax­
ing process runs the risk of missing a critical ingredient.
Starks may be viewed as further evidence of the importance of 
the human element in the taxing process. This time, however, the 
record suggests that human sympathies were running with the tax­
payer and against the IRS. Judge Mulroney seems to have been 
less than pleased with the performance of the government’s attor­
ney. The judge, commenting on the government’s interrogation of 
the male transferor, observes that “. . . he was not asked the direct 
question as to whether the advancements of money and property, 
which he admits he made, were gifts by him to her. We have quoted 
the only two statements he made that throw any light at all on the 
issue of whether the advancements were gifts or earnings. Such 
passages in his answers to the effect that he was making a ‘personal 
investment in the future’ or the house purchase was ‘considered a 
permanent basis’ are incomprehensive and rather absurd as state­
ments of purpose. His testimony, in so far as it can be understood 
at all, tends to corroborate petitioner.” In summary, even though the 
taxpayer technically once again had the burden of proving the IRS 
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wrong, the failure of the government’s attorney to ask the obvious 
question and to pursue related questions when a witness gave “in- 
comprehensive” answers seems to have influenced the judge in this 
instance. At any event, the court did conclude that “all of the cir­
cumstances and the testimony of petitioner and even of respondent’s 
witness support her statement that she received gifts of money and 
property during the five years in question and no taxable income.”
Lessons for Tax Research. Even though the specific technical tax 
content of these two cases is trivial, a tax adviser can learn several 
things from these two cases. History—that is, facts that took place 
well before the events deemed to be critical in a given tax dispute— 
may significantly influence the outcome of the decision. Therefore, 
in gathering the facts in a tax problem, the tax adviser can never 
be too thorough in getting all of the facts of his case.
A study of these two cases also reveals the intricate balance be­
tween facts and conclusions. If the trier of facts—IRS agent, con­
feree, appellate conferee, or judge—can be convinced of the authen­
ticity or even the reasonableness of the facts presented for his con­
sideration, he has ample opportunity to reach the conclusion de­
sired by the taxpayer. If those facts are not presented to him, or are 
presented inadequately, the decision-maker cannot be blamed for 
failing to give them full consideration. Disputes are often lost by the 
party who fails to capitalize on the opportunity to know and present 
all pertinent facts in the best light.
Finally, some further reflections on these two cases are instructive 
for tax planning generally. If the parties to this litigation had cor­
rectly anticipated their subsequent tax problems, what might they 
have done to reduce the probabilities of an unfavorable result? For 
example, would the results have differed if neither party had in­
cluded “weekly allowance” in their financial arrangements? Or all 
transfers had been made on such special occasions as a birthday, an 
anniversary, Christmas, Saint Valentine’s Day, or some other holi­
day? If gift cards had accompanied each transfer and those cards 
saved and “treasured” in a scrapbook? If gift tax returns had been 
filed by the transferor? Obviously, each of the additional facts sug­
gested here would lend credence to the conclusion that the trans­
fers were indeed gifts. At some point the evidence—perhaps the fil­
ing of the gift tax return—would be so overwhelming that no one 
would question the conclusion in anything but the most unusual 
circumstances.
33
The important point of this review is, of course, that the tax 
adviser often plays a critical role in settings very remote from the 
courtroom. If he correctly anticipates potential tax problems that 
might arise, he is in an excellent position to recommend actions for 
accumulation of supporting proof that will almost assure the con­
clusion his client is interested in reaching, without going to court. 
Even when the tax adviser has been consulted only after all of the 
facts are “carved in stone,” the thoroughness with which he pre­
sents those facts is often critical to the resolution of the tax question. 
And no one can make a good presentation of the facts until he 
knows precisely what they are, down to the very last detail. A study 
of two more cases can yield additional insight into the critical role 
which facts play in tax questions.
Deductible or Not?
In general, we know that income earned from the rendering of 
a service must be reported by the person who rendered the service 
and that income from property must be reported by the person who 
owns the property. If a taxpayer arranges for someone else to pay 
to one of his parents a part of the value that was originally owed 
to him for services rendered, generally that payment would still be 
taxed to the individual rendering the service, and the payment 
would not ordinarily be deductible by him. Payments made to par­
ents, like payments made to anyone else, would be deductible for 
income tax purposes only if the parent had rendered a business- 
related service to the child and the payment made for such a ser­
vice were reasonable in amount. But what exactly do those words 
mean?
The third case to be reviewed here involves a professional baseball 
player named Cecil Randolph Hundley, Jr. The case was heard by 
the Tax Court in 1967 and the decision, rendered by Judge Hoyt, 
reads in part as follows.
Cecil Randolph Hundley, Jr. 48 TC 339 (1967) 
Findings of Fact
The stipulated facts are found accordingly and adopted as our 
findings.
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Cecil Randolph Hundley, Jr. (hereinafter referred to as peti­
tioner), filed his 1960 income tax return with the district director 
of internal revenue, Richmond, Va. Martinsville, Va., was his legal 
residence at the time petitioner filed the petition herein. Petitioner 
is a professional baseball player and at the time of trial was a 
catcher for the Chicago Cubs of the National League.
Petitioner’s father, Cecil Randolph Hundley, Sr. (hereinafter re­
ferred to as Cecil), is a former semiprofessional baseball player, and 
he has also been a baseball coach. Cecil played as a catcher through­
out his baseball career, and received numerous injuries to his throw­
ing hand while using the traditional two-handed method of catch­
ing. This is a common problem of catchers. A few years before 
Cecil retired from active participation in baseball as a player, he 
developed a one-handed method of catching which was unique and 
unorthodox. This technique was beneficial because injuries to the 
catcher’s throwing hand were avoided. Cecil became actively en­
gaged in the construction and excavation business in 1947 and was 
still engaged in that business at time of trial.
Petitioner attended Bassett High School near Martinsville, Va., from 
which he graduated in June of 1960. During 1958 petitioner was a 
member of his high school baseball team and the local American 
Legion team. He played catcher for both teams and was an out­
standing player. In the spring of 1958, while a sophomore in high 
school, petitioner decided that he wanted to become a good major 
league professional ball player. Petitioner believed that Cecil was 
best qualified to coach and train him for the attainment of this goal. 
After discussing his ambition with Cecil, an oral agreement was 
reached between petitioner and Cecil. Cecil agreed to devote his 
efforts to a program of intensive training of petitioner in the skills 
of baseball, to act as petitioner’s coach, business agent, manager, 
publicity director, and sales agent in negotiating with professional 
baseball teams for a contract. His role may best be described in 
petitioner’s own words when he first asked Cecil to handle things for 
him in 1958: “Daddy, do the business part and let me play the ball.”
As compensation for Cecil’s services, it was agreed that Cecil 
would receive 50 percent of any bonus that might be received un­
der the terms of a professional baseball contract if one should later 
be signed. This contingent payment agreement was thought to be 
fair and reasonable by the parties since it was unknown at that time 
whether petitioner would ever develop into a player with major 
league potential or sign a professional baseball contract or receive
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a bonus for signing. Moreover, petitioner could not sign a baseball 
contract while still a minor without his parent’s consent or until he 
graduated from high school. The size of baseball bonuses obtain­
able at some unknown time, years in the future, was extremely 
conjectural. A rule limiting bonuses to $4,000 for signing baseball 
contracts had been suspended in 1958 and its reinstatement was a 
definite possibility before 1960. It was not expected by petitioner or 
Cecil at that time that an exceptionally large bonus would ever be 
received. Later on they estimated that at most $25,000 might be 
paid to petitioner as a bonus.
Between the spring of 1958 and petitioner’s graduation from high 
school in 1960, Cecil devoted a great deal of time to petitioner’s 
development into the best baseball player possible. Cecil became 
petitioner’s coach and taught petitioner the skill of being a one- 
handed catcher. While this method is advantageous, it is difficult 
to master because it is contrary to natural instincts. The perfection 
of this unorthodox technique therefore required an inordinate 
amount of time and effort by the teacher and the pupil. Cecil also 
taught petitioner to be a power hitter in order to enhance petition­
er’s appeal to professional baseball teams. Petitioner weighed only 
155 pounds during his high school days which was a decided handi­
cap for him both as a hitter and a catcher hoping to break into the 
big leagues.
Cecil attended every baseball practice session and every home 
and away game in which petitioner participated between 1958 and 
1960. On many of these occasions he met with scouts for big league 
teams. By mutual agreement, Cecil relieved petitioner’s high school 
and American Legion coach from any duties with respect to peti­
tioner. It was agreed between the coach and Cecil that it would be 
in the petitioner’s interest for Cecil to be in complete charge of the 
training program. Cecil supplied petitioner with baseball equipment 
at his own expense during this period.
In order to obtain the best possible professional baseball contract 
for petitioner, Cecil had many meetings with members of the press 
during the 2-year period from the spring of 1958 to June 16, 1960, 
to publicize petitioner’s skill as a baseball player. Cecil handled all 
the negotiations with representatives of the many professional 
baseball teams that became interested in petitioner. This undertak­
ing involved numerous meetings at home and out of town. Cecil 
left Sundays open for such negotiations for the entire 2-year period
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but negotiations often occurred on other days of the week. Cecil 
was never paid anything for the considerable expenses he incurred 
over the 2-year period.
The amount of compensation to be received by Cecil was con­
tingent on the obtainment and size of a bonus to be paid petitioner 
for signing a professional baseball contract. In determining the per­
centage of the possible bonus to be received by Cecil, the parties 
also gave consideration to Cecil’s increased expenses and the an­
ticipated loss of time and income from his construction business. 
Cecil had to neglect his business and he lost several substantial 
contracts during the period of petitioner’s intensive training. The 
amount of time he devoted to his grading and excavating business 
was substantialy reduced during 1958, 1959, and 1960 with cor­
responding loss of business income.
Petitioner developed into an outstanding high school baseball 
player under Cecil’s tutorage and by 1960 many major league 
clubs had become interested in signing him. Due to the rule requir­
ing high school graduation before signing a baseball contract, ex­
tensive final negotiation sessions with representatives of the various 
major league baseball teams did not begin until after petitioner’s 
graduation in 1960.
The final negotiation sessions were held at Cecil’s home and after 
2 weeks resulted in a professional baseball contract signed by peti­
tioner on June 16, 1960. All of the negotiations with the many major 
league clubs bidding for petitioner’s contract were handled by 
Cecil in such a way that the bidding for petitioner’s signature was 
extremely competitive. Representatives of the various baseball teams 
were allowed to make as many offers as they wanted during the 
2-week period, but the terms of any offer were not revealed to rep­
resentatives of other teams. Cecil’s expert and shrewd handling of 
the negotiations was instrumental in obtaining a most favorable 
contract and an extraordinarily large bonus for the petitioner.
The baseball contract finally signed by petitioner was with a 
minor league affiliate of the San Francisco Giants of the National 
League. The contract provided for a bonus of $110,000 to be paid 
over a 5-year period at the rate of $22,000 per year, $11,000 to 
petitioner and $11,000 to Cecil, and a guaranteed salary to peti­
tioner of not less than $1,000 per month during the baseball play­
ing season for a period of 5 years. Cecil bargained for and insisted 
upon the minimum salary provision in addition to the large bonus 
because of his expectation that petitioner would be playing in the
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relatively low paying minor leagues for at least 5 years. Cecil also 
signed the contract because under the rules of professional baseball 
the signature of a minor was not accepted without the signature of 
his parent.
The baseball contract contained the following pertinent provi­
sions:
1. The Club hereby employs the Player to render, and the 
Player agrees to render, skilled services as a baseball player in 
connection with all games of the Club during the year 1960, includ­
ing the Club’s training season, the Club’s exhibition games, the 
Club’s playing season, any official series in which the Club may 
participate, and in any game or games in the receipts of which the 
Player may be entitled to share. The Player convenants that at the 
time he signs this contract he is not under contract or contractual 
obligation to any baseball club other than the one party to this con­
tract and that he is capable of and will perform with expertness, 
diligence and fidelity the service stated and such other duties as 
may be required of him in such employment.
2. For the service aforesaid subsequent to the training season the 
Club will pay the Player at the rate of one thousand dollars 
($1,000) per month . . . after the commencement of the playing 
season . . . and end with the termination of the Club’s scheduled 
playing season and any official league playoff series in which the 
Club participates.
• • • •
14. Player is to receive cash bonus of one hundred and ten thou­
sand dollars ($110,000) payable as follows:
Eleven thousand dollars ($11,000) upon approval of this contract 
by the National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues. Also 
eleven thousand dollars ($11,000) on Sept. 15, 1961; Sept. 15, 1962; 
Sept. 15, 1963; Sept. 15, 1964.
The father, Cecil R. Hundley, is to receive eleven thousand dol­
lars ($11,000) upon approval of contract by the National Associa­
tion of Professional Baseball Leagues. Also eleven thousand dollars 
($11,000) on Sept. 15, 1961; Sept 15, 1962; Sept. 15, 1963; and 
Sept. 15, 1964.
• • • •
The designation of $11,000 to be paid annually to Cecil for 5 
years was a consequence of the agreement between Cecil and peti­
tioner to divide equally any bonus received by petitioner for signing
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a professional baseball contract. The scout for the San Francisco 
Giants who negotiated the contract was aware of the aforemen­
tioned agreement before the contract was written, and the terms 
of the contract reflected the prior understanding of the contracting 
parties with respect to the division of the bonus payments. Petition­
er’s high school coach also knew of the 50-50 bonus agreement be­
tween petitioner and Cecil and had been aware of it since its in­
ception in 1958.
During the 1960 taxable year which is in issue, petitioner and 
Cecil each received $11,000 of the bonus from the National Exhi­
bition Co. pursuant to the terms of the contract. Petitioner did not 
include the $11,000 payment received by Cecil in his gross income 
reported in his income tax return for 1960. Cecil duly reported it 
in his income tax return for that year.
The notice of deficiency received by petitioner stated that income 
reported as received from the National Exhibition Co. was under­
stated by the amount of $11,000. The parties are apparently in agree­
ment that petitioner understated his income for 1960 in the deter­
mined amount, but petitioner contends that an offsetting expense 
deducion of $11,000 should have been allowed for the payment re­
ceived by Cecil as partial compensation for services rendered under 
the 1958 agreement between petitioner and Cecil. Respondent’s posi­
tion on brief is that only a $2,200 expense deduction, 10 percent of 
the total bonus payment in 1960, is allowable to petitioner in 1960 
as the reasonable value of services performed by Cecil.
The contract between Cecil and petitioner was made in 1958; 
it was bona fide and at arm’s length, reasonable in light of the cir­
cumstances existing when made and in the taxable year before us. 
The payment of 50 percent of petitioner’s bonus thereunder to 
Cecil in 1960 was compensation to him for services actually ren­
dered to petitioner. He received and kept the $11,000 of the bonus 
paid directly to him by the ball club.
Opinion
Respondent’s determination that an additional $11,000 should 
have been included in petitioner’s income for 1960 is based upon 
section 61(a) which provides that gross income includes compen­
sation for services and section 73(a) which provides that amounts 
received in respect of the services of a child shall be included in 
the child’s gross income even though such amounts are not received 
by the child.
It is beyond question and on brief the parties agree that the
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$11,000 received by Cecil actually represented an amount paid in 
consideration of obtaining petitioner’s services as a professional 
baseball player. Petitioner, while agreeing with the foregoing con­
clusion, argues that a deduction in the amount of $11,000 should 
be allowed for 1960 under section 162 or 212. Respondent has 
conceded that such a deduction should be allowed but only in the 
amount of $2,200.
Section 162 provides that a deduction shall be allowed for an 
ordinary and necessary expense paid during the taxable year in 
carrying on any trade or business including a reasonable allowance 
for compensation for personal services actually rendered. Section 
212 provides that an individual may deduct all ordinary and nec­
essary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year for the 
production or collection of income.
Respondent argues there is insufficient evidence to establish an 
agreement in 1958 to share any bonus equally and that even if 
there were such an agreement no portion paid for Cecil’s services 
to petitioner prior to 1960 is deductible because prior to his grad­
uation, petitioner was not in the trade or business of being a base­
ball player. He contends that the only service performed by Cecil 
for which petitioner is entitled to a deduction was the actual nego­
tiation of the June 16, 1960, contract. He concedes on brief that a 
reasonable value for the services rendered by Cecil during the 2- 
week period from graduation to signing the contract is $2,200, 10 
percent of the total bonus paid in 1960.
Petitioner has introduced persuasive and convincing evidence that 
the agreement was in fact reached in the spring of 1958, and we 
have so found. This finding is essential to petitioner’s position that 
a deduction for an ordinary and necessary business expense de­
duction in the amount of $11,000 should be allowed in 1960. He 
argues that a contingent right to 50 percent of any bonus obtained 
was a reasonable value for services rendered by Cecil between the 
spring of 1958 and the signing of the contract in 1960, and that 
payment for such services was therefore an ordinary and necessary 
expense associated with his business of professional baseball.
We agree that the 50 percent contingent compensation agreement 
was reasonable in amount. Section 1.162-7(b) (2) of the regu­
lations sets forth a test for the deductibility of contingent compen­
sation which we have accepted as correct in Roy Marilyn Stone 
Trust, 44 T.C. 349 (1965). We apply the test here.
The primary elements considered by petitioner and Cecil in de-
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termining Cecil’s contingent compensation were the amount of time 
that would be spent in coaching, training, and representing peti­
tioner during the uncertain period between 1958 and an eventual 
contract. Cecil’s exclusive handling of all publicity and contract 
negotiations and the income that would probably be lost due to 
less time spent on Cecil’s construction business were also important 
factors. In addition to the foregoing considerations, emphasis should 
be placed on the fact that the ultimate receipt of a bonus of any 
kind was uncertain and indefinite. The amount was indeterminable 
and in 1958 neither petitioner, Cecil, nor the high school coach who 
was aware of the agreement had any notion that an exceptionally 
large bonus would be paid 2 years hence. Petitioner might well 
never have become a professional ballplayer, nor was it at all certain 
that he would be paid a bonus in the future. Viewing the circum­
stances at the time the agreement was made in the light of all of the 
evidence before us we conclude and hold that the test of resonable­
ness has been met even though the contingent compensation may be 
greater than the amount which might be ordinarily paid.
 • • • •
While it is true that an agreement of this sort between a father 
and his minor son cannot possess the arm’s-length character of trans­
actions between independent, knowledgeable businessmen and must 
be most carefully scrutinized, the agreement here stands every search­
ing test. Independent and trustworthy witnesses verified its existence 
since 1958. It was in our judgement and in the opinion of both 
petitioner and Cecil, then and at trial, fair to both parties. See 
Olivia de Havilland Goodrich, 20 T.C. 323 (1953).
• • • •
Respondent contends further, however, that even if the bonus 
splitting agreement arose in 1958 and was intended to ultimately 
result in a reasonable amount of compensation for services rendered 
throughout the 2-year period, the full amount received by Cecil is 
still not deductible because petitioner was not engaged in a trade 
or business or any other income-producing activity until graduation 
from high school when he became eligible to sign a professional 
baseball contract. In order for an expenditure to qualify for deduc­
tibility under section 162 or 212, it must have been paid or incurred 
in carrying on any trade or business or for any other income pro­
ducing or collecting activity...  .
The contingent compensation agreement was so closely bound up 
with the existence of the petitioner’s business activity of professional
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baseball that payments made thereunder must be considered as paid 
in carrying on a trade or business. If petitioner had never entered 
the business of professional baseball or had not been paid a bonus 
therefor, no payments would have been made to or received by 
Cecil. The whole basis of the agreement was the ultimate existence 
and establishment of the contemplated business activity and the col­
lection of a bonus. We therefore conclude that payments made un­
der the terms of the agreement were paid for services actually 
rendered in carrying on a business. The obligation to make the 
payments to Cecil was an obligation of the business since there 
would be no obligation without the business. If the business were 
entered without payment of a bonus there also would be no obli­
gation to share it with Cecil. The unique relationship of Cecil’s 
compensation to the professional baseball contract and petitioner’s 
income derived therefrom in 1960 is most persuasive of the de­
ductible nature of the compensation payment made that year.
Respondent’s final argument, raised herein for the first time on 
brief, is based on the premise that the services rendered prior to 
high school graduation were basically educational in nature, and 
that educational expenditures are personal and nondeductible if 
undertaken primarily for the purpose of obtaining a new position or 
substantial advancement in position. See sec. 1.162-5(b), Income 
Tax Regs. We have previously held that claimed deductions for 
educational expenditures of the foregoing type are not allowable. 
Mary O. Furner, 47 T.C. 165 (1966); Joseph T. Booth III, 35 T.C. 
1144 (1961); and Arnold Namrow, 33 T.C. 419 (1959), aff'd. 288 
F.2d 648 (C.A. 4, 1961).
However, petitioner is not claiming a deduction in the amount 
of $11,000 for educational expenditures, and indeed he could not. 
It is clear that a significant portion of Cecil’s compensation was not 
for coaching and training petitioner in the skills of baseball, if that 
be deemed education, but for other services rendered throughout 
the 2-year period.
 •  •  •  •
We hold, therefore, that whereas respondent acted correctly in 
including the entire $22,000 bonus in petitioner’s taxable income, 
petitioner should be nevertheless allowed a deduction in the amount 
of $11,000 in 1960 as a business expense for the portion of the 
bonus paid directly to Cecil for his personal services actually ren­
dered with such rewarding financial results for both petitioner and 
his father.
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The last case to be reviewed in this chapter involves another pro­
fessional baseball player named Richard A. Allen. His case was 
heard by the Tax Court in 1968 and the decision, rendered by 
Judge Raum, reads in part as follows.
Richard A. Alien, 50 TC 466 (1968)
Findings of Fact
Some of the facts have been stipulated and, as stipulated, are in­
corporated herein by this reference along with accompanying ex­
hibits.
Petitioners Richard A. and Barbara Allen are husband and wife, 
who at the time of the filing of the petitions and amended peti­
tions herein resided in Philadelphia, Pa. Richard A. Allen filed his 
individual returns for the calendar years 1960, 1961, and 1962, and a 
joint return with his wife Barbara Allen for 1963, on the cash receipts 
and disbursements method of accounting, with the district director 
of internal revenue, Pittsburgh, Pa. Barbara Allen is a party to this 
proceeding solely by virtue of the joint return filed for 1963, and the 
term petitioner’ will hereinafter refer solely to Richard A. Allen.
Petitioner was bom on March 8, 1942. In the spring of 1960 peti­
tioner, then age 18, was living with his mother, Mrs. Era Allen, in 
Wampum, Pa., and was a senior at a local high school. Mrs. Allen 
had been separated from her husband since 1957. She had eight 
children, of whom three, including petitioner, were dependent upon 
her for support during 1960. She received no funds from her hus­
band, and supported her family by doing housework, sewing, or 
laundry work.
In the course of his high school years, petitioner acquired a 
reputation as an outstanding baseball and basketball player. He was 
anxious to play professional baseball, and had even expressed a 
desire to leave high school for that purpose before graduation, 
but was not permitted to do so by his mother. During the peti­
tioner’s junior year in high school, word of his athletic talents 
reached John Ogden (hereinafter “Ogden”), a baseball “scout” for 
the Philadelphia National League Club, commonly known and here­
inafter referred to as the Phillies. Ogden’s attention was drawn to 
petitioner through a newspaper article about petitioner which, 
while primarily describing him as a great basketball player, also
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mentioned that he had hit 22 “home runs” playing with a men’s 
semiprofessional baseball team the summer before his junior year 
in high school, and that the player who had come closest to his 
total on this team, which otherwise comprised only grown men, 
had hit only 15 home runs. Ogden’s function as a scout for the 
Phillies was to select baseball talent capable of playing in the major 
leagues, i.e., with the Phillies, and after reading this article he made 
up his mind to see petitioner.
Ogden had himself played baseball for around 16 to 18 years, 
was general manager of one baseball club and owner of another 
for 7 or 8 years, and at the time of the trial herein had been a 
baseball scout for the preceding 28 years—a total of about 52 years 
in professional baseball. After interviewing petitioner and watching 
him play basketball and baseball, Ogden determined that petitioner 
was the greatest prospect he had ever seen. He conveyed this im­
pression to John Joseph Quinn (hereinafter “Quinn”), vice president 
and general manager of the Phillies, and told Quinn that petitioner 
was worth “whatever it takes to get him.” Quinn thereupon gave 
Ogden authority to “go and get” petitioner, i.e., to sign him to a 
contract to play baseball for the Phillies.
From this point on, Ogden became very friendly with petitioner’s 
family. He hired Coy Allen, petitioner’s older brother of about 36 
or 37 who had played some semiprofessional baseball in the past, 
as a scout for the Phillies. He also signed Harold Allen, another 
brother of petitioner to a contract to play baseball in the Phillies 
organization. He visited the Allen home often, and talked to peti­
tioner about playing baseball. He did not, however, attempt immedi­
ately to sign petitioner to a contract because of a rule adhered to by 
the Phillies and other baseball teams prohibiting the signing of any 
boy attending high school to a baseball contract until after his 
graduation.
Ogden, as well as representatives of a dozen or more other base­
ball teams that also desired petitioner’s services, discussed petition­
er’s prospects with his mother, Era Allen. She was the head of the 
family, and she made all the family decisions. Although petitioner 
discussed baseball with the various scouts, he referred them to his 
mother in connection with any proposed financial arrangements, and 
he felt “bound” to play for whichever club his mother might select.
Era Allen conducted all negotiations with Ogden in respect of the 
financial arrangements that might be made for petitioner if it should 
be determined that he would play for the Phillies. However, she 
knew nothing about baseball, particularly the financial aspects of
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baseball, and she relied almost entirely upon advice from her son 
Coy Allen. After petitioner had entered into a contract to play for 
the Phillies organization, as hereinafter more fully set forth, Era 
Allen paid Coy $2,000 in 1960 for his services out of the funds 
which she received under that contract, and she deducted that 
amount from her gross income on her 1960 individual income tax 
return.
One of the principal items of negotiation with Ogden was the 
amount of “bonus” to be paid for petitioner’s agreement to play for 
the Phillies organization. Such bonus was in addition to the monthly 
or periodic compensation to be paid petitioner for services actually 
rendered as a ballplayer. The purpose of the bonus was to assure 
the Phillies of the right to the player’s services, if he were to play 
at all, and to prevent him from playing for any other club except 
with permission of the Phillies. Scouts for other teams had made 
offers of a bonus of at least $20,000 or $25,000. During the course 
of the negotiations Ogden made successive offers of a bonus in the 
amounts of $35,000, $50,000, and finally $70,000. The $70,000 offer 
was satisfactory to petitioner’s mother, but she wanted $40,000 of 
that amount paid to her and $30,000 to petitioner. She thought that 
she was entitled to a portion of the bonus because she was respon­
sible for his coming into baseball by her hard work, perseverance, 
taking care of petitioner, and seeing that he “did the right thing.” 
Although it had been informally agreed prior to petitioner’s gradu­
ation that he would go with the Phillies, the contract was presented 
to and signed by petitioner some 30 or 40 minutes after he had re­
ceived his high school diploma on June 2, 1960.
The contract was formally between petitioner and the Williams­
port Baseball Club, one of six or seven minor league teams affili­
ated with the Phillies through a contractual arrangement known as 
a “working agreement” whereby, in general, the Phillies were en­
titled, in exchange for a stated consideration, to “select” the con­
tracts of any of the players on the Williamsport Club for their own 
purposes and under which the Phillies further agreed, among other 
things, to reimburse the Williamsport Club for any bonus paid to 
a player for signing a contract with that club. The Williamsport 
Club was under the substantial control of the Phillies, and the 
contract between petitioner and the Williamsport Club was signed 
on behalf of the latter by an official of the Phillies, who was in 
charge of all the Phillies’ minor league clubs, or what was called 
their “farm system,” and who was authorized to sign on behalf of 
the Williamsport Club. The contract was on the standard form
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prescribed by the National Association of Professional Baseball 
Leagues. Since petitioner was a minor, his mother gave her consent 
to his execution of the contract by signing her name under a printed 
paragraph at the end of the form contract entitled “Consent of 
Parent or Guardian.” Such consent was given explicity [sic] “to the 
execution of this contract by the minor player party hereto,” and 
was stated to be effective as to any assignment or renewal of the 
contract as therein specified. She was not a party to the contract. 
The Phillies, in accordance with their usual practice, would not have 
entered into any such contract, through the Williamsport Club or 
otherwise, without having obtained the consent of a parent or 
guardian of the minor player.
In addition to providing for a salary of $850 per month for peti­
tioner’s services as a ballplayer, the contract provided for the 
$70,000 bonus payable over a 5-year period, of which $40,000 was 
to be paid directly to petitioner’s mother and $30,000 to petitioner. 
The contract provided in part as follows:
1. The Club hereby employs the Player to render, and the 
Player agrees to render, skilled services as a baseball player in 
connection with all games of the Club during the year 1960.... The 
Player convenants that at the time he signs this contract he is not 
under contract or contractual obligation to any baseball club other 
than the one party to this contract and that he is capable of and 
will perform with expertness, diligence and fidelity the service 
stated and such other duties as may be required of him in such 
employment.
2. For the service aforesaid subsequent to the training season 
the Club will pay the Player at the rate of eight hundred fifty dol­
lars per month.
• • • •
5. ( a ) The Player agrees that, while under contract and prior to 
expiration of the Club’s right to renew the contract, and until he 
reports to his club for spring training, if this contract is renewed, 
for the purpose of avoiding injuries he will not play baseball other­
wise than for the Club except that he may participate in post­
season games as prescribed in the National Association Agreement.
(b) The Player and the Club recognize and agree that the 
Player’s participation in other sports may impair or destroy his 
ability and skill as a baseball player. Accordingly, the Player agrees 
he will not engage in professional boxing or wrestling and that,
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except with the written consent of the Club, he will not play pro­
fessional football, basketball, hockey or other contact sport.
• • • •
is to receive bonus of 
D o..................................
$6,000 payable June 2, 1960
$8,000 . . do .. June 1, 1961
D o.................................. $8,000 . .d o . . June 1, 1962
D o.................................. $4,000 . .d o . . June 1, 1963
D o.................................. $4,000 . . do .. June 1, 1964
Mother Mrs. Era Allen is to receive bonus of $16,000 payable
June 2, 1960
Mother Mrs. Era Allen is to receive bonus of $10,000 payable
June 1, 1961
Mother Mrs. Era Allen is to receive bonus of $6,000 payable
June 2, 1962
Mother Mrs. Era Allen is to receive bonus of $4,000 payable
June 2, 1963
Mother Mrs. Era Allen is to receive bonus of $4,000 payable
June 2 ,  1964
Total bonus seventy thousand dollars guaranteed.
• • • •
It was generally the practice in baseball to have the signature of 
a parent or guardian when signing a player under the age of 21 to 
a contract, and a contract lacking such signature would probably 
not have been approved by the president of the National Associ­
ation of Professional Baseball Leagues.
The installments of the $70,000 bonus agreed to by the Williams­
port Baseball Club in its contract with petitioner were actually 
paid by the Phillies under their “working agreement” with the 
Williamsport Club. The Phillies viewed such bonus arrangements 
as consideration to induce a player to sign a contract which thus 
tied him to the Phillies and prevented his playing baseball for any 
other club without the consent of the Phillies. These bonus ar­
rangements represented a gamble on the part of the Phillies, for a 
player might not actually have the ability to play in the major 
leagues, or might decide on his own that he no longer wanted to 
play baseball. The Phillies could not recover bonus money already 
paid, and as a matter of baseball practice felt obligated to pay a 
bonus, once agreed to, in all events, even if some part of the bonus 
still remained unpaid when the player left or was given his uncon­
ditional release by the club. Nevertheless, in light of petitioner’s
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future potential and ability, Ogden, who negotiated petitioner’s 
bonus, and Quinn, who had the final say in these matters, felt that 
$70,000 was a fair price to pay to “get” the right to petitioner’s ser­
vices as a professional baseball player. It was a matter of indiffer­
ence to them as to whom the bonus was paid or what division was 
made of the money. The previous year, in 1959, the Phillies had 
paid a bonus of approximately $100,000 to one Ted Kazanski and 
in 1960, at about the same time they signed petitioner, the Phillies 
paid a bonus of approximately $40,000 to one Bruce Gruber.
Following the execution of the foregoing contract in June 1960 
with the Williamsport Club, petitioner performed services as a pro­
fessional baseball player under annual contracts for various minor 
league teams affiliated with the Phillies until sometime in 1963. 
From that time, he has performed his services directly for the Phil­
lies, and in 1967 his annual salary as a baseball player was ap­
proximately $65,000.
Petitioner ( and his wife Barbara Allen in the taxable year 1963) 
reported as taxable ordinary income in his (their) Federal income 
tax returns for the taxable years 1960, 1961, 1962, and 1963 the 
bonus payments received by petitioner in each of said years, as 
follows :
1960 .............................................. $ 6,000
1961 .............................................. 8,000
1962 .............................................. 8,000
1963 .............................................. 4,000
Petitioner’s mother, Era Allen, reported as taxable ordinary in­
come in her Federal income tax returns for the taxable years 1960, 
1961, 1962, and 1963 the payments received by her in each of 
said years, as follows:
1960 ..............................................
1961 ..............................................
1962 ..............................................
1963 ..............................................
$16,000
10,000
6,000
4,000
In his notice of deficiency to petitioner in respect of the taxable 
years 1961 and 1962, and his notice of deficiency to petitioner 
Richard and his wife Barbara Allen in respect of the taxable year 
1963, the Commissioner determined that the bonus payments re­
ceived by petitioner’s mother in 1961, 1962, and 1963 represented 
amounts received in respect of a minor child and were taxable 
to petitioner under sections 61 and 73 of the Internal Revenue
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Code of 1954; he increased petitioner’s taxable income in each of 
those years accordingly.
Opinion
1. Inclusion of Bonus in Petitioner’s Gross Income. (a) Petitioner 
was only 18 years old when the events giving rise to the bonus 
payments in controversy took place. Accordingly, if the payments 
made during the years in issue (1961-63) by the Phillies to Era 
Allen, petitioner’s mother, constitute “amounts received in respect 
of the services” of petitioner within the meaning of section 73(a), 
I.R.C. 1954, then plainly they must be included in petitioner’s 
gross income rather than in that of his mother. Although petitioner 
contends that the statute does not cover the present situation, we 
hold that the payments made to his mother during the years in issue 
were received solely in respect of petitioner’s services, and that all 
such amounts were therefore includable in his income.
Petitioner argues that the payments received by his mother, total­
ing $40,000 over a 5-year period, were not part of his bonus for 
signing a contract to play baseball for the Phillies organization, but 
rather represented compensation for services performed by her, 
paid by the Phillies in return for her influencing petitioner to sign 
the contract and giving her written consent thereto. But there was 
no evidence of any written or oral agreement between the Phillies 
and Era Allen in which she agreed to further the Phillies’ interests 
in this manner, and we shall not lightly infer the existence of an 
agreement by a mother dealing on behalf of her minor child which 
would or could have the effect of consigning her child’s interests to 
a secondary position so that she might act for her own profit. 
Moreover, we think the evidence in the record consistently points 
to the conclusion that the payments received from the Phillies by 
Era Allen were considered and treated by the parties as part of 
petitioner’s total bonus of $70,000. This sum was paid by the Phil­
lies solely to obtain the exclusive right to petitioner’s services as a 
professional baseball player; no portion thereof was in fact paid for 
his mother’s consent.
We note, first of all, that there was no separate written agree­
ment between the Phillies and Era Allen concerning the payment 
of $40,000 to her, and that in fact the sole provision of which we 
are aware for the payment of this sum appears in the contract be­
tween petitioner and the Williamsport Baseball Club, a minor 
league baseball club affiliated with the Phillies under a “working 
agreement” which entitled the Phillies to claim the contract and
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the services of any player on the club at any time. Petitioner’s con­
tract, a uniform player’s contract standard in professional baseball, 
contained a paragraph requiring the parties to set forth any “ad­
ditional compensation” (aside from the regular payment of salary) 
received or to be received from the club “in connection with this 
contract” and it is in the space provided for such “additional com­
pensation” that all the annual installments of petitioner’s bonus, 
both those payable to petitioner and those payable to his mother, 
are set forth. After a description of all such installments, identifying 
the payee (petitioner or his mother), the amount and the date due, 
appear the words: “Total bonus seventy thousand dollars guaran­
teed.” Moreover, if further proof be needed that the Phillies did 
not consider any part of the $70,000 bonus as compensation for Era 
Allen’s services it is provided by the testimony of John Ogden, the 
baseball scout responsible for petitioner’s signing a contract with 
the Phillies’ organization. Although Ogden resisted being pinned 
down, the clear import of his testimony was that the total bonus 
paid was determined solely by petitioner’s ability to play baseball 
and his future prospects as a player, that the Phillies considered 
$70,000 a fair price to pay for the right to petitioner’s services, and 
that it made little difference to them whether petitioner’s mother 
received any part of the bonus so determined.
Era Allen herself did not claim to be entitled to $40,000 by vir­
tue of any services performed for or on behalf of the Phillies, and 
in fact made clear in her testimony that she bargained, as one 
would expect, “for whatever was best for my son.” Rather, she in­
sisted upon a large portion of petitioner’s bonus because she felt 
that petitioner would never have reached the point at which he was 
able to sign a lucrative contract with a professional baseball team 
had it not been for her hard work and perseverance in supporting 
him. And indeed, as the mother of a minor child, one who by the 
fruits of her own labor had contributed to the support of her minor 
child without the help of the child’s father, she appears to have been 
entitled to all petitioner’s earnings under Pennsylvania law. Pa. Stat. 
tit. 48, sec. 91 (1965).
Prior to 1944, the Commissioner’s rulings and regulations “required 
a parent to report in his (or her) return the earnings of a minor 
child, if under the laws of the state where they resided the parent 
had a right to such earnings,” even if none or only part of the 
child’s earnings were actually appropriated by the parent. . . . Be­
cause parents were not entitled to the earnings of their minor chil­
dren in all States, and because even in those States following this
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common-law doctrine the parents’ right to the earnings of a minor 
child could be lost if it was found that the child had been emanci­
pated, the result of the Commissioner’s policy was that:
for Federal income tax purposes, opposite results obtain (ed) 
under the same set of facts depending upon the applicable 
State law. In addition, such variations in the facts as make ap­
plicable the exceptions to the general rule in each jurisdiction 
tend(ed) to produce additional uncertainty with respect to the 
tax treatment of the earnings of minor children.
H. Rept. No. 1365, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 21 (1944); S. Rept. 
No. 885, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 22. To remedy these defects, 
Congress in 1944 enacted the substantially identical predecessor of 
section 73 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, providing the 
easily determinable and uniform rule that all amounts received 
"in respect of the services of a child” shall be included in his in­
come. “Thus, even though the contract of employment is made 
directly by the parent and the parent receives the compensation 
for the services, for the purpose of the Federal income tax the 
amounts would be considered to be taxable to the child because 
earned by him.” H. Rept. No. 885, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 22, 23. 
We think section 73 reverses what would have been the likely re­
sult in this case under pre-1944 law wholly apart from the con­
tract, and that the $70,000 bonus is taxable in full to petitioner.
Petitioner stresses the fact that the $70,000 bonus paid by the 
Phillies did not constitute a direct payment for his “services” as a 
professional baseball player, which were to be compensated at an 
agreed salary of $850 per month, for the $70,000 was to be paid in 
all events, whether or not petitioner ever performed any services 
for the Phillies organization. Therefore, it is argued, the bonus 
payments could not have constituted compensation for services 
which alone are taxed to a minor child under section 73. Cf. Rev. 
Rul. 58-145, 1958-1 C.B. 360. This argument misreads the statute, 
which speaks in terms of “amounts received in respect of the ser­
vices of a child,” and not merely of compensation for services per­
formed. True, petitioner performed no services in the usual sense 
for his $70,000 bonus, unless his act of signing the contract be con­
sidered such, but the bonus payments here were paid by the Phillies 
as an inducement to obtain his services as a professional baseball 
player and to preclude him from rendering those services to other 
professional baseball teams; they thus certainly constituted amounts 
received “in respect of” his services.
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(b ) Even if amounts in issue were not received “in respect of the 
services” of a child under section 73, we think that the bonus in­
stallments paid to petitioner’s mother during the tax years 1961-63 
are nevertheless chargeable to him under the general provisions 
of section 61. It has long been established that one who becomes 
entitled to receive income may not avoid tax thereon by causing it 
to be paid to another through “anticipatory arrangements however 
skillfully devised.” Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-115; Helvering 
v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112; Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122; Har­
rison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579.
As indicated above, the entire $70,000 bonus was paid as con­
sideration for petitioner’s agreement to play baseball for the Phil­
lies or any team designated by the Phillies. We reject as contrary 
to fact the argument that part of that amount was paid to his 
mother for her consent to the contract. It was petitioner, and peti­
tioner alone who was the source of the income and it is a matter of 
no consequence that his mother thought that she was entitled to 
some of that income because of her conscientious upbringing of 
petitioner. . . .
2. Petitioners Alternative Contention—Deduction of Bonus Pay­
ments From His Gross Income. Finally petitioner argues alternatively 
that if his entire $70,000 bonus is includable in his income, he 
should be allowed to deduct the bonus payments received by his 
mother as an “ordinary and necessary” expense incurred in carry­
ing on his trade or business as a professional baseball player. He 
places great reliance in this argument upon Cecil Randolph Hund­
ley, Jr., 48 T.C. 339, acq. 1967-2 C.B. 2, a case recently decided by 
this Court in which a professional baseball player was allowed to 
deduct that portion of his bonus for signing a baseball contract 
which was paid directly to his father, the result of an agreement 
entered into some 2 years before the contract was signed as a means 
of compensating the father for his services as a baseball coach and 
business agent. However, the special facts in Hundley, which sup­
ported a finding of reasonableness for the amount of the deduction 
claimed and warranted the conclusion that the amounts paid there 
in fact represented a bona fide expense incurred in carrying on the 
taxpayer’s trade or business of being a professional baseball player, 
are almost entirely absent here.
It is unnecessary to determine the exact sum which would have 
constituted a reasonable payment to Era Allen for her services, 
though we note that only $2,000 was paid to her son Coy Allen for
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the advice she so greatly relied on, for we are certain that in any 
case it could not have exceeded the $16,000 received by her in 1960. 
Although the year 1960 is not before us in these proceedings, we 
can and do take into account the payment made to her in that 
year in determining whether the deductions now claimed by peti­
tioner for payments made to her in the years 1961, 1962, and 1963 
are reasonable in amount and deductible as “ordinary and neces­
sary” business expenses. We think they clearly are not, and hold 
that petitioner is not entitled to deductions in any amount for pay­
ments made to his mother in those years.
A Comparison of the Facts. Once again even a cursory examina­
tion of these two Tax Court decisions reveals that the cases have 
several facts in common. In both instances:
1. A professional baseball player arranged to have a portion of a 
sizable bonus paid to one of his parents.
2. Both the parent and the ball-playing minor child signed the 
professional contract.
3. The bonus payments actually were made by the ball club to 
the parent over several years.
4. The parent reported the amount received as ordinary taxable 
income and paid the tax liability thereon.
The two cases also differ in several factual respects.
1. The names, dates, amounts, and places of residence of the 
principal parties differed in each case.
2. The parent involved in one case was the baseball player’s 
father; in the other case it involved his mother.
3. One parent was knowledgeable about and deeply involved in 
training the child in the skill of ball playing; the other parent 
knew relatively little about baseball.
4. One parent-child pair had a prior oral agreement about how 
they would divide any bonus that might eventually be re­
ceived; the other parent-child pair had  no such prior agree­
ment.
Once again, it is pertinent to inquire whether or not the com­
mon facts are sufficient to require a common result or whether the
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different facts justify a different result. The decisions of the court 
again were very different. Cecil Hundley, Jr., was allowed to de­
duct the portion of the bonus paid to his father; Richard Allen was 
denied the right to deduct the portion of the bonus paid to his 
mother. Because the law was the same in both cases, and because 
there is little basis in the reported decisions to conclude that differ­
ences in the judicial process had much influence on these results, 
we must conclude that the different facts adequately explain the 
divergent results.
An Analysis of the Divergent Results. Judge Hoyt makes it clear 
that the decision in Hundley is critically dependent upon the exis­
tence of the oral agreement between the father and the son. He 
states: “Petitioner has introduced persuasive and convincing evi­
dence that the agreement was in fact reached in the spring of 
1958, and we have so found. This finding is essential to petitioner’s 
position. . . .” Judge Raum makes it equally clear in Allen that he 
could find no contractual agreement in that case. He states: “Peti­
tioner argues that the payments received by his mother . . . were not 
part of his bonus for signing a contract to play baseball for the 
Phillies organization, but rather represented compensation for ser­
vices performed by her, paid by the Phillies in return for her in­
fluencing petitioner to sign the contract and giving her written con­
sent thereto. But there was no evidence of any written or oral agree­
ment between the Phillies and Era Allen in which she agreed to 
further the Phillies’ interests in this manner, and we shall not 
lightly infer the existence of an agreement by a mother dealing on 
behalf of her minor child. . . .”
One cannot help but wonder exactly how it is possible for a per­
son to present convincing evidence of an oral agreement made be­
tween a father and his tenth-grade son some nine years prior to the 
litigation. Two brief statements in the reported decision provide the 
only clues. One statement notes that the high school coach knew 
of the oral agreement since its inception; the other statement sug­
gests that the scout for the San Francisco Giants, who negotiated 
the Hundley contract, also knew of the oral agreement since its 
inception. We can only conclude, therefore, that these statements 
are either based on an oral examination of witnesses at the trial or 
that written depositions were obtained from these persons and sub­
mitted as evidence at the trial to substantiate the existence of the 
oral contract.
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Lessons for Tax Research. For the student of tax research, perhaps 
the most instructive aspect of the last two cases is their demonstra­
tion of the importance of favorable testimony by impartial witnesses. 
Proper preparation of a tax file sometimes may include the need 
to provide supporting evidence available only from disinterested 
third parties. The longer one waits to locate such a party, the greater 
the difficulty in finding one capable of giving the testimony needed. 
To the maximum extent possible, considering economic constraints, 
the tax adviser should anticipate the importance of all supporting 
documents, including sworn statements from third parties. If strong 
evidence of one or two critical facts can be provided to an IRS 
agent or to a conferee, the probability of litigation may be signifi­
cantly reduced.
A careful reading of these two decisions also reveals that very 
similar fact situations may sometimes be argued on radically dif­
ferent grounds. In other words, even though the facts are similar, 
the questions raised may be different. Although this observation 
really is more pertinent to the next chapter of this tax study than it 
is to the present chapter, and even though the more unusual argu­
ment did not prove to be fruitful in this instance, we observe in pass­
ing that Allen argues for a favorable result in the alternative. First, 
the taxpayer contends that the payments made to his mother were 
not for his services as a ballplayer. Only later, should the first argu­
ment fail, does he argue that the payments to his mother are de­
ductible business expenses. In Hundley, on the other hand, the tax­
payer never raised the former issue. The fact that both questions 
deserve consideration stems directly from a careful review of the 
facts and the law.
In Allen the argument is made that a bonus payment really is 
not a payment for services rendered. At least in part, that payment 
really is to compensate the ballplayer for not rendering services (to 
a competitor club).
The pertinent statutory provisions refer to “amounts received in 
respect of the services of a child.” (Emphasis added.) The question 
raised, then, deals with whether a ballplayer’s bonus properly falls 
within the meaning of the “in respect of” clause. After reviewing 
the congressional intent behind those words, the court determined 
that it did and thus rejected the taxpayer’s first line of argument. 
Nevertheless, this observation should remind the tax adviser to con­
sider the facts of his case in every possible way before resigning 
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himself to a single line of argument. The next chapter examines in 
greater detail the subtle relationship between the facts and a state­
ment of the pertinent questions.
For the tax adviser, a knowledge of the statutes alone is insuffi­
cient. An adviser must carefully delineate facts important to the 
tax question and recognize the need to document significant facts in 
the event they must be retrieved and substantiated during a later 
audit. The next chapter addresses the task of extracting or anticipat­
ing tax questions from the fact situation.
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3
. . . there is frequently more to be /earn’d from the 
unexpected Questions of a Child, than the Discourses 
of Men, who talk in a Road, according to the Notions 
they have borrowed, and the Prejudices of their 
Education.
JOHN LOCKE
The Elusive Nature of 
Tax Questions
Tax questions arise when a unique set of fact circumstances is ex­
amined in light of general rules of tax law. Learning to identify and 
phrase the critical tax questions implicit in any set of facts is no 
small accomplishment for, in many instances, the most important 
questions are by no means obvious. The more experienced the tax 
adviser, the easier it is for him to identify and to ask the right 
questions. For the beginner, asking the right question is often the 
most difficult part of tax research. Even the most seasoned tax vet­
eran can easily overlook a very important question, and for this 
reason successful tax practitioners make it a general practice to re­
quire an internal review of all tax research before stating an opinion 
to anyone outside the firm. This precaution sometimes is extended 
to include even the preparation of a written record of all oral re­
sponses made to informal inquiries received. The probability of 
overlooking either an important tax question or a part of the law 
is simply too great to permit any less thorough procedure.
The difficulty experienced in properly identifying and stating the 
pertinent tax questions is largely attributable to the high degree of 
interdependence that exists betw een the facts, questions, and law. If 
the tax adviser fails to determine all of the pertinent facts, the chance 
that he will overlook a critical question is greatly increased. Simi­
larly, even if the tax adviser has determined all of the critical facts, 
he may fail to consider a critical part of the law and thus again over- 
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look a critical question. Finally, even if the tax adviser knows all 
of the facts and all of the law pertinent to a case, he still may over­
look an obvious question simply because of human error.
Errors in stating questions are often related to either (1) failure 
to think originally or creatively about tax problems or (2) failure to 
pay sufficient attention to detail. A veteran tax adviser will seldom 
fail to heed detail; on the other hand, precisely because of his long 
experience, he may be prone to overlook new and different ways of 
viewing recurrent problems.1 In some instances, therefore, it is de­
sirable to have the most complex tax situations reviewed by inex­
perienced as well as experienced personnel. The former individuals 
might ask the obvious question that otherwise would be overlooked, 
but only the latter individuals can fully appreciate the significance 
of even the obvious question once it has been asked. Frequently, 
one good tax question raises two or more related questions, and be­
fore long the tax result becomes dependent upon a network of 
closely related but separate questions.
Initial Statement of the Question
The resolution of a tax problem often evolves through several 
stages of development. In many instances the initial statement of 
the question may be only remotely related to the questions that 
turn out to be critical to its solution. The greater the technical com­
petence of the researcher, the fewer steps in the evolution of an an­
swer. The technical competence of tax researchers is, in all likeli­
hood, normally distributed on a continuum ranging from little or no 
competence to very great expertise. Any attempt to separate these 
individuals into discrete groups is obviously unrealistic. Neverthe­
less, for purposes of discussion of the difficulties encountered in 
identifying tax questions, tax advisers could be categorized as fall­
ing into one of three groups, namely, those with “minimal” technical 
competence, those with “intermediate” technical competence, and 
those with “extensive” technical competence relative to the subject
1 For example, in Allen (see chapter 2) it would have been very easy to 
overlook the first of the two alternative arguments considered there; i.e., 
what exactly was Allen being paid for in the bonus? If it was for not render­
ing a service, a different result might apply. Admittedly, that argument was 
not successful in that particular case, but it was pertinent and could have 
been important.
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at hand. Technical competence in one area of taxation does not 
guarantee equal competence in other areas. Individuals who have 
an extensive technical knowledge in one aspect of taxation must 
move with a beginner’s caution when approaching another area of 
the law; although the problems are often similar, the applicable 
rules are sometimes quite different. As was stated earlier, a final tax 
result depends upon three variables: facts, law, and an administra­
tive (and/or judicial) process. Just as the facts of one case may 
differ from another, so also may the law.
Minimal Technical Competence
A tax adviser with minimal technical competence usually can 
state tax questions in only the broadest of terms. After reviewing 
the facts he typically is prepared to ask such general questions 
as the following:
1. Must gross income be recognized “in these fact circum­
stances”?
a. If so, how much income must be recognized?
b. If so, in which year should that income be reported?
2. Can a deduction be claimed “in these circumstances”?
a. If so, how much can be deducted?
b. If so, in which year can the deduction be claimed?
c. If not, can something be added to the tax basis of an asset?
3. If income must be recognized, is that income ordinary income 
or capital gain?
a. If capital gain, is it long or short-term?
b. If ordinary income, is it earned income?
4. What is the tax basis of a specific asset?
In any real situation, of course, the actual facts of the case must be 
substituted for the phrase “in these circumstances” in the hypo­
thetical questions posed above. For example, in the first question 
suggested above, the facts might be such as to justify this question: 
“Must gross income be recognized if a taxpayer transfers appreci­
ated property to his ex-wife in settlement of any claims that she 
might have against him arising from a divorce?” Or, in the second 
hypothetical question, the facts might justify a question like this: 
“Can an accrual-basis corporate taxpayer claim an income tax de­
duction in the current year for an unpaid note given as a bonus to
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a cash-basis employee who is also the corporate-employer’s sole 
stockholder?” Observe that even the initial statement of a tax ques­
tion should be very carefully phrased so as to include what appear 
to be all of the important facts of the situation.
Because beginning staff members typically enter the tax depart­
ments of accounting firms with minimal technical competence, they 
usually are prepared to ask only broad, general questions. If prop­
erly phrased, however, the broad questions posed by the new staff- 
man are ultimately the same questions which the more knowledge­
able tax adviser seeks to answer. He tends, however, to phrase his 
initial questions in somewhat different terms.
Intermediate Technical Competence
The tax adviser with an intermediate level of technical compe­
tence often can review a fact situation and state the pertinent ques­
tions in terms of specific statutory authority. For example, the first 
question already considered for the beginning adviser might be 
verbalized by a person with more experience in words like this: 
"Has any gross income been realized within the meaning of Sec­
tion 61 or 1002 if a taxpayer transfers appreciated property to his 
former spouse as part of a divorce settlement in the state of Mary­
land?” Or, in the second question previously considered, he may 
ask: “Does Section 267 disallow the current deduction for a bonus, 
otherwise deductible under Sections 162 and 461, which is payable 
by a corporation to a cash-basis employee who is the corporate 
employer’s sole stockholder, if the corporate obligation is evidenced 
by a note due six months following the end of the employer’s tax 
year?”
A comparison of the same two hypothetical questions, as phrased 
by the person with minimal competence versus that phrased by the 
person with an intermediate level of competence, reveals several 
interesting differences.
First, the more experienced person generally understands the 
statutory basis of authority which is applicable to the tax questions. 
Or, to put this same difference in another way, the more experienced 
person knows that most tax questions have a statutory base, and he 
knows which code sections are applicable to the facts under con­
sideration. In still other words, the experienced person knows that 
correct tax results do not stem from secondary reference books,
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which all too frequently state “rules” ad infinitum without reveal­
ing the source of authority for their conclusions.
Second, the tax adviser with intermediate technical competence 
often phrases his questions in such a way that they imply the an­
swer to a more general question, subject only to the determination 
of the applicability of one or more “special provisions” to the facts 
under consideration. For example, the phrasing of the first question 
suggested earlier for the person with intermediate level skills may 
really imply something like this: “The stated facts will result in 
the recognition of income under the general rules of Section 61 
and/or 1002, unless some other authority can be found to support 
a contrary conclusion.” Note that questions phrased by the person 
with greater technical competence frequently suggest where the 
answers can be located. If a researcher knows which code sections 
are applicable to a given fact situation, his task in locating pertinent 
authority for a solution is greatly simplified.
Third, the more competent tax adviser is apt to include more 
facts in his statement of the question than is the beginning adviser. 
Thus, for example, he may imply the importance of state law to a 
federal income tax result by adding a phrase such as “in the state 
of Maryland.” This tendency to add more facts to the statement of 
the question is the result of experience. The more experienced per­
son often recognizes, in his statement of the question, some of the 
apparently innocent facts that can so critically modify a tax result.
In daily tax practice, a person with minimal technical tax com­
petence acquires a great deal of his knowledge by answering the 
specific question posed to him by his more competent colleagues. 
He saves valuable and expensive time by being directed to look in 
the right places. Without this assistance, the beginner must spend 
many hours just locating the general authority which is pertinent 
to his question. (The various methods of locating authority are 
described in chapter 4.) We might note, however, that the begin­
ner typically prepares working papers detailing the research steps 
he undertakes to answer the questions posed by his supervisors. 
These working papers both permit the supervisor to review the ade­
quacy of the staffman’s conclusions and leave a permanent record 
of the facts and the authorities that were considered in solving any 
given tax problem. These records may prove to be invaluable should 
the IRS later question the way the tax adviser handled a particular 
tax problem.
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Extensive Technical Competence
The tax adviser with an extensive level of technical competence 
in a given area can often review a fact situation and state the per­
tinent question in a still more refined manner. For example, he may 
ask a question like this: “Is there any reason why Davis would not 
apply ‘to this situation’?” Or he may ask, “Are all of the conditions 
stipulated in Revenue Ruling 55-608 satisfied ‘in this case’?” By stat­
ing his question in this way, the expert implies not only that he 
knows the general statutory authority for an answer, but also that 
he knows specific interpretative authority that would in all likeli­
hood apply to the facts under consideration. The expert often needs 
only to determine the most recent events to resolve a tax question. 
Unless something new has happened, that somehow has managed 
to avoid his attention or to slip his memory, his phrasing of the 
question suggests that a very specific answer can be found to the 
general but unstated question. Thus, the expert’s question—“Is there 
any reason why Davis would not apply?”—may in reality be the 
same question that the beginner phrased this way: “Must gross in­
come be recognized if an ex-husband transfers appreciated prop­
erty to his ex-wife in settlement of any claims she might have 
against him arising from a divorce?” The former question implies 
that the answer to the latter question can be found in the decision 
of the Supreme Court in United States v. Davis, 370 US 65 (1962). 
Similarly, the bonus question may imply that the answer to the cur­
rent deduction may be found in Revenue Ruling 55-608, 1955-2 CB 
546. The phrasing of the expert’s question recognizes, however, that 
there may be ample reason why specific interpretive authority 
would not apply. For example, the facts of the two cases may differ 
in some material way—perhaps the taxpayer in the divorce case lived 
in a community property state, whereas the Davis decision involved 
a taxpayer in a non-community property state—or the Davis decision 
may have been otherwise modified by a regulation, ruling, or judi­
cial decision issued after 1962. If one knows his way around a tax 
library, it obviously will require even less time to answer the ques­
tion posed by the expert than it will to answer the question posed 
by the adviser with “intermediate” competency. Unfortunately, how­
ever, not all tax questions are so easily stated or resolved, even by 
the expert.
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Restatement of the Initial Question After Some Research
In some circumstances even an expert must move cautiously from 
facts, to questions, to authority, and thence back to more facts, 
more questions, and more authority before he can resolve a tax 
problem. The search for authority to resolve an initial question 
sometimes leads to the realization that facts never previously deemed 
important are critical to the resolution of the problem. In that event 
the tax adviser returns to the fact determination procedure before 
looking any further for answers. The initial search suggests consid­
ering other tax rules rather than isolating more facts; at other times 
it suggests the need to determine additional facts as well as the need 
to consider additional rules. Before reaching the administrative or 
judicial process the tax adviser has only two raw materials with 
which to work: facts and rules. He must learn how to identify and 
phrase pertinent questions by examining facts in light of rules. That 
microscopic examination is what reveals the need for further facts 
and/or rules. The tax research process is not complete until all of 
the facts have been fully examined in light of all of the rules and all 
pertinent questions have been resolved to the extent possible.
This “research procedure” is illustrated conceptually in figure 3.1. 
The spiral line shows how the researcher proceeds from an initial 
statement of the facts (F 1), to an initial statement of the questions 
(Q1), to an initial search for authority (A1). If the initial authority 
suggests new and different questions (Q2), as it often does, the re­
searcher continues by making additional fact determinations (F2) 
and/or by considering additional authority (A2). This procedure 
continues over and over until all the facts are known, all the author­
ities are considered, and all the questions are answered—at least 
tentatively. At this juncture the tax adviser evaluates the facts and 
authorities he has just unearthed and reaches a conclusion.
Figure 3.1
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Dangers Inherent in Statements of Questions
The danger of overlooking pertinent alternatives is greatly in­
creased if tax questions are stated too narrowly. This danger is par­
ticularly acute for the more experienced tax adviser because, as 
noted earlier, he generally knows where to begin looking. Once the 
search for pertinent authority is restricted to a particular segment 
of the code, for all practical purposes all other alternatives are 
eliminated.
This danger has been vividly demonstrated to the authors time 
and time again. While teaching a university course in tax research 
methodology, it is, of course, necessary to design example cases 
that will lead students to make important discoveries of their own. 
A large number of the example cases are drawn from “live” prob­
lems suggested by various tax practitioners. In more cases than we 
care to admit, the very best solutions have been those never con­
sidered by either the authors or by those who suggested the prob­
lems to us in the first instance. Beginning students, unhampered by 
predilection and blessed by natural curiosity and intelligence, have 
managed on more than one occasion to view the problem in an en­
tirely different light. This is mentioned in order to stress the im­
portance of imagination and creativity in tax research and planning. 
As was noted in chapter 2, the “thinking step,” the point at which 
the practitioner spends time considering facts, alternatives, and op­
tions, is an indispensible segment of the research process.
A second danger inherent in the statement of the question is the 
tendency to phrase the question utilizing conclusions rather than 
elementary facts. The important distinction between conclusions 
and facts was noted in the prior chapter. The use of conclusions in 
stating questions is hazardous because they tend to prejudice the 
result by subtly influencing the way one searches for pertinent au­
thority. If, for example, one begins to search for authority on the 
proper way to handle a particular expenditure for tax purposes, 
his question might ask, Should the expenditure of funds for “this- 
and-that” be capitalized? The answer probably will be affirmative. 
On the other hand, if the same question is rephrased in terms some­
thing like this—Can the expenditure of funds for ‘“this-and-that” be 
deducted?—the answer, once again, will probably be affirmative. 
Obviously, if the facts are the same (that is, if the “this-and-that” 
in the two questions are identical) both answers cannot be correct.
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The explanation for the conflicting results probably can be traced 
to the place where the researcher looked for his authority. The prior 
question would tend to lead the researcher to decisions in which 
Section 263 was held to be of primary importance, whereas the lat­
ter question would lead him to decisions in which Section 162 was 
found to be of greater importance.2 Ideally, the index of reference 
volumes would include citations to both decisions in both places, 
but the cost of duplication quickly becomes prohibitive, and the 
human element in any classification system is less than perfect. 
Consequently, the statement of the question may assume unusual 
importance. Perhaps the tax adviser’s problem is akin to the lawyer’s 
problem in asking a leading question of a witness. To the maximum 
extent possible, tax questions should be phrased neutrally and with­
out conclusions so as to permit the researcher greater freedom in 
finding the best possible authority for resolving his question.
A Comprehensive Example
The remainder of this chapter is a detailed review of a relatively 
simple, yet comprehensive, example that demonstrates the elusive 
nature of tax questions. In the process of developing this example 
we will attempt to illustrate the way in which facts, rules, and 
questions are inextricably entwined, one with the other, in tax prob­
lems. In following this example, the reader should not be concerned 
with the problem of locating pertinent authority. The next chapter 
will explain how the reader might have found that same authority 
had he been working alone on this problem. To begin, let us assume 
the following statement of facts.
On February 10, 1976, Ima Hitchcock, a long-time client of 
your CPA firm, sold one-half of her equity interest in General
2 Section 263 reads in part as follows: “No deduction shall be allowed for— 
(1) Any amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improve­
ments or betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate.” 
Section 162 reads in part as follows: “There shall be allowed as a deduc­
tion all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the 
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. . . .” Obviously, reasonable 
men can and do differ in their application of these rules to specific fact 
situations.
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Paper Corporation (hereafter, GPC) for $325,000 cash. Ms.
Hitchock had owned 60,000 shares (or 20 percent) of the out­
standing common stock of GPC since its inception in 1946. 
During the past 20 years, she had been active in GPC manage­
ment. Following this sale of stock, however, she planned to re­
tire from active business life. Her records clearly reveal that 
her tax basis in the 30,000 shares sold was only $25,000 (one- 
half of her original purchase price).
Given no additional facts, both the beginner and the seasoned tax 
adviser would be likely to conclude that Ms. Hitchcock should re­
port a $300,000 long-term capital gain in 1976 because of her sale 
of the GPC stock. The case appears to be wholly straightforward 
and without complication, as long as no one asks any questions 
or volunteers any additional information. Although few persons 
would ask for it in this case, the statutory authority for the sug­
gested conclusion would rest upon Sections 1001, 1002, 1012, 
1221, 1222, and 1223. Section 1221 would establish that the stock 
is a capital asset; Sections 1222 and 1223 would determine the long­
term status of the capital gain realized; Section 1012 would specify 
the cost basis of the shares sold; Section 1001 would define the 
gain realized as the difference between the $325,000 received and 
the $25,000 cost basis surrendered; and Section 1002 would require 
that the entire $300,000 realized gain be recognized. If, however, 
someone happened to ask who purchased Ms. Hitchcock’s shares, 
problems could arise quickly.
Diagraming the Facts
Before beginning to consider this example in more detail, a sim­
ple “stick figure” diagram may be made of the transaction just de­
scribed. In the authors’ opinion, every tax adviser should become 
accustomed to preparing such simple diagrams of the essential facts 
of any case before he begins to ask any questions or search for any 
authority. In addition to diagraming the critical transaction itself, 
the practitioner should diagram a simple portrayal of the fact situ­
ation as it existed both before and after the transaction under ex­
amination. Each person can create his own set of symbols for any 
problem; this illustration, however, utilizes only a stick figure to 
represent an individual taxpayer (Ima Hitchcock) and a square to 
represent a corporate taxpayer (General Paper Corporation). These
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simple symbols are used to diagram the before- and after-fact situ­
ation, as well as the transaction under analysis, as follows.
Figure 3.2
BEFORE
THE TRANSACTION
AFTER
The diagram of this deceptively simple tax problem is the first 
critical step toward asking the necessary questions.
First Questions Cali for Additional Facts
As is evident in the diagram, the first two critical questions ap­
pear to be (1) Who owns the other 80 percent of GPC stock? and 
(2) Who purchased the shares from Ms. Hitchcock? The answers to 
these two questions obviously call for the determination of more 
facts, not for additional authority.
Suppose that the CPA knew from his prior work with this client 
that GPC is a closely owned corporation; that is, it has been equally 
owned by five local residents (including Ms. Hitchcock) since its
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inception in 1945. Knowing these facts, one of the two questions sug­
gested above has already been answered. However, the CPA might 
be curious about who purchased the stock, how the value of 
$325,000 was determined, and so on. Under these circumstances, we 
can easily imagine a conversation between Ms. Hitchcock and her 
CPA as follows:
CPA: Who purchased your stock in GPC, Ms. Hitchcock?
Ms. H: Ghost Publishing, Incorporated.
CPA: That is a name that I have not heard before. Is it
a local firm?
Ms. H: Yes, it is my grandson’s corporation.
From there this conversation would proceed to establish the facts 
that Ghost Publishing, Incorporated (hereafter, GPI) was indeed 
a small but very profitable corporation whose stock was entirely 
owned by Ms. Hitchcock’s favorite grandson, Alvred Hitchcock. 
GPI decided to purchase the GPC stock both to guarantee its own 
supply of paper and because Alvred was convinced that GPC was a 
sound financial investment.
The discovery of these additional facts would begin to separate 
the beginner from the more experienced tax adviser. In all prob­
ability, the beginner quite possibly would not modify his prior con­
clusion concerning Ms. Hitchcock’s need to report a $300,000 long­
term capital gain in 1976. The more seasoned tax adviser would 
know at least that sales between related parties are often subject to 
special scrutiny, and he would begin to search for possible authority 
that might modify his prior conclusion.
Before we proceed to examine possible authority, we should stop 
and observe two apparently innocent facts that have vital impor­
tance to the resolution of this tax problem: (1) The GPC shares 
were purchased from Ms. Hitchcock by GPI and (2) GPI is owned 
by Ms. Hitchcock’s grandson. Unless these two facts are discov­
ered, and their importance fully appreciated, this problem simply 
could not proceed any further. We might also pause briefly to re­
diagram both our “transaction” and the after-the-transaction situa­
tion to accommodate the new facts which we have just determined. 
The new diagrams might look as follows, opposite.
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Figure 3.3
THE TRANSACTION
AFTER
Once again this diagram should serve to highlight the potential 
problems which lie ahead of us.
An experienced researcher would realize the danger implicit in 
sales between related parties and begin to look for some authority 
which might modify his conclusion. The tax adviser with extensive 
technical competence in the taxation of corporations and corporate 
shareholder relations might be able to turn directly to Section 304 to 
determine the next appropriate question—that is, Does Section 304 
apply to Ms. Hitchcock’s sale of 30,000 shares of GPC stock to 
GPI?
The Authority
Understanding Section 304 may be difficult. It reads as follows.
SEC. 304. REDEMPTION THROUGH USE OF RELATED COR­
PORATIONS.
(a) Treatment of Certain Stock Purchases.—
(1) Acquisition by related corporation (other than subsidiary).— 
For purposes of sections 302 and 303, if—
(A) one or more persons are in control of each of two 
corporations, and
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(B ) in return for property, one of the corporations acquires 
stock in the other corporation from the person (or per­
sons) so in control, then (unless paragraph (2) applies) 
such property shall be treated as a distribution in redemp­
tion of the stock of the corporation acquiring such stock. 
In any such case, the stock so acquired shall be treated as 
having been transferred by the person from whom ac­
quired, and as having been received by the corporation 
acquiring it, as a contribution to the capital of such cor­
poration.
(2) Acquisition by subsidiary.—For purposes of sections 302 
and 303, if—
(A) in return for property, one corporation acquires from 
a shareholder of another corporation stock in such other 
corporation, and
(B) the issuing corporation controls the acquiring corpo­
ration, then such property shall be treated as a distribution 
in redemption of the stock of the issuing corporation.
(b ) Special Rules for Application of Subsection (a ) .—
(1) Rule for determinations under section 302(b).—In the case 
of any acquisition of stock to which subsection (a) of this 
section applies, determinations as to whether the acquisition is, 
by reason of section 302(b), to be treated as a distribution in 
part or full payment in exchange for the stock shall be made 
by reference to the stock of the issuing corporation. In applying 
section 318(a) (relating to constructive ownership of stock) 
with respect to section 302(b) for purposes of this paragraph, 
sections 3 18 (a)(2 )(C ) and 318 (a)(3 )(C ) shall be applied 
without regard to the 50 percent limitation contained therein.
(2) Amount constituting dividend.—
(A ) Where subsection (a )(1 )  applies.—In the case of any 
acquisition of stock to which paragraph (1) ( and not para­
graph (2 ))  of subsection ( a ) of this section applies, the 
determination of the amount which is a dividend shall be 
made solely by reference to the earnings and profits of the 
acquiring corporation.
(B ) Where subsection (a )(2 )  applies.—In the case of any 
acquisition of stock to which subsection (a )(2 )  of this sec­
tion applies, the determination of the amount which is a 
dividend shall be made as if the property were distrib­
uted by the acquiring corporation to the issuing corpora-
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tion and immediately thereafter distributed by the issuing 
corporation.
(c) Control.—
(1) In general.—For purposes of this section, control means 
the ownership of stock possessing at least 50 percent of the 
total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to 
vote, or at least 50 percent of the total value of shares of all 
classes of stock. If a person (or persons) is in control (within 
the meaning of the preceding sentence) of a corporation which 
in turn owns at least 50 percent of the total combined voting 
power of all stock entitled to vote of another corporation, or 
owns at least 50 percent of the total value of the shares of all 
classes of stock of another corporation, then such person (or 
persons) shall be treated as in control of such other corpora­
tion.
(2) Constructive ownership.—Section 318(a) (relating to the 
constructive ownership of stock) shall apply for purposes of 
determining control under paragraph (1). For purposes of the 
preceding sentence, sections 3 18 (a)(2 )(C ) and 318(a)(3)(C ) 
shall be applied without regard to the 50 percent limitation 
contained therein.
Although the beginner might require assistance in interpreting and 
applying this code section to the facts of Ms. Hitchcock’s sale, he 
must learn how to, read and understand the language if he is ever 
to succeed as a tax adviser. Certainly the beginner might take com­
fort in knowing that even such a distinguished jurist as Learned 
Hand found this to be a formidable assignment. He once said,
In my own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax, for 
example, merely dance before my eyes in a meaningless procession: 
cross-reference to cross-reference, exception upon exception—couched 
in abstract terms that offer no handles to seize hold of—leave in my 
mind only a confused sense of some vitally important, but success­
fully concealed, purport, which it is my duty to extract, but which 
is within my power, if at all, only after the most inordinate ex­
penditure of time.3
3 Learned Hand, “Thomas Walter Swan,” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 57, Decem­
ber 1947, p. 169.
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Perhaps the final line of the quotation is the most telling. Learning 
how to understand the code is most certainly a time-consuming 
process. Even a beginner will realize, after any careful reading of 
Section 304, that certain words and phrases deserve his special at­
tention. He knows that if he is ever to understand Section 304 he 
must determine the import of Sections 302 and 303, that he will 
have to distinguish between an acquisition by a “related corpora­
tion that is not a subsidiary” and an acquisition by a subsidiary cor­
poration, and that he will have to determine how the constructive 
ownership rules of Section 318 are applied to determine control. 
For both the beginner and for the person with an intermediate level 
of tax skills, these determinations may well constitute the next 
pertinent set of questions.
The Third Set of Questions
Although this conclusion is not obvious at the outset, the last of 
the determinations suggested in the preceding paragraph is the 
one that must be solved first. In reverse order, then, those deter­
minations can be stated as questions like this:
1. After the sale of 30,000 shares of GPC common stock to GPI, 
what shares does Ms. Hitchcock own, directly or indirectly, 
for purposes of Section 304, giving full consideration to the 
constructive ownership rules of Section 318?
2. Can the sale of 30,000 shares of GPC stock to GPI by Ms. 
Hitchcock be considered, for purposes of Section 304, as 
either
(a) an acquisition by a related (but not subsidiary) corpora­
tion or
(b) an acquisition by a subsidiary corporation?
3. If the answer to either question in two, above, is affirmative, 
what is the tax effect of Section 302 and/or 303 on this dis­
position of stock?
To solve these three questions we must turn to more authority. Our 
first stop will be at Section 318, the constructive ownership rules, 
which are applicable to Section 304 according to paragraph (2) of 
subsection (c).
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More Authority
Fortunately, Section 318 does not, at least at the outset, appear 
to be as confusing as Section 304. Section 318 reads in part, as 
follows.
SEC. 318. CONSTRUCTIVE OWNERSHIP OF STOCK.
(a) General Rule.—For purposes of those provisions of this sub­
chapter to which the rules contained in this section are expressly 
made applicable—
(1) Members of family.—
(A) In general.—An individual shall be considered as own­
ing the stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for—
(i) his spouse (other than a spouse who is legally sepa­
rated from the individual under a decree of divorce or 
separate maintenance), and
(ii) his children, grandchildren, and parents.
(B) Effect of adoption.—For purposes of subparagraph 
(a )( ii) , a legally adopted child of an individual shall be 
treated as a child of such individual by blood.
(2) Attribution from partnerships, estates, trusts, and corpora­
tions.— • • • •
(C) From corporations.—If 50 percent or more in value of 
the stock in a corporation is owned, directly or indirectly, 
by or for any person, such person shall be considered as 
owning the stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for 
such corporation, in that proportion which the value of the 
stock which such person so owns bears to the value of all 
the stock in such corporation.
(3) Attribution to partnerships, estates, trusts, and corpora­
tions.— • • • •
(C) To corporations.—If 50 percent or more in value of the 
stock in a corporation is owned, directly or indirectly, by 
or for any person, such corporation shall be considered as 
owning the stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for 
such person. • • • •
(5) Operating rules.—
(A) In general.—Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) 
and (C ), stock constructively owned by a person by rea­
son of the application of paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4),
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shall, for purposes of applying paragraphs (1), (2), (3), 
and (4), be considered as actually owned by such person.
(B) Members of family.—Stock constructively owned by an 
individual by reason of the application of paragraph (1) 
shall not be considered as owned by him for purposes of 
again applying paragraph (1) in order to make another 
the constructive owner of such stock.
(C) Partnerships, estates, trusts, and corporations.—Stock 
constructively owned by a partnership, estate, trust, or 
corporation by reason of the application of paragraph (3) 
shall not be considered as owned by it for purposes of 
applying paragraph (2) in order to make another the con­
structive owner of such stock.
A reexamination of the facts already known about GPC in light of 
the rules of Section 318 suggests the need to determine some addi­
tional facts before proceeding toward a solution.
More Questions and More Facts
A careful reading of Section 318 suggests that we must make ab­
solutely certain who it is that owns the other 80 percent of GPC. 
Earlier it was stated that GPC was “equally owned by five local 
residents.” After reading the quoted portion of Section 318, it should 
be obvious that we must ask if any of the other four GPC owners 
are related to Ms. Hitchcock within any of the family relationships 
described in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of Section 318. At 
the same time, we probably should make certain that none of the 
other four original owners has sold any of his original stock in GPC. 
If they have, we would also have to determine who purchased 
those shares and determine the relationship, if any, between those 
purchasers and Ms. Hitchcock. To simplify the remaining task just 
a little, let us assume that we can quickly determine that none of 
the other four owners of GPC are in any way related to Ms. Hitch­
cock and that each of the other four original owners continues to 
own all of his shares in GPC. Having determined this, we can now 
reach our first tentative conclusions.
First Tentative Conclusions
Specifically, we are now prepared to answer the first of the three 
questions suggested on page 72; that is, After the sale of 30,000
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shares of GPC common stock to GPI, what shares does Ms. Hitch­
cock own, directly or indirectly, for purposes of Section 304, giving 
full consideration to the constructive ownership rules of Section 
318? By operation of Section 318(a) (1) (A) (ii), Ms. Ima Hitch­
cock constructively owns any shares of stock owned by her grand­
son, Alvred. Consequently, Ms. Hitchcock is deemed to own 100 
percent of GPI, the corporation that purchased the 30,000 shares 
of GPC stock from her. Furthermore, by operation of Section 
318 (a )(2 )(C ), Ms. Hitchcock’s grandson Alvred is indirectly 
deemed to own any stock owned by GPI, and Section 318(a)(1) 
says that effectively Ms. Hitchcock must pretend that she owns 
not only what her grandson owns directly, but also that which he 
owns indirectly.4 This means, of course, that Ms. Hitchcock is, for 
purposes of Section 304, deemed to own that which she just sold.
Having made this determination, however, we can now also an­
swer the second of the three questions posed earlier; that is, Does 
Section 304 apply to this sale of stock? Obviously that question 
really is two questions and we can separate them for purposes of 
further investigation. First, we must determine if the acquisition of 
the 30,000 shares by GPI can be considered to be an acquisition 
by a related, but non-subsidiary, corporation; second, we must de­
termine if that acquisition can be considered to be an acquisition 
by a subsidiary corporation. These questions might lead us to ask 
another tentative question: What is meant by a related but non­
subsidiary corporation? Section 304 (a )(1 )(A ) apparently is in­
tended to provide the rules for stock acquisitions where the seller 
of the stock (that is, the “one or more persons” clause) is “in con­
trol of” both the corporation whose stock is sold and the corpora­
tion making the purchase. The more experienced tax adviser will 
immediately recognize this as a brother-sister corporate relation­
ship. That relationship can be diagramed as follows, page 76.
4 The only exception to this conclusion is stated in the operating rules of Sec­
tion 318(a)(5 )(B ) which reads as follows: “Stock constructively owned by 
an individual by reason of the application of paragraph (1) [that is, by 
family attribution] shall not be considered as owned by him for purposes of 
again applying paragraph (1) in order to make another the constructive 
owner of such stock.” Since Alvred’s indirect ownership of GPC shares 
comes about by application of paragraph (2) (C) of Section 318 and not by 
application of paragraph (1), Section 318(a) ( 1) (A) (ii) requires that Ms. 
Ima Hitchcock also include in her indirect ownership any shares which 
GPI owns.
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Figure 3.4
In this ownership arrangement, corporations B and S are deemed 
to be related to one another as brother and sister corporations. (The 
degree of control required to establish this relationship is stated in 
Section 304(c)(1) as either 50 percent of the voting power or 50 
percent of the value of the shares.)
Even giving full consideration to all indirect ownership as well 
as all direct ownership, Ms. Ima Hitchcock can be said to own only 
20 percent of GPC. She owns 10 percent directly and another 10 
percent indirectly.5 Thus, even though Ms. Hitchcock owns 100 
percent of GPI (the acquiring corporation) indirectly, she owns 
only 20 percent of GPC, and therefore the rules of Section 304(a)
(1) do not apply to her disposition. In other words, Ms. Hitchcock’s 
sale would not be deemed to be an acquisition by a related non­
subsidiary corporation.
We must return then to the second part of our last question; 
that is, Can the sale of GPC stock by Ms. Hitchcock to GPI be 
considered as an acquisition made by a subsidiary corporation? 
Once again a commonsense answer would seem to be a negative 
one. The acquirer (GPI) is in no way the subsidiary of GPC (the 
corporation whose stock Ms. Hitchcock sold). Be careful, however, 
and look again at the simple diagram on page 69. If one can impute 
shares one way around an ownership circle, is it possible that the 
process might work in the reverse direction as well? The answer, of 
course, must be found in the wording of the code.
5 Incidentally, the revised diagram of the facts pictured on page 69 really sug­
gests this conclusion with much less confusion than do all of the words of the 
code. Perhaps one picture can be worth a thousand words. Note that simply 
following the dotted lines of that diagram back from Alvred to Ms. Hitch­
cock shows that the conclusion just reached is not really so farfetched 
after all.
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Ordinarily, Section 318(a)(3 )(C ) attributes ownership from a 
stockholder to a corporation only if the stockholder owns 50 per­
cent or more of the value of that corporation’s outstanding stock. 
The last sentence of Section 304(c) (2), however, says that . sec­
tions 318(a)(2 )(C ) and 318(a)(3)(C ) shall be applied without 
regard to the 50 percent limitation contained therein.” This seems 
to say, then, that for purposes of Section 304 any acquiring cor­
poration will be deemed to own any stock owned (indirectly or 
directly) by any of its stockholders. Returning to the facts of the 
problem, this means that GPC owns any stock that Ms. Hitchcock 
owns and, you will remember, we just determined that Ms. Hitch­
cock is deemed to own 100 percent of GPL In effect, then, GPC 
owns 100 percent of GPI, making GPI (the acquirer) a wholly 
owned subsidiary of the corporation whose stock Ms. Hitchcock 
sold. It appears, therefore, that Section 304(a)(2) does apply to 
this disposition. Perhaps it would now be useful to paraphrase that 
paragraph of the code, substituting the facts of our specific situ­
ation for the exact words of the code. If we do that, the pertinent 
paragraph would read something like this:
Acquisition by subsidiary.—For purposes of sections 302 and 303, 
i f -
(A) in return for $325,000, GPI, acquired from Ms. Hitchcock 
stock in GPC, and
(B) GPC controls GPI,
then the $325,000 shall be treated as a distribution in redemption of 
the stock of GPC.
The careful reader will have observed that even at this point we 
have not yet determined the correct tax treatment of Ms. Hitch­
cock’s stock disposition. Before we can make that determination, 
we must ask still more questions.
More Questions, More Authority
Code Section 304 (a )(2 ) simply provides that Ms. Hitchcock’s 
sale should be treated as a distribution in redemption of stock, and 
it suggests that we look to two additional code sections to see what 
that means. Our next question, then, must be this: If Ms. Hitch­
cock’s disposition of GPC stock is to be treated as a stock redemp­
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tion under Section 302 and/or 303, what, if anything, do those 
sections say about the tax treatment of amounts received?
On further searching we could quickly discover that Section 303 
deals only with distributions in redemption of stock to pay death 
taxes. Clearly, the facts of our problem do not suggest anything 
about Ms. Hitchcock’s making this disposition to pay death taxes, 
thus we may safely conclude that Section 303 is not applicable to 
our solution. We turn, therefore, to Section 302, which reads in 
pertinent part as follows.
SEC. 302. DISTRIBUTIONS IN REDEMPTION OF STOCK.
(a) General Rule.—If a corporation redeems its stock (within the 
meaning of section 317(b)), and if paragraph (1), (2), (3), or 
(4) of subsection (b) applies, such redemption shall be treated as 
a distribution in part or full payment in exchange for the stock.
(b) Redemptions Treated as Exchanges.—
(1) Redemptions not equivalent to dividends.—Subsection (a) 
shall apply if the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a 
dividend.
(2) Substantially disproportionate redemption of stock.—
(A) In general.—Subsection (a) shall apply if the distri­
bution is substantially disproportionate with respect to the 
shareholder.
(B) Limitation.—This paragraph shall not apply unless 
immediately after the redemption the shareholder owns 
less than 50 percent of the total combined voting power 
of all classes of stock entitled to vote.
(C) Definitions.—For purposes of this paragraph, the dis­
tribution is substantially disproportionate if—
(i) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation 
owned by the shareholder immediately after the redemp­
tion bears to all of the voting stock of the corporation at 
such time,
is less than 80 percent of—
(ii) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation 
owned by the shareholder immediately before the re­
demption bears to all of the voting stock of the corpo­
ration at such time.
For purposes of this paragraph, no distribution shall be 
treated as substantially disproportionate unless the share­
holder’s ownership of the common stock of the corporation
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(whether voting or nonvoting) after and before redemp­
tion also meets the 80 percent requirement of the pre­
ceding sentence. For purposes of the preceding sentence, 
if there is more than one class of common stock, the de­
terminations shall be made by reference to fair market 
value.
(D ) Series of redemptions.—This paragraph shall not ap­
ply to any redemption made pursuant to a plan the pur­
pose or effect of which is a series of redemptions resulting 
in a distribution which (in the aggregate) is not substan­
tially disproportionate with respect to the shareholder.
(3) Termination of shareholder’s interest.—Subsection (a) 
shall apply if the redemption is in complete redemption of all 
of the stock of the corporation owned by the shareholder.
(4) Stock issued by railroad corporations in certain reorgani­
zation.—
• • • •
(5) Application of paragraphs.—In determining whether a re­
demption meets the requirements of paragraph (1), the fact 
that such redemption fails to meet the requirements of para­
graph (2), (3), or (4) shall not be taken into account. If a 
redemption meets the requirements of paragraph (3) and also 
the requirements of paragraph ( 1 ), (2), or (4), then so much 
of subsection (c )(2 )  as would (but for this sentence) apply in 
respect of the acquisition of an interest in the corporation with­
in the 10-year period beginning on the date of the distribution 
shall not apply.
(c) Constructive Ownership of Stock.—
(1) In general.—Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this 
subsection, section 318(a) shall apply in determining the 
ownership of stock for purposes of this section.
• • • •
(d ) Redemptions Treated as Distributions of Property.—Except as 
otherwise provided in this subchapter, if a corporation redeems its 
stock (within the meaning of section 317 (b )), and if subsection 
(a) of this section does not apply, such redemption shall be treated 
as a distribution of property to which section 301 applies.
Obviously, this new and relatively lengthy code section simply 
brings more new questions to mind. The careful reader should ob­
serve that Section 302(a) provides a general rule that any redemp­
tion will be treated as “a distribution in part or full payment in ex­
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change for the stock” (emphasis added) if the conditions of any 
one of four paragraphs are satisfied. This means that if the condi­
tions of any one of the four subsections can be satisfied, a taxpayer 
from whom stock is redeemed can treat the disposition as a sale. 
In most instances this would result in capital gain treatment. The 
general rules of subsection (a) say absolutely nothing, however, 
about the proper tax treatment of the redemption proceeds if those 
conditions cannot be satisfied. That possibility is treated in sub­
section (d), which says that “such redemption shall be treated as 
a distribution of property to which section 301 applies.” (Emphasis 
added.) On further investigation we could discover that Section 
301 generally provides a dividend treatment for properties distrib­
uted by a corporation to its shareholder. This would mean, of course, 
that the redeemed shareholder would have to report an ordinary 
income rather than a capital gain.
If we continued to examine the facts of our illustrative problem 
in detail against all of the rules of Section 302, we would have to 
proceed through another relatively complex set of code provisions 
not unlike those we have just examined in some detail. Because 
this procedure is no longer new, and because we really are inter­
ested only in demonstrating the complex relationship which exists 
between facts, authorities, and tax questions, we will discontinue 
our detailed step-by-step approach and state the remainder of this 
analysis in more general terms. We can begin such a summary treat­
ment of our problem as follows:
1. Question: Is Ms. Hitchcock’s disposition a redemption within 
the meaning of Section 317(b), as required by Section 302(a)? 
Authority: Section 317(b) reads as follows:
Redemption of stock.—For purposes of this part, stock 
shall be treated as redeemed by a corporation if the cor­
poration acquires its stock from a shareholder in exchange 
for property, whether or not the stock so acquired is can­
celled, retired, or held as treasury stock.
Conclusion: The intended meaning of this section is not ob­
vious; it seems to suggest only that what the acquiring cor­
poration does with shares it acquires from its shareholders 
will in no way effect the classification of the stock acquisition 
as a stock redemption. The section seems initially not to apply
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to our case because it refers to a corporation acquiring its stock 
from a shareholder. A more general reflection on how this sec­
tion is made applicable to related corporations through Sec­
tion 304 suggests, however, that these words must be stretched 
to include the stock of a related corporation if the obvious 
meaning of Section 304 is not to be emasculated. Hence, we 
would likely conclude that Ms. Hitchcock’s disposition prob­
ably is a redemption within the meaning of Section 317(b).
2. Question: Is Ms. Hitchcock’s sale (redemption) of 30,000 
shares of GPC stock to GPI a redemption that falls within the 
meaning of any one of the exceptions of Section 302(b)(1) 
through (b )(4 )?
Authority: Read again Section 302(b)(1) through (b )(4 ) as 
quoted previously.
Conclusions (in reverse order):
(a) Clearly the exception of Section 302(b) (4) is not applic­
able; that is, GPC is not a railroad corporation.
(b) Clearly the exception of Section 302(b)(3) is not applic­
able; that is, Ms. Hitchcock continues to own directly 
30,000 shares of GPC stock even after her sale of 30,000 
shares to GPI.
(c) Clearly the exception of Section 302(b)(2) is not ap­
plicable; that is, considering her indirect ownership as 
well as her direct ownership, Ms. Hitchcock owns after 
the sale exactly what she owned before the sale, namely, 
20 percent of GPC. (Note that Section 302(c) requires 
that the attribution rules of Section 318 be applied to 
stock redemptions.)
The Final Question
Without having carefully examined each of the intermediate 
questions and authorities suggested above, the reader might have 
some trouble in stating the final question. If he took the time to 
do so, however, it would seem that Ms. Hitchcock’s final question 
might be stated thus: Is Ms. Hitchcock’s sale of 30,000 shares of 
GPC to GPI properly treated as a “redemption not essentially equiv­
alent to a dividend” as that phrase is used in Section 302(b)(1)?
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The implied conclusion stems importantly from (1) the require­
ment in Section 304 (with assistance from Section 318) that Ms. 
Hitchcock’s apparent sale be treated not as a sale at all but as a 
redemption of a parent corporation’s stock when that stock is pur­
chased by its subsidiary corporation and (2) the requirement in 
Section 302 that stock redemptions be treated as a dividend unless 
one of the four exceptions in Section 302(b) are satisfied.
Any detailed assessment of the authority which is pertinent to an 
interpretation of Section 302(b)(1) would lead us well into the 
objective of chapter 5 of this tax study. Consequently, we will not 
undertake that assessment here. We will note, in passing, some 
general observations that would become pertinent to a resolution 
of the problem were we actually to undertake a detailed assessment. 
First, “the legislative history of Section 302(b)(1) . . . suggests 
that it is to play a modest role in the scheme of things.”6 Second, 
in the Treasury regulations the only example of a stock redemp­
tion qualifying for exchange treatment under Section 302(b)(1) is 
stated in Regs. Sec. 1.302-2(a), which reads, in part, as follows: 
“For example, if a shareholder owns only nonvoting stock of a 
corporation which is not section 306 stock and which is limited and 
preferred as to dividends and in liquidation, and one-half of such 
stock is redeemed, the distribution will ordinarily meet the require­
ments of paragraph (1) of section 302(b) but will not meet the 
requirements of paragraphs (2), (3), or (4) of such section.” This 
example obviously lends no support to the case at hand since the 
facts of Ms. Hitchcock’s ownership are radically different from those 
described in this regulation. Third, in U.S. v. Davis, 397 US 301 
(1970), the Supreme Court held “. . . that neither the absence of a 
tax-avoidance motive nor the presence of a business purpose for 
the redemption would protect it against dividend treatment.”7 In 
summary, the authority for granting Ms. Hitchcock exchange (that 
is, capital gain) treatment by operation of the exception stated in 
Section 302(b)(1) appears to be relatively weak. And if the ex­
ception of Section 302(b)(1) cannot be made to apply, Ms. Hitch­
6 Boris I. Bittker and James S. Eustice, Federal Taxation of Corporations and
Shareholders, 3d ed. (Boston: Warren, Gorham & Lamont, Inc., 1971), 
pp. 9-24.
7Ibid., pp. 9-25.
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cock must report a $325,000 dividend income by operation of Sec­
tion 302(d).8
Do We Begin Again?
At this point the difference between the tax adviser with limited 
technical competence and the more experienced tax adviser is once 
again apt to become apparent. If the beginner actually had dis­
covered and understood all of the facts and all of the rules con­
sidered thus far in our example, he would be very apt to conclude 
that the correct tax treatment of Ms. Hitchcock’s apparent sale is, 
after all, dividend treatment rather than capital gain. The more 
experienced tax adviser is more likely to ask one last searching 
question, Does this conclusion make any common sense? If his 
answer to this one last question is negative, as it is apt to be in this 
case, the expert sets off once more on yet another search for author­
ity to justify an apparently more reasonable conclusion.
By rethinking the facts of this illustration, a tax adviser should 
observe that his tentative conclusion rests largely on the presump­
tion that GPI is a subsidiary of GPC when, in fact, GPC does not 
directly own a single share of GPI stock. In fact, no “first generation 
shareholder” of GPC even owns such stock. He might go on to ob­
serve, then, that the literal application of the rules just studied 
could clearly lead to potentially absurd results in some circum­
stances. For example, if a stockholder owned only a few shares of 
General Motors Corporation common stock and he should happen 
to sell some of these shares to his grandson’s wholly owned corpo­
ration, the tax result would, for the same reasons as those deter­
mined here, be held to constitute a dividend. His grandson’s little 
corporation would, by some wild stretch of the imagination and 
the law of the land, be made into a subsidiary of General Motors. 
This observation might lead the experienced tax adviser to look 
into the history of Section 304, where he would discover that it was 
intended to close an unintended opportunity for owners of closely 
related corporations to “bail out” the earnings and profits of their 
corporation as a capital gain, rather than through the payment of
8 Our conclusion simply assumes a sufficiency of earnings and profits as re­
quired by Section 316, which defines the word “dividend.” In actual prac­
tice, of course, this would constitute another critical fact determination.
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dividends. Still further reflection on the intended purpose of Sec­
tion 304 would suggest clearly that the section was never intended 
to cover the isolated sale of a few shares of General Motors to a 
very distantly related corporation and that, in all probability, it was 
never intended to cover a situation like Ms. Hitchcock’s either. A 
careful study of the constructive ownership provisions required by 
Section 304 would also yield some obvious ambiguities in statutory 
construction. For example, given the literal application of the con­
structive ownership rules of Section 318, every brother-sister pair 
of corporations is automatically a parent-subsidiary pair as well, 
although both the code and the Treasury regulations imply that 
the two situations are separate and must be treated differently. Fi­
nally, the experienced tax adviser might locate judicial support that 
would suggest that courts on rare occasions refuse to apply the code 
literally if the result is clearly absurd and inconsistent with the in­
tent of Congress.9 And last but not least, the tax adviser may locate 
some secondary reference work that points up the very problem 
encountered.10 All of these authorities give the experienced tax ad­
viser some comfort, but, at the same time, they leave him in some­
thing of a dilemma.
A Moral Dilemma?
Any tax adviser who painstakingly has found his way through the 
facts and the law of Ms. Hitchcock’s sale might be trapped in a 
moral dilemma. That adviser would understand that, in all likeli­
hood, he could just report the “sale” of Ms. Hitchcock’s stock in 
Part II, Schedule D, Form 1040, as a routine sale and that it would 
not be questioned further. After all, what is the statistical probabil­
9 For example, note the following words from the United States Supreme 
Court: “When . . . [plain] meaning has led to absurd or futile results, this 
Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of the Act. Frequently, 
. . . even when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but merely 
an unreasonable one plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as 
a whole this court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal whole.” 
U.S. v. American Trucking Association, 310 US 534 (1940).
10Relative to the parent-subsidiary relation derived solely from constructive 
ownership rules see Bittker and Eustice, Federal Taxation of Corporations 
and Shareholders, pp. 9-39/40. See also Jacob Mertens, Jr., Law of Federal 
Income Taxation, Vol. 1 (Chicago: Callaghan and Co.) para. 9.106, pp. 
328-29.
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ity of an audit that would discover who purchased the shares and 
reveal who it was that owned the purchasing corporation? Beyond 
that, what is the chance that an auditor would fully understand all 
of the intricacies of Sections 301, 302, 304, 317, and 318? Further­
more, there is some authority (admittedly weak) for treating the 
sale-redemption as an exchange under Section 302 (b )(1 ) anyway. 
If that authority is applicable, the correct tax result is a $300,000 
long-term capital gain. The tax adviser strongly suspects that capi­
tal gain treatment really is the treatment intended by Congress 
(even though no one ever really considered it), but he knows 
equally well that the Internal Revenue Service might reach a con­
trary conclusion were it fully aware of all the facts. Certainly, the 
tax adviser knows that his client intended to enter into a sale that 
would produce capital gain rather than ordinary dividend income. 
The real dilemma, then, may concern not the conclusion, but the 
proper method of reporting all of the facts that have transpired. If 
the tax adviser reveals all he knows on the tax return, the probabil­
ity of an audit and the possibility of costly litigation are substantially 
increased. If he remains silent, reports the disposition as a simple 
sale, and all the facts are subsequently discovered and the dispute 
is litigated, the adviser stands to jeopardize his professional repu­
tation and possibly risk the penalties of perjury for filing a false 
return.
Under the circumstances described here, the tax adviser might 
seek the opinion of Ms. Hitchcock’s legal counsel to obtain another 
opinion as to the correct treatment of the proceeds from the dis­
position of the GPC stock and as to the proper method of reporting 
that event. The latter conclusion is particularly important if legal 
counsel should state that, in his opinion, the correct treatment of 
the proceeds is as a capital gain. Although an opinion of legal counsel 
would not absolve the tax adviser from his own professional respon­
sibility, it would lend credence to the tax treatment he finally re­
ports and, to some extent, demonstrate his desire to perform his 
duty in a professionally responsible manner.
That foregoing example demonstrates (1) the critical role of 
facts, (2) the interdependency of facts and rules, and (3) the elu­
sive nature of pertinent tax questions. If all the facts are discovered 
and all the rules are known and understood, apparently simple 
transactions have a way of creating relatively complex tax problems 
in all too many situations. The tax adviser must ask the right ques­
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tions, not because he desires to convert a simple situation into a 
complex problem and a larger fee, but because the correct report­
ing of a tax result depends so directly upon his asking those ques­
tions. Questions often evolve from fact determination to rule ap­
plication. For example, in our illustration the first critical questions 
were (1) Who purchased the shares? and (2) Who owned the 
purchaser? Certainly those are fact questions. Nevertheless, unless 
a person has some appreciation of the applicable rules, it would 
be highly unlikely that he would continue to ask the right ques­
tions. After the facts were determined, the critical questions con­
cerned the application of rules to known facts, for example, (1) 
Does Section 304 apply to Ms. Hitchcock’s sale of 30,000 shares of 
GPC to GPI? (2) Does Section 318 apply to make GPI a subsidiary 
corporation of GPC? and (3) Does the exception of Section 302 
(b) (1) apply to this same disposition? Each question appears to be 
more esoteric than the preceding one. Yet every question depends 
to an important degree upon the tax adviser's knowledge of the 
authority that is applicable to the given fact situation.
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. . . reasons are as two graines of wheate,
hid in two bushels of chaffe;
you shall seeke all day ere you finde them . . .
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE
Locating Appropriate 
Authority
In chapters 2 and 3 we discussed the importance of facts and the 
methodology employed to delineate questions that must be an­
swered to solve tax problems successfully. To determine a techni­
cally correct answer to a tax question, the tax adviser may consult 
statutory, administrative, judicial, and, in some instances, editorial 
authority. This process consists of two distinct phases: (1) the tax 
adviser must locate the appropriate authority and (2) he must as­
sess the importance of that authority; augment it if it is found to be 
incomplete, and, on occasion, choose between conflicting authori­
ties. The following pages will identify the various kinds of tax 
authorities and ways to locate them, and chapter 5 will concentrate 
on the assessment of authorities.
The Tax-Legislation Process
Our present income taxing system began with the Tariff Act of 
October 3, 1913. Since then numerous revenue acts have been 
enacted into law. Due to their number and increasing complexity, 
existing revenue acts were codified into a single document called 
the Internal Revenue Code in 1939. The Internal Revenue Code of 
1939 was revised and simplified again in the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1954. All revenue acts enacted into law after 1939 have been 
integrated into the extant Internal Revenue Code.
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By virtue of Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution, all revenue 
bills must originate in the House and cannot be sent to the Senate 
until the House has completed action on the bill. After introduction, 
most of the actual work on a revenue bill takes place in the House 
Ways and Means Committee. In the case of major bills, public 
hearings are scheduled. The first and most prominent witness dur­
ing these hearings usually is the secretary of the Treasury, repre­
senting the executive branch of the government. Upon conclusion 
of the hearings, the committee goes into executive session and, after 
tentative conclusions have been reached, prepares the House Ways 
and Means Committee report, which includes the proposed bill 
drafted in legislative language, an assessment of its effect on rev­
enue, and a general explanation of the provisions in the bill. The 
report represents the only written document that details the reasons 
for the committee’s actions and, therefore, it constitutes an impor­
tant reference source for the courts, the Internal Revenue Service, 
and practitioners in determining legislative intent in connection 
with each section of the code. Upon completion of the committee 
report, the bill is reported to the floor of the House for action. Prior 
to 1975, revenue legislation usually was considered “privileged” 
business and, as such, had priority over other matters on the floor. 
In the past, the approval of the Rules Committee usually was sought 
before a bill was placed on the floor. This procedure was followed 
so that a tax bill could be debated under the “closed rule”; thus, 
amendments from the floor were forbidden unless the Ways and 
Means Committee approved them. This procedure appears to be 
changing and it is anticipated that future revenue legislation will 
be subject to amendments on the floor of the House.
After approval by the House, a tax bill is sent to the Senate where 
it is immediately referred to the Finance Committee. If it is a major 
bill, the Senate Finance Committee holds its own hearings and pre­
pares its own committee report. Debate on the floor of the Senate 
proceeds with few restraints; consequently, Senate amendments to 
a revenue bill are commonplace. Obviously, the Senate Finance 
Committee report will not disclose the intent of Congress on the 
amended portion of a bill. For those portions it becomes necessary 
to consult the Congressional Record to understand the reasons for 
the amendment.
If the House and Senate pass different versions of the same bill, 
further congressional action is necessary. After the House adopts
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a motion to disagree with the Senate version of a revenue bill, a 
conference committee is appointed to iron out the differences. Like 
the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance 
Committee, the conference committee may prepare its own com­
mittee report, concentrating on the areas of disagreement. Their 
report usually is rather technical and does not explain how the two 
bills were reconciled. However, statements made on the floor of 
either chamber prior to the final vote on the conference report are 
entered in the Congressional Record. These statements often shed 
light on congressional intent for the amended sections. After ap­
proval of the conference bill by both the House and the Senate, the 
bill is sent to the President for his signature.1
To illustrate how the tax adviser might utilize his knowledge of 
the foregoing process, let us refer to the Revenue Act of 1971, which 
was signed by the President as Public Law 92-178 on December 10, 
1971, amending the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Among many 
other changes, the act considerably liberalized Section 214 of the 
code, which deals with child care expenses. The new child care ex­
pense provisions are found in Section 210 of the 1971 act. In addi­
tion to numerous other changes incorporated in Section 210, the 
act requires that married taxpayers who claim a deduction for 
child care expenses must both be gainfully employed on a “substan­
tially full-time” basis, unless one of the spouses is physically or men­
tally incapacitated. The tax practitioner who is faced with the ques­
tion of whether or not his client satisfies the “substantially full-time” 
employment criterion might, in the absence of other authoritative 
pronouncements (such as Treasury regulations or revenue rulings), 
consult the committee reports. The House Ways and Means Com­
mittee report for the 1971 act contains no mention of any proposed 
change to Section 214 of the 1954 code. Following the legislative 
process of a tax bill, the next logical step is to examine the Senate 
Finance Committee report, which discloses that changes dealing 
with the child care expense deduction were added by the Senate 
Finance Committee. A careful perusal of the Senate report reveals 
exactly what was meant by the provision that married taxpayers 
must both satisfy, among other requirements, the “substantially 
full-time” employment test. The committee report states that
1For a more complete discussion of the legislative process, see Joseph A. Peck- 
man, Federal Tax Policy, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institu­
tion, 1971).
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. . . the term employed on a fulltime basis’ means employed for 
three-quarters or more of the normal or customary work week (or 
the equivalent on the average during the month).2
Tracing this Senate Finance Committee amendment to the confer­
ence committee report reveals that the liberalized child care deduc­
tion provisions were adopted by the conference committee as 
Amendment No. 49 without further elaboration on the meaning of 
“substantially full-time” employment.
Accessing Public Documents
Committee reports can be obtained in a number of ways. The of­
ficial report of each committee (House Ways and Means, Senate 
Finance, and conference) is published by the Government Printing 
Office (GPO). These reports are available in the government docu­
ments section of any library that has been designated as an official 
depository. Committee reports are also reprinted in the weekly 
Internal Revenue Bulletin and consequently appear in the Cumula­
tive Bulletin; they can also be found in the U.S. Code Congressional 
and Administrative News (USCCAN), published by West Publish­
ing Company. In addition, major revenue acts—such as the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969 or the Revenue Act of 1971—are published with 
partial or full texts of the accompanying committee reports by 
Commerce Clearing House, Inc., and Prentice-Hall, Inc. The editors 
of the Rabkin and Johnson tax service (Federal Income, Gift and 
Estate Taxation) also typically extract important segments of com­
mittee reports and intersperse them among the code sections con­
tained in the four “Code” volumes of the service.
At times it becomes necessary to trace the history of a particular 
1954 code section to the 1939 code or to previous revenue acts. Bar­
ton’s Federal Tax Laws Correlated (FTLC), a six-volume refer­
ence service, is an extremely useful tool to guide the researcher 
from the 1954 code to the 1939 code and prior acts. Barton’s FTLC 
gives the researcher citations to the official committee reports, the 
USCCAN, and Cumulative Bulletin where applicable segments of 
committee reports can be found. A second source for references to
2U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, S. Rept. 92-553, 92d Cong., 
1st sess., 1971, p. 42.
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committee reports is Seidmans Legislative History of Federal In­
come Tax and Excess Profits Tax Laws. This three-volume work 
contains the legislative history of tax statutes enacted from 1861 to 
1953, including the original text of revenue acts and 1939 code sec­
tions, with excerpts from applicable committee reports. Another 
source of recent legislative history of the code is Tax Manage­
ment’s Primary Sources. This publication is arranged by IRC sec­
tion number and emphasizes the legislative history of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969 and subsequent acts. Selected provisions are 
traced back to 1954. Documentary materials pertaining to substan­
tive current legislation is forwarded to subscribers on a monthly 
basis.3
The well-informed tax adviser should stay abreast of congres­
sional activities involving tax statutes in order to determine the 
potential positive and negative tax effects such developments may 
harbor with respect to his clients. One effective means of keeping 
in touch with such daily congressional tax activities is through 
Tax Notes, a weekly newsletter published by Tax Analysts and 
Advocates, Washington, D.C. For a more comprehensive listing of 
tax newsletters, see page 134 of this chapter.
The Internal Revenue Code
All federal statutes passed by Congress are compiled and pub­
lished in the United States Code. Title 26 of the United States Code 
contains the statutes that authorize the Treasury Department, spe­
cifically, the Internal Revenue Service, to collect taxes for the fed­
eral government. The present code, commonly known as the In­
ternal Revenue Code of 1954, applies to taxable years beginning 
after 1953. Prior to 1954, statutory authority for the collection of 
taxes rested with the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. Although the 
Internal Revenue Code is amended almost annually, the designa­
tion 1954 remains fixed with the present Internal Revenue Code.
3 Walter E. Barton and Carroll W. Browning, Federal Tax Laws Correlated 
(Boston: Warren, Gorham & Lamont, Inc., 1969).
J. S. Seidman, Seidmans Legislative History of Federal Income Tax Laws, 
1938-1861 and Excess Profits Tax Laws 1953-1939 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall).
Tax Management, Primary Sources (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National 
Affairs).
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The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is divided into the following 
segments:
Subtitles Chapters
A. Income Taxes 1-6
B. Estate and Gift Taxes 11-12
C. Employment Taxes 21-25
D. Miscellaneous Excise Taxes 31-42
E. Alcohol, Tobacco, and Certain Other Excise Taxes 51-53
F. Procedure and Administration 61-80
G. The Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation 91-92
H. Financing the Presidential Election Campaigns 95-96
The bulk of the income tax provisions is found in Chapter 1 of Sub­
title A. Chapter 1 is divided into twenty subchapters, A through T. 
(Effectively, however, Chapter 1 currently consists of only nineteen 
subchapters since Subchapter R has been repealed.) These sub­
chapter designations are often used by tax practitioners as part of 
their everyday vocabulary to identify general areas of income tax­
ation. The most frequently used designations are these.
Subchapter
C Corporate distributions and adjustments
F Exempt organizations
J Estates, trusts, beneficiaries, and decedents
K Partners and partnerships
N Taxation of multinational corporations
S Tax status election of small business operations
Section numbers are additional subdivisions of the Internal Rev­
enue Code and run consecutively through the entire code. For ex­
ample, Subchapter A, which deals with the determination of an en­
tity’s tax liability, includes section numbers 1 through 58. To the 
extent that section numbers are unassigned, the arrangement is 
suitable for future expansion of the code. The reader should also 
note that section numbers give a clue to which general income tax 
topic is involved. For example, code section numbers in the 300 
series indicate that the section will deal with the topic of corporate 
distributions and adjustments. Each section is further broken down 
into categories (see exhibit 4.1, opposite).
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Exhibit 4.1
SBC. 117. SCHOLARSHIPS AND FELLOWSHIP GRANTS.
(a ) General Rule.—In the case of an individual, gross income does not include—
(1) any amount received—
(A ) as a scholarship at an educational institution (as defined in sec­
tion 151 (e) (4 )), or
(6 )  as a fellowship grant,
including the value of contributed services and accommodations; and
(2) any amount received to cover expenses for—
(A ) travel,
(B) research,
(C) clerical help, or
(D ) equipment,
which are incident to such a scholarship or to a fellowship grant, but only 
to the extent that the amount is so expended by the recipient.
■ ...(b ) Limitations.—
(1) Individuals who are candidates for degrees.—In the case of an in­
dividual who is a candidate for a degree at an educational institution (as 
defined in section 151 (e) (4)), subsection (a) shall not apply to that portion 
of any amount received which represents payment for teaching, research, or 
other services in the nature of part-time employment required as a condi­
tion to receiving the scholarship or the fellowship grant. If teaching, research, 
or other services are required of all candidates (whether or not recipients 
of scholarships or fellowship grants) for a particular degree as a condition 
to receiving such degree, such teaching, research, or other services shall not 
be regarded as part-time employment within the meaning of this paragraph.
—   (2) Individuals who are not candidates for degrees.—In the case of an
individual who is not a candidate for a degree at an educational institution 
(as defined in section 151 (e) (4)), subsection (a) shall apply only if the 
condition in subparagraph (A ) is satisfied and then only within the limita­
tions provided in subparagraph (B).
  (A ) Conditions for exclusion.—The grantor of the scholarship or
fellowship grant is—
(i) an organization described in section 501(c)(3) which is 
exempt from tax under section 501(a),
(ii) a foreign government,
(iii) an international organization, or a binational or multi­
national educational and cultural foundation or commission created 
or continued pursuant to the Mutual Educational and Cultural 
Exchange Act of 1961, or
(iv) the United States, or an instrumentality or agency thereof, 
or a State, a territory, or a possession of the United States, or any 
political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia.
(B) E xtent of exclusion.—The amount of the scholarship or fellow­
ship grant excluded under subsection (a) (1) in any taxable year shall be 
limited to an amount equal to $300 times the number of months for 
which the recipient received amounts under the scholarship or fellow­
ship grant during such taxable year, except that no exclusion shall be 
allowed under subsection (a) after the recipient has been entitled to 
exclude under this section for a period of 36 months (whether or not 
consecutive) amounts received as a scholarship or fellowship grant while 
not a candidate for a degree at an educational institution (as defined 
in section 151 (e) (4)).
Section 117
  Subsection (b)
  Paragraph (2)
  Subparagraph (A)
    Sub-subparagraph (ii)
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The Internal Revenue Code is published annually in paperback 
editions by Commerce Clearing House, Inc. (CCH), Prentice-Hall, 
Inc. (P-H), and Research Institute of America (RIA). The code 
is also published in most multivolume tax services, either separately 
in a loose-leaf volume or serially in several volumes. In the latter 
case, the volume includes editorial comments arranged on a topical 
and/or section number basis.
Administrative Interpretations
Within the executive branch, the Treasury Department has the 
responsibility of implementing the tax statutes passed by Congress. 
This function is specifically carried out by the Internal Revenue 
Service division of the Treasury Department. The duties of the In­
ternal Revenue Service are two-fold: First, the statutes must be in­
terpreted according to the intent of Congress, and, second, the sta­
tutes must be enforced.
The interpretive duties of the Treasury and the IRS range from 
the general to the specific. Treasury regulations are written in broad, 
general terms to explain the provisions of the Internal Revenue 
Code. Revenue rulings, on the other hand, interpret the code only 
with respect to specific facts and are inapplicable to fact situations 
that deviate from those stated in a particular revenue ruling.
Treasury Regulations
Section 7805 of the Internal Revenue Code gives the secretary 
of the Treasury or his delegate a general power to prescribe neces­
sary rules and regulations to administer the tax laws as passed by 
Congress. In addition to Section 7805, specific reference is made 
throughout the code to the effect that the secretary or his dele­
gate shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry 
out the purpose of a specific chapter or section.
Treasury regulations may be divided into regulations that are 
almost “statutory” and those that are interpretive. An example of 
“statutory regulations” are those promulgated under Section 1502 
(formerly Section 141(b), Internal Revenue Code of 1939) dealing 
with consolidated tax returns. Because of the complexity of the sub­
ject, Congress failed to legislate in detail in the area of consolidated 
tax returns and delegated this responsibility to the secretary of the
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Treasury or his delegate. Apparently, in 1954, Congress had second 
thoughts concerning the delegation of legislative power to the secre­
tary. Had the 1954 code been enacted in the form in which it passed 
the House of Representatives, the consolidated return regulations 
actually would have been written into the statute. The Senate Fi­
nance Committee disagreed, however, and in the conference com­
mittee the view of the Senate prevailed.4 Due to the complexity and 
detail involved in the consolidated return regulations, Congress ap­
parently felt that revisions and amendments should be left under 
the purview of the Treasury.
Taxpayers electing to file consolidated returns must execute a con­
sent form in which they agree to be bound by the provisions of the 
regulations.5 Presumably, such an agreement leaves almost no ap­
peal from the provisions of the consolidated return regulations and, 
in that sense, gives them a position more nearly “statutory” than the 
interpretive regulations.
The purpose of the interpretive regulations is to clarify the lan­
guage of the code as passed by Congress. Although the wording of 
the regulations is sometimes almost identical to the language of the 
code and of little assistance, in recent years the Treasury has made 
frequent attempts to add helpful examples to the regulations.
In effect, even the interpretive regulations may come to have the 
force of law; however, technically, if they contradict the intent of 
Congress, they can be overturned by the courts.6 Nevertheless, the 
odds are very much against the taxpayer or his representative who 
tries to win a case against the Internal Revenue Service solely by 
attempting to declare a specific Treasury regulation to be in conflict 
with the code or the intent of Congress. For a more complete dis­
cussion on the status of Treasury regulations, see chapter 5.
According to the Administrative Procedure Act, regulations must 
be issued in proposed form before they are published in final form. 
Proposed regulations for a new or existing part of the code may 
begin with the formation of a special task force that may include 
representatives of the Internal Revenue Service, the American Bar 
Association, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 
and other knowledgeable individuals, as was the case with the
4U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, S. Rept. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d 
sess., 1954, p. 120.
5Treas. Regs. Sec. 1.1502-75(h) (2) (1966).
6 See, for example, W. W. Marett, 325 F2d 28 (CA-5, 1963).
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regulations under Section 1502. Usually, however, regulations are 
prepared solely by members of the Treasury Department. Inter­
ested parties generally are given thirty days from the date the pro­
posed regulations appear in the Federal Register to submit objec­
tions or suggestions. Depending upon the controversy surrounding 
a proposed regulation, it will, after the given time period, be either 
withdrawn and issued in permanent form or amended and reissued 
as a new proposed regulation.
Permanent regulations are initially published as official Treasury 
Decisions (TD) and appear in the Federal Register. They subse­
quently are reprinted by the Government Printing Office in codified 
form and are officially cited as Title 26 of the Code of Federal Regu­
lations (26 CFR . . .). Commerce Clearing House and Prentice-Hall 
publish paperback editions of the Treasury regulations periodically.
The identifying number of a specific part of the regulations can 
be divided into three segments, as follows:
Treas. Regs. Sec. 1.1245-2 (a )(3 )(ii)
Segment I II III
Segment I indicates that the regulation deals either with a specific 
tax or with a procedural rule. Title 26 of the Code of Federal Regu­
lations utilizes the following designations as the identification num­
bers for what we call “segment I” of a correct citation of a Treasury 
regulation.
Part 1 Income Tax
Part 20 Estate Tax
Part 25 Gift Tax
Part 31 Employment Tax
Parts 48 and 49 Excise Taxes
Part 301 Administrative and Procedural
Part 601 Statement of Procedural Rules
Segment II simply coincides with the specific code section that the 
regulation interprets. Thus, in the above example, one can deter­
mine that the regulation cited (a) deals with the income tax (be­
cause of the prefix 1) and (b ) refers specifically to Section 1245 of 
the Internal Revenue Code. Segment III represents the sequence of 
the regulation and a breakdown of its content. Thus, segment III in
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the example refers to Section 1245, second section, paragraph (a), 
subparagraph (3), subdivision (ii). Generally, there is no direct 
correlation between the sequence designation of the Internal Rev­
enue Code and the organization of a Treasury regulation. For in­
stance, Code Section 1245(c) discusses “Adjustment to Basis,” while 
the interpretive discussion of the same topic is found in Treas. Regs. 
Sec. 1.1245-5.
Frequently, there is a considerable delay between the time a par­
ticular section is added to the code and the time when the Treasury 
issues proposed or permanent regulations. A case in point is found 
in the child care expense provisions of Code Section 214, which 
underwent major modification in the Revenue Act of 1971. The new 
statute became effective for the tax year 1972. Three years later the 
Treasury regulations for the revised statute had not yet been pro­
posed or issued. Regulations published for Section 214 are applic­
able only for tax years prior to 1972. The tax researcher must, there­
fore, be careful to ascertain that the regulations he consults are in 
fact valid for the current statute.
Occasionally, when a major change of a particular code section 
has been enacted and the commissioner of internal revenue subse­
quently issues new regulations, two sets of regulations will appear 
covering the same code section for a time. The regulations currently 
published under Section 170, on charitable contributions, are a case 
in point. Due to the major revisions in the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 
new regulations were issued in 1972 to govern Section 170. New 
regulations are distinguishable from those applicable to tax years 
prior to 1970 through the addition of a capital letter A. That is, 
Treas. Regs. Sec. 1.170A-1 applies to years after 1969, Treas. Regs. 
Sec. 1.170-1, to years before 1970. Once again, to identify current 
and noncurrent regulations, the researcher must be aware of this 
procedure.
Revenue Rulings
Another interpretive tool used by the Internal Revenue Service to 
apply tax laws to specific situations are letter rulings. These letter 
rulings generally are official replies given by the IRS to inquiries 
from taxpayers concerning the tax consequences of a proposed 
transaction. If, in the opinion of the Internal Revenue Service, the 
issue is of significant general application, the essence of the reply
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will be published in the form of a revenue ruling. In the past, care 
was taken to protect the identity of the actual taxpayer making the 
initial request to comply with statutory provisions prohibiting the 
disclosure of information obtained from the public.
Initially revenue rulings are published in the weekly Internal 
Revenue Bulletin. The same rulings later appear in the permanently 
bound Cumulative Bulletin, a semiannual publication of the Gov­
ernment Printing Office. A typical citation for a revenue ruling 
would appear in the following forms:
Rev. Rul. 74-101, IRB 13,10 
or
Rev. Rul. 74-101, 1974-1 CB 131
The first citation refers to the 101st revenue ruling published in 
1974 in the thirteenth weekly Internal Revenue Bulletin, on page 10. 
The second citation refers to the same revenue ruling; however, in 
this instance its source is the first volume of the 1974 Cumulative 
Bulletin, page 131.
Prior to 1953, rulings by the Internal Revenue Service appeared 
under various titles such as general counsel’s memorandums 
(GCM), appeals and review memorandums (ARM), internal 
revenue mimeographs (IR-Mim.), and tax board memorandums 
(TBM), to name just a few. While some of these rulings still have 
potential value, in Revenue Procedure 67-6, 1967-1 CB 576, the 
IRS announced a continuing review program of rulings. If the IRS 
revokes or modifies a prior revenue ruling, open tax years can be 
retroactively affected for all taxpayers other than the taxpayer who 
initially requested the ruling. The modification will affect the latter 
party only if a misstatement or omission of material facts was in­
volved. In researching a problem, the tax practitioner should con­
sult a current status table to avoid the embarrassment of relying on 
a ruling that has been revoked or modified. The current rulings vol­
um e (vol. 7) of the Mertens’ Law of Federal Income Taxation is 
particularly helpful for this task.
Published revenue rulings generally have less force than Treasury 
regulations because they were intended to cover only specific fact 
situations. Consequently, published rulings provide valid precedent 
only if a second taxpayers facts are substantially identical. In deal­
ing with revenue agents and other Internal Revenue Service per­
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sonnel, however, one might remember that regulations, revenue rul­
ings, and acquiesced Tax Court decisions constitute the official pol­
icy of the service. Thus an agent is often more easily persuaded by 
a revenue ruling than by a district court or even a circuit court de­
cision. An agent’s work must be approved by his supervisor and 
sometimes by the review staff; these persons tend to minimize liti­
gation hazards.
Revenue Procedures
Revenue procedures announce administrative practices followed 
by the Internal Revenue Service. The depreciation guidelines an­
nounced in Revenue Procedures 62-21 and 65-13 are an example. If 
a taxpayer will accept the estimated lives recommended in these 
revenue procedures, as liberalized by the Revenue Act of 1971, the 
service will not challenge the result of their application if proper 
procedures were followed.
Publication and identification methods for revenue procedures 
are identical to those used for revenue rulings. That is, they are in­
itially published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin and subsequently 
in the Cumulative Bulletin and are numbered in the sequence of 
their appearance. Only the prefix “Rev. Proc.” is different.
Technical Information Releases
Technical information releases (TIRs) are used by the Internal 
Revenue Service to disseminate important technical information on 
specific issues. TIRs are not published in the Internal Revenue Bul­
letin but are distributed via a practitioners’ mailing list. In addition, 
the major tax services publish them in their current-matters volume. 
If the IRS decides that a TIR has enough general application, it will 
be reissued as a revenue procedure. In such an instance, of course, 
the TIR will appear in the Internal Revenue Bulletin and subse­
quently in the Cumulative Bulletin. A TIR usually includes a state­
ment indicating the extent to which the practitioner may rely upon 
the announcement.
Letter Rulings and Technical Advice Memoranda
To further clarify provisions of the code, the Internal Revenue 
Service has furnished interpretive rulings in the form of private let­
ter rulings and technical advice memorandums. Private letter rulings
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are issued to taxpayers who formally request advice about the tax 
consequences applicable to a specific business transaction. Such rul­
ing requests have been employed frequently by taxpayers to assure 
themselves of a preplanned tax result before consummating a trans­
action and as a subsequent aid in the preparation of the tax return. 
The Internal Revenue Service may refuse a ruling request; but even 
when rulings are given it is usually understood that such a ruling is 
limited in application to the taxpayer making the request, and IRS 
personnel are instructed not to accept private rulings as precedent 
when offered by taxpayers other than those for whom the rulings 
were originally rendered. In the past, however, private letter rul­
ings have often inspired the publication of revenue rulings or rev­
enue procedures describing similar fact situations.
The technical advice memorandum, a special after-the-fact ruling, 
also may be requested from the technical staff of the Internal Rev­
enue Service. For example, if a disagreement arises in the course 
of an audit between the taxpayer or his representative and the rev­
enue agent, either side may request formal technical advice on the 
issue(s) through the district director. If the advice is favorable to 
the taxpayer, IRS personnel usually will comply with the ruling. 
In some instances, such technical advice also has been used as the 
basis for the issuance of a revenue ruling.
Recently, the continuation of private rulings has been placed in 
serious jeopardy. Through legal action brought by various taxpay­
ers against the Internal Revenue Service under the Freedom of In­
formation Act (FOIA), the IRS has been ordered to release un­
published rulings.7 At this writing, the Administration is planning 
to introduce legislation that would more specifically indicate docu­
ments that would be available for public scrutiny. An issue to be 
resolved is to what extent such a law would have retroactive appli­
cation. The commissioner of Internal Revenue has stated, however, 
that based upon Tax Analysts, the Service considers technical 
advice memorandums not in the same category as private letter rul­
ings and thus does not anticipate the release of technical advice 
memorandums.8 Nevertheless, taxpayers who have in the past uti­
7Tax Analysts and Advocates, 505 F2d 350 (CA-D.C., 1974); also Fruehauf
Corp, 369 F.Supp. 108 (DC Mich, 1974), aff’d CA-6, 6/9/75.
8Joel M. Forster, ed , “Washington Report,” The Tax Adviser, March 1975, 
pp. 162-65.
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lized the private rulings procedure may now steer away from it be­
cause of their desire to keep certain information confidential.
Judicial Interpretations
In situations where statutory authority alone does not provide a 
clearcut solution for a particular problem, the taxpayer or his ad­
viser must consult judicial as well as administrative authority in 
forming an opinion. Judicial interpretations provide varying degrees 
of precedent, depending upon the nature of the conflict and the 
jurisdictional authority of the court that rendered the opinion.
While a vast majority of all disagreements with the Internal Rev­
enue Service are settled on the administrative level, unsettled dis­
putes may be litigated by filing suit in one of three courts of orig­
inal jurisdiction: the United States Tax Court, a United States dis­
trict court, or the United States Court of Claims. Appeals from both 
the Tax Court and the district courts are heard by the circuit courts 
of appeals. Appeals from a circuit court or the Court of Claims must 
be directed to the United States Supreme Court. The judicial alter­
natives available to a taxpayer can be depicted as in figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1
Courts of
Original
Jurisdiction
Appellate
Courts
United States 
Tax Court
United States 
District Courts
United States 
Circuit Courts 
of Appeals
United States 
Court of Claims
United States 
Supreme Court
After receiving a request for certiorari from either the govern­
ment or the taxpayer, the Supreme Court decides whether or not it 
should review a case. Certiorari is most commonly granted in situ­
ations where a conflict already exists between two or more circuit 
courts of appeals and/or the Court of Claims. Sometimes the Su­
preme Court will grant certiorari without a prior conflict if it deems
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a case to have special significance. In order to understand fully the 
weight of a court decision, and the degree to which it sets prece­
dent, an elementary understanding of the jurisdiction of each court 
is essential.
United States Tax Court
The United States Tax Court consists of sixteen judges, separate 
and distinct from the Treasury Department, appointed by the Pres­
ident for fifteen-year terms. Although the principal office of the Tax 
Court is located in Washington, D.C., the court conducts hearings 
in most large cities in the United States. The Tax Court is organized 
by divisions, which usually consist of only one judge, although they 
may consist of more than one. Commissioners may be assigned to 
assist a judge. Proceedings before the Tax Court may be conducted 
with or without trial; if sufficient facts are stipulated, the assigned 
judge may render an opinion without a formal trial.
After hearing a case, the assigned judge will submit his findings 
of fact and his opinion, in writing, to the chief judge, who then 
decides whether or not the case should be reviewed by the full 
court. Should the chief judge decide that a full review is not neces­
sary, the original decision will stand and be entered either as a 
"regular” or a "memorandum” decision. Regular decisions are pub­
lished by the Government Printing Office.
Prior to 1943, the Tax Court was known as the Board of Tax Ap­
peals, the decisions of which were published in forty-seven volumes 
covering the period from 1924 to 1942. These volumes are cited as 
the United States Board of Tax Appeals Reports (BTA). For ex­
ample, 39 BTA 13 refers to the thirty-ninth volume of the Board 
of Tax Appeals Reports, page 13. Beginning with the latter part 
of 1942, when Congress changed the name of the body, the pro­
ceedings have been published as The Tax Court of the United 
States Reports (TC). Thus, an illustrative citation would be 12 TC 
101. Bound volumes of the Tax Court reports are published only by 
the United States Government Printing Office.
Tax Court memorandum decisions are reproduced by the gov­
ernment in mimeograph form only. However, Commerce Clearing 
House publishes memorandum decisions in their Tax Court Memo­
randum Decisions (TCM) series and Prentice-Hall makes them 
available as the Prentice-Hall Memorandum Decisions (PH-TC
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Memo). In recent years the Tax Court has handed down more 
memorandum opinions than regular opinions. Memorandum opin­
ions usually involve conclusions that, in the opinion of the chief 
judge, have been well established and require only a delineation 
of facts. Nevertheless, in 1945 Judge Murdock publicly pointed out 
the precedent value of memorandum decisions and acknowledged 
that they could be cited in briefs.9
If, in the opinion of the chief judge, a case contains an unusual 
point of law or one on which considerable disagreement exists 
among the judges of the Tax Court, he may assign the case to the 
full court. After each judge has had an opportunity to study the 
case, the court meets for an expression of opinions and a vote. In 
such instances it is possible that one or more majority and minority 
opinions will be prepared and that the trial judge—possibly the only 
one to have actually heard the proceedings—could write the minor­
ity opinion. The majority opinion will be entered as the final de­
cision of the Tax Court.
As a general rule, the Tax Court’s jurisdiction rests with the de­
termination of deficiencies in income, excess profits, self employ­
ment, estate, or gift taxes. Specifically excluded are claims for re­
funds if the commissioner did not first assess a deficiency10 and mat­
ters of administrative policy.11 Claims for refund must be tried in 
either a district court or the Court of Claims. Thus, in order to 
bring suit in the Tax Court of the United States, a taxpayer must 
have received a notice of deficiency and a so-called ninety-day let­
ter and, subsequently, have refused to pay the deficiency.
Some Tax Court transcripts disclose that a “decision has been 
entered under Rule 50.” This notation signifies that the court has 
reached a conclusion as to the facts and issues of the case but leaves 
the computational aspects of the decision to the opposing parties. 
Both parties will subsequently submit to the court their version of 
the refund or deficiency computation. If both parties agree on the 
computation, no further argument is necessary. In the event of dis­
agreement, the court will reach its decision on the basis of the data
9 J. Edgar Murdock, “What Has the Tax Court of the United States Been 
Doing?” American Bar Association Journal, June 1945, pp. 298-99.
10Scaife Company, 47 BTA 964 (1942).
11 Cleveland House Brewing Company, 1 BTA 87 (1924).
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presented by each party. Data submitted or arguments heard under 
Rule 50 are usually not a part of the trial transcript.
As part of Public Law 91-172, Congress enacted IRC Section 
7463, which authorizes the creation of special trial procedures 
within the Tax Court for disputes involving $1,000 or less (later 
amended to $1,500 or less).12 A taxpayer may request trial before 
the Small Tax Case Division by executing Form 2 of the Tax Court 
and paying a filing fee of $10. Even this fee may be waived if in 
the opinion of the court the petitioner is unable to make such pay­
ment. Legal counsel is not required; the taxpayer may represent 
himself. Trial procedures are conducted on an informal basis with 
the filing of briefs permitted but not required. Only an informal 
record of the trial proceedings is prepared and every decision is 
final, making an appeal from a decision of the Small Tax Case 
Division of the Tax Court impossible. Decisions of this division may 
not be cited as precedent in other cases.
Acquiescence policy. In some instances the commissioner of in­
ternal revenue will publicly announce his “acquiescence” or “non­
acquiescence” to a regular Tax Court decision. This policy does not 
encompass Tax Court memorandum decisions or decisions of other 
courts. In announcing his acquiescence, the commissioner publicly 
declares his agreement with a conclusion reached by the Tax Court. 
This does not necessarily mean that the commissioner agrees with 
the reasoning used by the court in reaching the conclusion, but only 
that in the future, unless otherwise announced, the Internal Rev­
enue Service will dispose of similar disputes in a manner consistent 
with that established in the acquiesced case. In those situations 
where the Tax Court has ruled against the government, the com­
missioner may wish to express nonacquiescence to inform taxpayers 
that he will continue to contest similar disputes in the future.
Acquiescence and nonacquiescence are announced in the weekly 
Internal Revenue Bulletin and are republished in the semiannual 
Cumulative Bulletin. In addition, citators of the major tax services 
indicate whether the commissioner has acquiesced or refused to 
acquiesce in a particular decision, giving specific reference to the 
Cumulative Bulletin in which the commissioner’s announcement
12 The $1,500 limitation includes the initial tax contested, potential additional 
amounts, and penalties, but excludes interest.
104
can be found. If the tax adviser plans to rely on a specific acquiesced 
case, it is important that he check the original announcement, be­
cause it is possible that only a partial acquiescence exists. For ex­
ample, a single Tax Court case may involve multiple issues and 
the commissioner may acquiesce in only one of those issues. An in­
teresting example of this is found in The Friedkinder Corporation, 
25 TC 70 (1955), in which the Tax Court considered three issues. 
The commissioner remained silent on the first issue, expressed non­
acquiescence to the second, and acquiesced to the third.13
The commissioner may also withdraw his acquiescence with retro­
active effect. For example, in Caulkins, 1 TC 656 (1943), the com­
missioner initially published his nonacquiescence but later changed 
this to acquiescence when the court of appeals sustained the Tax 
Court.14 Eleven years later another commissioner reinstated the 
initial nonacquiescence.15 A taxpayer who claimed that he had re­
lied on Caulkins before the acquiescence was retroactively with­
drawn found no relief when, in Dixon, the Supreme Court upheld 
the commissioner’s right to do so.16
United States District Court
The federal judicial system is divided into eleven judicial circuits 
as illustrated in figure 4.2, page 107. Ten of the circuits are num­
bered; the eleventh covers Washington, D.C. Each of the eleven 
circuits is further divided into districts. At least one district judge is 
assigned to each federal district. Depending upon need, however, 
two or more federal district judges may hear cases in any district. A 
taxpayer may bring suit in a federal district court only after he has 
paid a tax, either with the return or as a deficiency assessment, and 
has processed a request for refund.17 A United States district court 
is the only court in which a taxpayer can request a jury trial in a 
tax dispute. Published proceedings of the federal district courts can 
be found in the Federal Supplement reporter series, published by 
West Publishing Company.
13 Cumulative List of Announcements Relating to Decisions of the Tax Court, 
1972-2 CB 2.
14 See TC 1943-24-11581, 1943-1 CB 28; see TC 1944-24-11907, 1944-1 CB 5.
15 Rev. Rul. 55-136, 1955-1 CB 7.
16 W. Palmer Dixon, 381 US 68 (1965).
17 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, Sec. 7422.
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United States Court of Claims
The U.S. Court of Claims was created by Congress in 1855 to 
dispose of claims against the United States government. The Court 
of Claims is a single court consisting of a chief judge and four as­
sociate judges appointed by the President. By statute, the court is 
required to hold an annual term in Washington, D.C.18 Most of the 
hearings are held by fifteen commissioners who report their find­
ings to the judges. The prerequisites for filing suit in the Court of 
Claims are identical with those applicable to the district court; that 
is, the petitioners must have paid a tax and subsequently filed a 
request for refund that the commissioner rejected. The proceedings 
of the Court of Claims can be found in the Court of Claims Reporter 
series published by the United States Government Printing Office. 
In addition, West’s Federal Reporter includes all Court of Claims 
cases between 1929 and 1932 and after 1959. From 1932 to 1960 
the Court of Claims cases were published in the Federal Supplement 
series (West Publishing Company).
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals
In addition to the District of Columbia Circuit, the states and 
U.S. territories are geographically partitioned into judicial circuits 
numbered from one through ten (see figure 4.2). Decisions of the 
Tax Court and a district court may be appealed by either the tax­
payer or the government to the circuit court in which the taxpayer 
resides. Hearings before a circuit court are conducted by a panel 
of three judges.
Depending upon need and policies within each particular circuit, 
federal district judges may be asked to serve on a panel during a 
session. Upon request by any circuit judge, regardless of whether 
or not he was a member of the trial panel, the full circuit court 
(that is, all the judges in that circuit) may review the decision of 
a trial panel. The proceedings of the circuit courts are published by 
West Publishing Company in the Federal Reporter (1st and 2nd 
Series).
18 United States Code Annotated, Title 28, Sec. 174, (St. Paul, Minn.: West 
Publishing Co., 1968).
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United States Supreme Court
Final appeals from the Court of Claims or from a circuit court of 
appeals rests with the Supreme Court. As previously explained, ap­
peal requires a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court may or 
may not grant. Supreme Court decisions are of special importance 
because they constitute the final judicial authority in tax matters. 
The Supreme Court decisions can be found in any one of three 
publications: the United States Supreme Court Reports (U.S.), 
Government Printing Office; Supreme Court Reporter (S.Ct.), West 
Publishing Company; the United States Reports, Lawyers’ Edition 
(L.Ed.), Lawyers’ Co-Operative Publishing Company.
Special Tax Reporter Series
All tax decisions rendered by the Supreme Court, the circuit 
courts of appeals, the Court of Claims, federal district courts, and 
some state courts are separately published by Commerce Clearing 
House in the United States Tax Cases (USTC) series and by Pren­
tice-Hall in the American Federal Tax Reports (AFTR and 
AFTR2d) series. These two special judicial reporter series provide 
a tax practitioner with two major advantages: First, by collecting 
only tax cases in one reporter series, it is economically possible for 
most tax practitioners to acquire at least one complete set of all 
judicial authority dealing with tax problems; second, the space re­
quired to store one complete tax reporter series is minimal when 
compared with the many volumes that would otherwise have to be 
maintained were all judicial tax decisions readily available (tax 
cases would be mixed among other civil and criminal proceedings).
Tax Court decisions, which comprise a separate volume, are not 
included in either the USTC or AFTR series. In addition to the 
Tax Court reporter series published annually by the Government 
Printing Office, however, both CCH and P-H provide a current loose- 
leaf service which offers all regular and memorandum Tax Court 
decisions in an expeditious manner. If these loose-leaf volumes are 
retained, it is unnecessary to purchase the government (TC) series 
to obtain a complete set. Most practitioners, however, make that 
purchase anyway in order to obtain bound volumes of the regular 
Tax Court decisions. As noted earlier, unlike the government, both 
Commerce Clearing House and Prentice-Hall publish bound vol­
umes of the Tax Court memorandum decisions.
108
Although the duplication of a single judicial proceeding in sev­
eral court reporter series has the advantages noted earlier, that same 
duplication creates the problem of multiple citations. The extent of 
the present duplication is shown in exhibits 4.2 and 4.3, pages 110 
and 112. In preparing tax communications, a writer can never be 
certain of which reporter series is most readily available to his 
reader; therefore, it is difficult to know which series should be 
cited. In order to standardize citation presentation, most formal 
publications have accepted the practice of presenting at least an 
initial reference to the “official” or “standard” reporter series. If 
other (secondary) citations are also given, they generally follow 
the standard citation. Thus, one might properly cite the decision 
in Harris as Harris v. Commissioner, 340 US 106 (1950), 39 AFTR 
1002, 50-2 USTC ¶10,786. Obviously additional secondary refer­
ences could be added to the two in the above illustration.
The Citator
The tax researcher who must consider judicial authority has a 
most useful tool at his disposal in a citator, which is simply a com­
pilation of cross-references to judicial decisions. Following the initial 
entry of each judicial proceeding in an alphabetical sequence, a 
citator includes later cross-references to additional citations—that is, 
to other cases—which in some way contain a reference to the initial 
entry. To illustrate, assume that only five judicial decisions have 
ever been rendered ( those being Able, Baker, Charlie, Daley, and 
Evert, in chronological order.) Assume further that the court in 
Baker made some mention of the Able decision; that the court in 
Daley made some reference to the decisions in Able and Charlie, 
but not to that in Baker; and that the court in Evert made refer­
ence only to the decision in Baker. Given these assumptions a com­
plete citator could be prepared as follows:
Able (initial citation)
. . . Baker (cross-reference to page in Baker which “cites” Able)
. . .  Daley (cross-reference to page in Daley which “cites” Able)
Baker (initial citation)
. . . Evert ( cross-reference to page in Evert which “cites” Baker)
Charlie (initial citation)
. . .  Daley (cross-reference to page in Daley which “cites” Charlie)
Daley (initial citation only)
Evert (initial citation only)
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Obviously, there are thousands of judicial decisions and many 
thousands of cross-references. Were there no citators (or other 
equivalent data retrieval systems), it would be virtually impossible 
to locate much of the pertinent judicial authority on most tax ques­
tions. With citators available, the task is at least feasible. To illus­
trate, consider the problem of interpreting what the words “ordi­
nary” and “necessary” mean as they are used in Code Sections 162 
and 212. This task was undertaken by the Supreme Court in 1933 
in Welch v. Helvering, 290 US 111 (1933). Since that 1933 deci­
sion, Welch v. Helvering has been “cited” in more than 300 sub­
sequent court decisions. A citator greatly facilitates the task of 
locating any or all of these decisions, which just may offer addi­
tional perspective on the meaning of the words “ordinary” and 
“necessary,” because it identifies a reasonable set of cases to exam­
ine further. In most instances, of course, the list of cases suggested 
by a citator will be much smaller than the 300 noted here.
Using the Citator. To demonstrate the methodology applied in 
searching for pertinent judicial decisions, assume that a tax re­
searcher has somehow identified a potentially important case with 
a primary citation. If that practitioner has only the USTC or 
AFTR reporter series available to him, he must first find an “equiva­
lent” secondary citation before he can read the decision he is inter­
ested in reviewing. If he has the AFTR series available, he should 
begin with the P-H Citator; if he has the USTC series available, he 
should begin with the CCH Citator. Each citator will give the 
secondary citation for its own reporter series only. The case “names” 
(technically called styles) are arranged in alphabetical sequence 
in both citators. However, the P-H Citator consists of five separate 
volumes, whereas the CCH Citator consists of only one. Thus, in 
working with P-H materials, a tax researcher may have to consult 
more than one volume if he wants to locate all of the subsequent 
decisions that have cited the initial entry. The number of volumes 
to be consulted will depend upon the year the initial case was 
heard. If a case was first tried sometime between 1796 and 1941, 
the researcher using the P-H series must consult all three volumes 
of the AFTR series, volume 1 of the AFTR2d series, and the loose- 
leaf volume for current citations. On the other hand, if the case
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being examined was first tried sometime between 1948 and 1954, 
the researcher would consult only volume 3 of the AFTR series, 
volume 1 of the AFTR2d series, and the current (loose-leaf) vol­
ume. Exhibit 4.4, see below, compares the CCH Citator with the 
P-H Citator; exhibit 4.5, opposite, cross-references the P-H Citator to 
other judicial reporters.
Exhibit 4.4
Key to Citator Services
Year
Publisher 1796-1941 1941-1948 1948-1954 1954-1967 Since 1967
Prentice-Hall 1st Series Vol. 1
1st Series 
Vol. 2
1st Series 
Vol. 3
2nd Series 
Vol. 1
Loose-
leaf
Commerce Clearing 
House Only one loose-leaf volume covering all dates
Any meaningful comparison of these two citator services must go 
beyond the apparent convenience factor of working with one CCH 
volume as opposed to five P-H volumes because the usefulness of 
either citator becomes a function of what the researcher wants to 
find. Should he desire to obtain a brief judicial history of a case, 
the CCH Citator is a handy research tool. For example, assume that 
the researcher wants to trace the history of Germantown Trust Co. 
This case came to his attention in a tax periodical, where it was 
cited as 309 US 304 (1940). A simple check in the one-volume 
CCH Citator, which is arranged in alphabetical order, discloses that 
Germantown Trust Co. was originally tried by the Board of Tax Ap­
peals in 1938 and entered as a memorandum decision; this decision 
was reversed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, and in turn was 
reversed by the Supreme Court (see exhibit 4.6, page 116). In ad­
dition, the CCH Citator discloses that Germantown Trust Co. has 
subsequently been cited in over twenty additional cases, most re­
cently in 1972. All of this information may or may not be pertinent 
to the researcher’s tax problem. Finally, of course, the CCH Citator 
gives the cross-reference of the case in the USTC series.
To gather this same information through the use of the P-H 
Citator, the researcher would proceed along the following lines 
(see exhibits 4.7-4.11, pages 117-121). The original citation, Ger­
mantown Trust Co., 309 US 304 (1940), discloses the decision year; 
thus, the researcher turns to volume 1 of the P-H Citator (1796- 
1941) to learn that the Board of Tax Appeals was the court of
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CCH Citator Page
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Exhibit 4.7
P-H Citator— Volume 1 for AFTR Series (1919-1941)
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P-H Citator— Volume 2 for AFTR Series (1941-1948)
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P-H Citator— Volume 3 for AFTR Series (1948-1954)
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P-H Citator— Volume 1 for AFTR— 2d Series (1954-1967)
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Exhibit 4.11
P-H Citator— Loose-Leaf Volume for AFTR— 2d Series (Since 1967)
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original jurisdiction, which tried the case twice. Furthermore, the 
P-H Citator shows that the BTA decision was reversed by the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals and that the text of the Supreme Court 
decision may be found at 23 AFTR 1084. Whether that decision 
sustained or reversed the circuit court cannot be determined from 
the citator. Additional cases in which Germantown Trust Co. has 
been cited are listed but, in order to compile a more complete list­
ing, all live citator volumes must be consulted, that is, volumes 2 
and 3 of the AFTR series, volume 1 of the AFTR2d series, and 
finally the loose-leaf edition covering cases since 1967.
It should be apparent that the CCH Citator is the more conveni­
ent source for locating a particular case in order to determine its 
original trial court, to trace its history through the appeals courts, 
and finally to compile a summary of cases in which the decision was 
subsequently cited. However, in the case of Germantown, the mul­
tiple-volume P-H Citator, in the aggregate, discloses a larger num­
ber of cases in which Germantown Trust Co. has been cited than 
does the one-volume CCH Citator. Furthermore, the P-H Citator 
features several other advantages not to be found in the CCH 
Citator, which may be of considerable importance to the careful 
tax researcher. Most of these advantages will assist the tax adviser 
in the process of assessing potential tax authority and thus a de­
tailed discussion of these desirable features will be deferred until 
the following chapter.
Editorial Interpretations
The sheer bulk and complexity of the tax statutes make it hu­
manly impossible for any individual to understand all of the rules 
and regulations pertinent to a tax practice. Fortunately, the tax 
practitioner has at his disposal a variety of editorial interpretations 
ranging from extensive loose-leaf tax services to brief explanations 
in professional journals and pamphlets, much of which is invaluable 
to an efficient tax practice.
Tax Services
Perhaps the most significant assistance is available through a sub­
scription to one or more major tax services. Tax services are de­
signed to help quickly locate statutory, administrative, and judicial
122
authority and to give helpful editorial interpretations of those pri­
mary authorities. The various tax services constantly update the 
information they provide. Subscribers are regularly informed of 
changes in the statute or regulations, new court decisions and rev­
enue rulings, and other pertinent matters. Nothing is more embar­
rassing to a practitioner than to plan a tax strategy with an outdated 
authority. Current subscription tax services are a tremendous time­
saving device that the tax practitioner can ill afford to be without.
A practitioner usually begins his research with the service with 
which he is most familiar. Dependence upon one service, however, 
can become detrimental. Each service is compiled and maintained 
by editors with divergent approaches to solving the same tax prob­
lem. Consequently, each service develops a distinct interpretive 
personality. While the salesman representing the publisher may 
believe that his product is adequate by itself, the experienced re­
searcher will discover that, because of their unique features, most 
tax services really complement each other.
The key to utilizing each tax service effectively lies in the mastery 
of its index systems. Access to materials in individual services may 
be gained through code section numbers, topical references, or 
both. To demonstrate the individuality of indexes of at least two 
frequently used tax services, assume the following fact situation. An 
immediate family member of an important client has become the 
victim of a political kidnapping. A sizable ransom is demanded and 
eventually delivered for the release of the victim. Subsequently, a 
determination must be made as to the deductibility of the ransom 
payment. If the tax researcher begins his inquiry with the topical 
index of the Prentice-Hall Tax Service, he will find the entry “ran­
som money,” with a reference to paragraph 7434. However, para­
graph 7434 discusses ransom payments only as they constitute in­
come to the extortioner. If the researcher consults the Commerce 
Clearing House Index, he will find the notation “Ransom payments, 
theft loss deduction,” directing him to paragraph 1571.29 and Rev­
enue Ruling 72-112, which allowed a deduction of ransom pay­
ments as a theft loss where the taking of money was illegal under 
state law and was done with criminal intent.
As one might suspect, Revenue Ruling 72-112 can also be found 
in the Prentice-Hall Tax Service under the heading “Theft” and 
a subheading “ransom payments as,” with a reference to paragraph 
14,407(10). Another key word will bring the same result in the P-H
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service. The heading “Extortion” will lead to the subheading 
“money obtained by” and the reference to paragraph 14,407 (10).
The foregoing example is not designed to recommend one par­
ticular index and tax service over another; its purpose is to demon­
strate the trial-and-error approach necessary to locate pertinent au­
thority. Furthermore, it also demonstrates the advisability of having 
more than one tax service available.
To further illustrate this point let us continue with the foregoing 
example and assume that, instead of representing the family of the 
kidnapped victim, the tax adviser is representing the kidnapper 
and must determine the tax aspects of the ransom money that he 
obtained. In the Commerce Clearing House Index, the heading “ran­
som” only leads to the deductibility question. In the Prentice-Hall 
index, the term “Ransom money” refers the researcher to para­
graph 7434. This citation gives a synopsis of James Rutkin, 343 
US 130 (1952), in which the Supreme Court held that money ex­
torted without the victim’s consent and through threats of violence 
is to be included in gross income. In order to locate this authority 
in the Commerce Clearing House Index, the researcher would have 
to begin with the key word “extortion,” which would lead to the 
heading “Extortion Payment” and the subheading “income from,” 
paragraph reference 681.242.
In addition to variations in index systems, each tax service is 
known for specific features that may prove to be helpful, depending 
upon the research problem in question. A summary of cost, organi­
zation, and techniques of supplementation utilized by major tax 
service publishers can be found in exhibit 4.12, page 126.19
The following general comments outline some of the features of 
each service. Commerce Clearing House and Prentice-Hall publish 
major tax services annually in loose-leaf binders under the titles 
Standard Federal Tax Reporter and Federal Taxes, respectively. 
In many ways, these two services are similar. Both publications 
follow the organization of the Internal Revenue Code. Each major 
division begins with a preliminary discussion introducing the sub­
ject in general terms; subdivisions include exact quotations of the
19 The source for exhibits 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14 is Charles Van Raimond, “CPA 
Tax Libraries in Texas—Their Content and Use” (master’s thesis, the Univer­
sity of Texas at Austin, 1975).
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code sections and the related Treasury regulations. In addition, each 
subdivision contains interpretive explanations by the editorial staff 
and brief synopses of related court decisions, revenue rulings, and 
revenue procedures. Each service also features a separate volume 
containing the most recent developments regarding statutory, ad­
ministrative, and judicial authority.
Mertens’s tax service, entitled Law of Federal Income Taxation 
(Chicago: Callaghan and Co.), is organized on a topical basis and, 
therefore, does not follow the sequence of the code.20 The separate 
loose-leaf volumes of Mertens’s service can be divided into two 
groupings: (1) the treatise volumes, each volume containing schol­
arly discussions of the various tax topics (statutory, administrative, 
and judicial authorities are cited in footnote form) and (2) volumes 
containing the Internal Revenue Code, a code commentary, Treas­
ury regulations, and various rulings and procedures. Although the 
code commentary volumes do not feature complete texts of the com­
mittee reports, the editorial summaries do provide historical back­
ground and suggest the apparent congressional intent for many sec­
tions. The ruling volumes comprised revenue rulings, revenue pro­
cedures, and miscellaneous announcements beginning with 1954. 
These volumes embody an efficient index system that, in addition 
to showing the current status of revenue rulings, assists in identify­
ing all rulings issued in connection with a particular Internal Rev­
enue Code section. Because of its encyclopedic approach to the sub­
ject matter, the Mertens service is especially helpful to the indi­
vidual with limited knowledge of the topic to be researched. Due 
to its scholarly excellence, Mertens is cited in court opinions.
Perhaps one weakness of Mertens is the fact that revised and 
new material is organized on a cumulative basis and appears in the 
front of each volume. This makes it somewhat cumbersome to lo­
cate the most recent developments on any particular topic. Further­
more, the revision process of Mertens occurs less frequently than 
that of Commerce Clearing House or Prentice-Hall.
Federal Income, Gift and Estate Taxation (9 vols.), by Jacob 
Rabkin and Mark H. Johnson (New York: Matthew Bender, Inc.) 
is a loose-leaf tax service organized by subject rather than by code
20See also Jacob Mertens, Jr., Law of Federal Gift and Estate Taxation (Chi­
cago: Callaghan and Co., 1969).
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section. For example, all material dealing with partnerships is found 
in one cumulative discussion. The Internal Revenue Code and the 
Treasury regulations are published in separate volumes. One of the 
outstanding features of the Rabkin and Johnson service is the avail­
ability of the legislative committee reports, which are interspersed 
in the Internal Revenue Code volumes.
The Research Institute of America, Inc., (RIA) publishes Tax 
Coordinator, a compilation of professional tax research. The service 
is divided into twenty-four separate divisions identified by a let­
tered tab card. Each division begins with an explanation of all prob­
lems in a given area, supported with citations to appropriate author­
ities. Next is the text of the applicable code section and Treasury 
regulation. Explanations of latest developments appear immediately 
following the verbatim reprints of the code and regulations. Edito­
rial explanations include illustrations, planning points, tax traps, and 
appropriate recommendations.
The Bureau of National Affairs publishes a portfolio tax service 
entitled Tax Management. At present the total service consists of 
some 150 portfolios that range in length from 50 to 200 pages. Each 
portfolio deals with a specific tax topic. The organization of the 
material within each portfolio follows a standard pattern. Part 
(A ) contains a detailed analysis of the subject matter. This analysis 
is written in narrative form, with extensive footnotes to statutory, 
administrative, and judicial authority. The format of discussion lends 
itself to research progressing from general backgrounds through 
specific problems within the topic under consideration. Part (B) 
provides helpful working papers, appropriate forms, and illustrations 
and part (C) includes a bibliography of related resource material.
Previously noted were two special judicial reporter series, 
namely, the Commerce Clearing House USTC series and the 
Prentice-Hall AFTR series. To some extent, the cases appearing 
in these series are “selected” by editorial staffs. In addition, the 
editors prepare “headnotes” for each case published. Headnotes 
enumerate the issue(s) contained in each case in brief form and 
give the court’s conclusion. Thus, a researcher may gain a quick 
understanding of the general subject matter of each case included 
in either series by simply scanning the headnotes. The researcher 
must remember, however, that the headnotes are in effect editorial 
comments and not an integral part of any official opinion.
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The decision to subscribe to only one tax service or to several 
must be made on the basis of how many services a practice can 
support. However, the tax adviser should keep in mind that, just as 
two heads are better than one, two or more tax services can increase 
effectiveness. The real benefit of any tax service lies in the time­
saving factor which allows the tax practitioner to quickly find a 
correct answer to his tax question. However, time constraints in a 
tax practice make it impossible to consult all available services on 
every problem. Anticipation of which service will most efficiently di­
rect research to an acceptable solution comes only with experience.
Books
The economics of a tax practice demand that the researcher find 
solutions quickly and without excessive cost to the client. Conse­
quently, a tax adviser cannot afford the luxury of pulling a full- 
length book from the shelf and spending a day or two pursuing 
the subject in leisurely fashion. However, a survey of CPA tax libra­
ries in Texas disclosed that practitioners considered some tax refer­
ence books to be invaluable in their tax practice. The three most 
frequently mentioned books are Federal Income Taxation of Corpo­
rations and Shareholders, third edition (Boston: Warren, Gorham 
and Lamont, 1971), by Boris I. Bittker and James S. Eustice; On 
Partnership Taxation (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971) by Arthur 
B. Willis; and The Consolidated Tax Return: Principles, Practice, 
Planning, second edition (Boston: Warren, Gorham and Lamont, 
1973), by Jack Crestol, Kevin M. Hennessey, and Anthony P. Rua.21 
Their special status implies that they contain information discussed 
and summarized in a fashion not elsewhere available.
Numerous tax institutes and seminars are held annually through­
out the United States. At such institutes, tax topics are discussed 
and papers are presented that usually deal with significant current 
issues. Three very popular tax institutes—the New York University 
Tax Institute, the University of Southern California Tax Institute, 
and the Tulane Tax Institute—publish their proceedings in annual 
bound volumes. Because of the emphasis on current and complex 
topics, tax researchers may benefit from consulting such materials.
21 Charles Van Raimond, “CPA Tax Libraries,” p. 23.
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Tax Magazines
More than a dozen magazines are currently published dealing 
exclusively with taxation and providing valuable assistance to the 
tax practitioner. Their formats range from those appealing to the 
general tax practitioner to those specializing in a particular field of 
taxation. For example, the Journal of Taxation features regular de­
partments dealing with corporations, estates, trusts and gifts, exempt 
institutions, partnerships, and so on. The Tax Adviser, published 
monthly by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 
is another popular tax journal for the general practitioner. A rela­
tively new periodical, the Journal of Real Estate Taxation, would 
obviously appeal most to the tax practitioner whose practice in­
cludes numerous clients with real estate problems.
To locate pertinent articles in the periodical tax literature, a re­
searcher may consult the cumulative indexes provided in the various 
issues. A more efficient means of locating journal material is through 
CCH Tax Articles, a three-volume service including a topical index, 
a code section index, and an author’s index. The P-H tax service 
index volume also contains an “Index to Tax Articles” that is organ­
ized by topic using the P-H paragraph index system. For a complete 
list of available tax magazines that may assist the tax researcher see 
exhibit 4.13, page 132.22
Tax Newsletters
Most tax newsletters are published weekly and are, therefore, 
excellent sources of the most recent developments. They keep the 
tax adviser in touch with the dynamics of the tax laws. Occasionally, 
in scanning a newsletter, a practitioner will spot an item that has 
relevance to a client’s problem. More often, however, the newsletter 
simply provides the practitioner with ideas that may be recalled and 
used in later work. See exhibit 4.14, page 134, for a comprehensive 
listing of the available publications.23
How many technical publications a tax adviser should purchase is, 
of course, an individual decision. Many publications duplicate in­
formation and reading all of them would demand too much of a 
tax adviser’s valuable time. The decision must, therefore, be based
22 Raimond, “CPA Tax Libraries.”
23 Ibid.
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on the size and nature of the practice. The larger the firm, the more 
varied the personalities, and the greater the areas of specialization 
represented, the greater the variety of subscriptions required.
Computer Assisted Tax Research
Mead Data Central, Inc., has developed a computer storage and 
retrieval system which is likely to have a far-reaching impact upon 
future tax research. This system, marketed under the trade name 
LEXIS, is useful in situations where authority is scarce and a man­
ual search could have overlooked appropriate authority. The inher­
ent speed of the computer also makes the LEXIS system invaluable 
in situations where authority is voluminous and access must be 
obtained quickly. The system is thorough and accurate when used 
by a knowledgeable tax practitioner.
The researcher subscribing to the LEXIS data base communicates 
with the computer through a terminal (possibly installed in his 
office) that is connected via telephone lines to the central computer 
in Dayton, Ohio. Access to the information stored in the computer 
memory is accomplished through “key-words-in-context.” The re­
searcher must select the words (or phrases) likely to be found in 
the original text of any authority that might be pertinent to the 
problem at hand. The computer scans all of the documents in its 
file and indicates via the terminal video screen the number of docu­
ments it has that include the selected words. The user may then 
narrow or expand his original key-word selection, depending upon 
the computer response. If he uses key words that are too common, 
the computer simply will have too many entries to justify his look­
ing at each of them. If he uses key words that are too restrictive, 
the computer will overlook authority that may be pertinent to his 
problem. For example, if the researcher entered only the words 
“personal residence” and “sale of,” the computer would be likely to 
locate 500 to 1,000 citations which contain those common words. 
In order to reduce the number of documents to be examined, the 
researcher might add the specific phrase “taxpayer 65 or over” and 
may find that this addition reduces the number of available docu­
ments substantially. Complementing this request with “primary resi­
dence” may bring the number of applicable documents down to an 
even more manageable size. When the search has been sufficiently 
narrowed, the complete text of actual documents can then be re-
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trieved on the video screen and, if necessary, printed out in hard 
copy. The critical difference between a computer search and a 
manual search is in the key words. Successful retrieval in the com­
puter system depends upon the correct identification of key words 
actually used in a tax authority; in the manual system it depends 
upon identification of the key word selected by the preparer of an 
index.24 Nevertheless, experience with one system is usually helpful 
in the other.
At the present time the LEXIS data bank includes the following 
documents:
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (as amended)
Final, temporary, and proposed Treasury regulations pertaining to 
the code
The Cumulative Bulletins beginning in 1954
Tax Court decisions from 1942
Tax Court memorandum decisions from 1968
Tax cases decided by the district courts from 1970
Tax cases decided by the Court of Claims from 1942
Tax cases decided by the courts of appeals from 1945
Tax cases decided by the Supreme Court from 1913
Public laws beginning with the 1954 Internal Revenue Code 
House, Senate, and Conference committee reports associated with
the 1954 code and amendments to the code
Ultrafiche
Maintaining a complete tax library often requires expensive of­
fice space. To partially alleviate the space problem, Commerce 
Clearing House has employed an ultrafiche technique to reproduce 
up to 1,700 pages on a single four-by-six-inch transparent plastic 
card. These cards are read on viewers, similar to those used with
24 The LEXIS terminal can also access the accounting data banks of the AICPA’s 
National Automated Accounting Retrieval System (NAARS). This system 
operates through Mead Data Central’s research service and gives the user 
access to a data bank containing complete accounting information on over 
6,000 corporate annual reports, Accounting Research Bulletins, Accounting 
Principles Board Opinions, Statements on Auditing Standards and all future 
pronouncements of the Financial Accounting Standards Board. Detailed in­
formation can be obtained from the Information Retrieval Department of the 
AICPA.
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microfilm, which may be equipped with printing capacity. At the 
present time the following texts have been reproduced by CCH 
using this technique:
Original Publisher
Board of Tax Appeals Report (1924-1942) GPO
United States Tax Court Reports (1943-present) GPO 
Cumulative Bulletins (1919-present) GPO
United States Tax Court ( 1913-present) CCH
Tax Court Memorandum Decisions (1943-present) CCH
This entire collection of ultrafiche plastic plates is filed in CCH 
loose-leaf binders and requires less than one foot of shelf space.
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. . .  as the articulation of a statute increases, the
room for interpretation must contract; but the meaning
of a sentence may be more than that of the separate
words, as a melody is more than the notes, and no
degree of particularity can ever obviate recourse to
the setting in which all appear, and which all collectively
create.
JUDGE LEARNED HAND
Assessing and
Applying Authority
After a tax researcher has located authority that seems pertinent 
to his problem, the important task of assessing that material begins. 
His aim is to arrive at a course of action that he can confidently 
communicate to his client along with identification of the risks and 
costs accompanying it.
Locating appropriate authority for a particular tax problem is 
only half the battle. The technical jargon of many portions of the 
Internal Revenue Code and Treasury regulations requires the tax 
adviser to read and comprehend unusually complex sentences in 
order to determine congressional intent; other portions of the code 
and regulations hinge upon deceptively simple words or phrases 
whose definitions may be debatable. Furthermore, while available 
secondary authorities or such interpretive sources as Treasury regu­
lations, revenue rulings, or court decisions may be more compre­
hensible than are primary statutory authorities, they are frequently 
less authoritative.
The researcher faces another, more serious hurdle when author­
ities conflict. The applicable law may be questionable due to con­
flicts between statutes or between interpretations of those statutes, 
between the IRS interpretations and various federal courts, and
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among the courts themselves at various levels of jurisdiction. Fin­
ally, a researcher may be unable to locate any authority at all on a 
particular problem.
In attempting to assess authority and apply it to complex practice 
problems, the researcher may encounter any one of four funda­
mentally different situations. The first involves clear, concise tax 
law that could be applied if the researcher were able to gather ad­
ditional facts from his client. In two other circumstances, the ad­
viser may be in possession of clearly established facts but finds (1) 
conflicting statutes or (2) conflicting interpretations of those sta­
tutes. Finally, a researcher may encounter a fourth situation in 
which existing tax law is incomplete or inapplicable, requiring him 
to resolve issues through interpolation from related authorities and 
application of creative thinking.
The Law Is Clear— the Facts Are Uncertain
A tax adviser frequently finds it difficult to reach a conclusion 
and to make a recommendation more because of insufficient knowl­
edge of the facts in the case than because of confusion in the ap­
plicable rules. In many situations, the biggest single problem is 
gathering sufficient evidence to support the taxpayer’s contention 
that he be granted the tax treatment clearly authorized in a specific 
provision of the Internal Revenue Code.
To illustrate this kind of problem, assume that a client, Mr. Jerry 
Hill, includes what he describes as a “$16,000 casualty loss” with 
the information he provides for the filing of his income tax return. 
A cursory line of questioning by his tax adviser reveals that the loss 
is claimed for a handwoven Indian wall carpet that, the client 
claims, was chewed and clawed to bits by a stray dog. Mr. Hill ex­
plains that while on vacation last summer, he left his residence in 
the care of his housekeeper. Apparently one day the housekeeper 
neglected to close a door securely and a stray dog wandered into the 
house. Upon the Hills’ return from vacation, they were told the fol­
lowing story. Attracted by strange noises, the housekeeper entered 
the study and found a dog gnawing and tearing on the wall rug. As 
the housekeeper entered the room, the dog turned and ran growling 
from the house. Although not certain of it the housekeeper reported 
noticing foam around the dog’s mouth. Later a neighbor said that a 
rabid dog had been seen roaming the neighborhood. The house­
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keeper, who eared for Hill’s own dogs, stated that the dog discov­
ered in the study was not one of Mr. Hill’s. Mr. Hill checked with 
the city dogcatcher concerning the reported sighting of a mad dog. 
He was, however, unable to confirm any such report with the dog­
catcher. He did not check with the police department.
Through a little research, the tax adviser is convinced that in or­
der for Mr. Hill to qualify for a casualty loss deduction under 
Section 165(a) he must satisfy the following specific requirements:
1. The loss must have been sudden and unexpected. (Matheson 
v. Commissioner, 54 F2d 537 (CA-2, 1931).)
2. The loss could not constitute a mysterious disappearance. 
(Paul Bakewell, Jr., 23 TC 803 (1955).)
3. The amount of the loss deduction is limited to fair market 
value (FMV) immediately before the casualty occurred, less 
the FMV immediately after the casualty, less any insurance 
recovery, and less a $100 floor. (Treas. Regs. Sec. 1.165-7(b).)
4. The loss could not be attributable to the taxpayer’s own dog. 
(J. R. Dyer, 20 TCM 705 (1961).)
At this point a tax adviser would be faced with two alternatives: 
he could accept his client’s statement at face value and claim the 
deduction, or he might suggest that the client accumulate additional 
substantiation of the loss if he desires to claim the deduction. If an 
adviser follows the former alternative he is simply postponing the 
collection of evidence until a possible audit by the IRS, because the 
presence of a rather sizable casualty loss on a client’s tax return 
undoubtedly would increase the risk of an audit. Furthermore, it 
might be self-defeating to defer the collection of evidence because 
two or three years from now individuals who could render state­
ments on matters now fresh in their minds may be unavailable, or 
they may not recall necessary details. Furthermore, helpful police 
records may be destroyed. Since the taxpayer may be unaware of 
what is needed to substantiate the loss deduction, he may, in the 
meantime, dispose of important evidence, such as the ruined rug.
If a tax adviser pursues the second alternative, he should present 
his client with a list of instructions and suggest that the client ac­
cumulate the necessary evidence to support the deduction in the 
event of an audit or eventual litigation. The list could include the 
following items:
141
1. Sworn statements from
(a) the housekeeper and (b) the individual who sighted the 
apparently rabid dog in the neighborhood.
2. Appraisal by a qualified expert or experts showing the value 
of the rug before and after the casualty.
3. Color photographs of the rug before and after the casualty.
4. Instructions to retain the damaged rug as evidence, if possible.
5. Statements from, or correspondence with, insurance agents 
relative to the amount of any insurance recovery.
6. Purchase invoice showing proof of ownership and cost.
A client may ignore an adviser’s request or he may be unable to 
obtain all of the evidence recommended. Nevertheless, the adviser 
will have informed his client on a timely basis of the requirements 
necessary to sustain the right to the deduction claimed.
In tax research work involving situations in which tax laws are 
clear but the facts of the situation are in question, it behooves the 
tax adviser to establish the facts necessary to reach a conclusion and 
either to accumulate appropriate supporting evidence or to suggest 
that his client do so. Then, in the event of an audit, the tax adviser 
would have only to persuade a revenue agent to accept the mass 
of overwhelming evidence and, therefore, to reach the conclusion 
desired.
The Facts Are Clear— the Law Is Questionable
The tax researcher may encounter another kind of problem in­
volving situations where facts are well established but the law is 
uncertain. Uncertainty may arise either because of conflicting or 
ambiguous statutes or because of conflicting interpretations of a sta­
tute, the latter of which is the more common.
Conflicting Statutes
Although it is rather rare, the facts of a problem sometimes can 
be analyzed in light of two entirely different provisions of the sta­
tute, with each provision furnishing a different tax result. It is 
reasonable under these circumstances for the tax adviser to report 
the transactions under that section of the Internal Revenue Code 
that would produce the lowest tax liability for his client. In this
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situation the adviser and his client should be prepared for a possible 
IRS challenge.
In Haserot v. Commissioner, 41 TC 562 (1964), the Tax Court 
was faced with an apparent conflict in statutory authority. The facts 
of that case reveal that a taxpayer transferred stock in two compa­
nies that he owned to a third corporation in exchange for that cor­
poration’s stock and “boot” (cash). After the transfer, the taxpayer 
owned more than 82 percent of the third corporation’s stock. Ac­
cordingly, the taxpayer treated the transaction as a nontaxable trans­
fer under Section 351, with “boot” received in the transfer taxable 
as a capital gain. The government, on the other hand, claimed that 
Section 304 was controlling. Having to choose one of these statutory 
provisions, the Tax Court said in part:
Both parties present a multiplicity of arguments as to which sec­
tion controls. If section 351 controls, the gain is to be taxed as a 
capital gain. If section 304 controls, then the gain is to be taxed as 
a capital gain or the $64,850 cash payment is to be taxed as a divi­
dend, depending upon the relevant parts of section 302.
• • • •
We have no reason to believe that Congress had any intent with 
regard to the fact pattern of this case. However, the statements in 
sections 301(a) and 302(d), “except as otherwise provided in this 
chapter [or subchapter]” of the Code, indicate that Congress made 
the policy decision that dividend treatment will result from the 
application of section 302 only if no other provision in the relevant 
parts of the Code requires other treatment. Section 351 has no such 
limitation. That section is, by its terms, applicable. That section 
provides for tax treatment of the payment in question in a manner 
other than and different from the distribution treatment provided 
for by sections 302(d) and 301. Consequently, the very words of 
the latter sections preclude dividend treatment in this case.1
The rather dubious conclusion reached by the Tax Court rests 
importantly on a very careful reading of the code. It suggests, in 
fact, that no statutory conflict exists even though the net result 
seems clearly to be inconsistent with the general intent of Section 
304. Fortunately, conflicting statutory authority is rare; when it is 
discovered, however, the taxpayer should be prepared to litigate his
1 Henry McK. Haserot, 41 TC 562 (1964).
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right to rely on the more advantageous provision.
In a few instances, the drafters of the Internal Revenue Code
anticipated the possible application of two provisions of the statute 
to the same fact situation and provided a statutory resolution of the 
conflict. For example, Section 368(a)(2)(A ) explicitly provides 
that a corporate reorganization that satisfies both the rules of a type 
C and a type D reorganization, shall be treated as a type D reorgan­
ization only. Unfortunately, not all conflicts in the statutes are so 
easily resolved.
Conflicting Interpretations
A tax researcher more frequently encounters conflicting interpre­
tations of tax statutes by various authorities. Conflicts may be found 
between the Treasury regulations and the code, between the Treas­
ury regulations and the courts, or between two federal courts. In 
such situations, the tax adviser must consider the alternatives and 
weigh the risks—including the cost of lengthy administrative bat­
tles with the IRS and potential litigation—before recommending a 
particular conclusion or course of action.2 While it is the responsi­
bility of the tax adviser to discover conflicting interpretations of the 
statutes and to advise his client of the risks and alternatives, the cli­
ent should decide which course of action to pursue. Although only 
the client can decide whether to incur the costs of an administrative 
or legal confrontation with the IRS, he generally relies heavily on 
the recommendation of his tax adviser in reaching that decision. 
Other pertinent considerations include the general inconvenience 
associated with such disputes, the risk of exposure to additional 
audits, and the possibility of adverse publicity.
Regulations Versus Individual Interpretation. During his research 
efforts, every tax adviser will form a personal opinion concerning 
the validity of specific regulations. Sometimes a tax adviser may have 
serious reservations concerning the Treasury’s interpretation of a 
statute and may so inform his client. However, to plan a tax strategy 
that depends solely on having a particular segment of the Treasury
2 For additional discussion of factors to be considered by a CPA in giving tax 
advice, see American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Statement on 
Responsibilities in Tax Practice No. 8, “Advice to Clients” (New York: Amer­
ican Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1970).
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regulations declared invalid is certainly a high-risk proposition. 
Nevertheless, if all other attempts to sustain a client’s position fail, 
legal counsel may advise a taxpayer to challenge the validity of a 
Treasury regulation.
In analyzing the validity of a specific regulation, a tax researcher 
should determine, among other things, the “age” of that regulation. 
Perhaps a life in excess of ten years would categorize a regulation 
as “old” and anything short of ten years would warrant the designa­
tion “new.” Old regulations—especially those that have been unsuc­
cessfully challenged in the courts—should be considered as the equiv­
alent of the statute itself. This is especially true if, subsequent to the 
unsuccessful court action, Congress revised other segments of the 
statute but left unchanged the provision that had been challenged. 
An example of a situation in which a regulation was challenged and 
later upheld by the courts can be found in Paul J. Ussery.3 In this 
instance the taxpayer took issue with the construction of Treas. 
Regs. Sec. 1.117-4, which excludes from the terms “fellowship” and 
“scholarship” any payments granted for academic work performed 
primarily for the benefit of the grantor. Because Congress amended 
the Internal Revenue Code subsequent to the Ussery decision but 
did not further clarify Section 117, one might assume that Con­
gress has given its approval to the court’s interpretation in Ussery. 
This conclusion is frequently stated by the court; see, for example, 
Helvering v. Winmill, 305 US 79 (1938).
Tax advisers should generally consider “old” regulations that have 
never been challenged to be well established. Most attempts to over­
turn old regulations through court action would be futile while the 
possibility of successfully challenging a “new” regulation is signifi­
cantly greater. Before challenging a new regulation, however, the 
tax adviser should determine the kind of regulation in question.4 The 
likelihood of a successful challenge will be very slim if the regula­
tion has been issued under specifically delegated authority. In the
3 Paul J. Ussery v. U.S., 296 F2d 582 (CA-5, 1961).
4 An example of statutory regulations are those under Sec. 1502, where Con­
gress delegated the authority to the Treasury secretary in the consolidated tax 
return area. Another example of statutory regulations will be forthcoming 
when the Treasury exercises its authority under Section 385 where the secre­
tary or his delegate has been granted authority to prescribe regulations that 
would offer guidelines for purposes of determining whether an interest in a 
corporation is either debt or equity.
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event that a tax adviser feels that a new and previously untested 
interpretive regulation construes a statute contrary to the intent 
of Congress, he must obtain legal counsel before embarking upon 
an all-out battle against the regulation.
Regulations Versus Courts. If a regulation has already been chal­
lenged, one of three possible outcomes may exist. First, the Internal 
Revenue Service may have lost the challenge and either revised or 
withdrawn the contested regulation. Second, the government may 
have lost one or more specific tests of the regulation but still be 
unwilling to concede defeat. Third, the IRS may have been able 
to defend a regulation successfully, and, therefore, further attempts 
to challenge that regulation would not hold much promise.
During the sixties, an interesting and prolonged conflict developed 
between certain Treasury regulations and a number of court deci­
sions beginning in 1954 with the Kintner decision.5 Prior to 1962, self- 
employed professionals, who were unable to incorporate under state 
law, could not deduct for tax purposes contributions made to profit- 
sharing or pension plans.6 At the same time, a tax deduction for con­
tributions to similar plans was available to corporations. In order 
to obtain the benefits available to corporations, professional partner­
ships attempted to assume the characteristics of associations, which 
qualify as corporations for tax purposes. These characteristics were 
first established in Morrissey and later adopted in the Treasury 
regulations.7
In opposing the classification of professional partnerships as “cor­
porate associations,” the commissioner lost numerous court battles. 
In an attempt to strengthen its position, the Treasury amended the 
regulations barring corporate treatment for unincorporated profes­
sional partnerships. This move resulted in the passage of state laws 
permitting the formation of professional corporations.
In a further move to strengthen the service’s position, Subsection
5U.S. v. Kintner, 216 F2d 418 (CA-9, 1954).
6 In 1962 the “H.R. 10” or “Keogh” plan was passed by Congress and allowed 
self-employed individuals a contribution deduction for retirement plans of 
up to the lesser of $2,500 or 10 percent of earned income. The amounts 
were amended in 1974 to read $7,500 and 15 percent, respectively.
7 See Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 US 344 (1935), and Treas. Regs. Sec. 
301.7701-2.
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(h) was added to Treas. Regs. Sec. 301.7701-2 on February 2, 1965. 
Subsection (h ) provided that all professional corporations would be 
taxed for federal income tax purposes as partnerships, even if in­
corporated under state professional corporation acts. Interested tax­
payers declared war on the so-called Kintner regulations and con­
sistently won one decision after another.8 The issue was finally set­
tled when, on August 8, 1969, the IRS announced that henceforth 
organizations formed under state professional corporation acts would 
be treated for tax purposes as corporations.9 Unfortunately, however, 
the Treasury regulations have not yet been fully amended to reflect 
this change of heart by the IRS.
During the time of controversy, tax advisers and their clients 
were faced with the options of accepting the Treasury regulations 
at face value or of casting their lot with court decisions, which time 
after time proved to be successful for the taxpayer. Many taxpayers 
were willing to invest time and assume the risk and expense of bat­
tling the IRS through administrative appeals procedures and the 
courts. While in this instance the final result was favorable to the 
taxpayers, in other conflicts taxpayers have been less successful.10
What has been said here concerning conflicting authority be­
tween Treasury regulations and judicial opinions is, obviously, 
equally applicable to conflicting authority between judicial opinions 
and revenue rulings, revenue procedures, and other official IRS 
pronouncements. While any dispute between the IRS and the courts 
is still in progress, taxpayers with similar questions become prime 
targets for future litigation if they adopt a position contrary to the 
service’s. The service is often looking for a “better” fact case (from 
its point of view) or for a more favorable circuit in which to litigate 
further. Any time a tax adviser recommends a position contrary to 
that of the Internal Revenue Service, even if that contrary position 
is adequately supported by judicial authority, the adviser should 
also explain to the client the potential risks and extra costs implicit 
in taking that position.
8 See, for example, U.S. v. Empey, 406 F2d 157 (CA-10, 1969); O’Neill v.
U.S., 410 F2d 888 (CA-6, 1969); Kurzner v. U.S., 413 F2d 97 (CA-5,
1969).
9TIR No. 1019, Federal Taxes, (P-H, 1969), par. 55, 334.
10 See, for example, B. Foreman Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 453 F2d 1144,
(CA-2, 1972), which deals with the creation of income issue under IRC
Sec. 482.
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As far as revenue agents, district conferees, and appellate con­
ferees are concerned, the IRS position is the law, and they will chal­
lenge a departure from this position. A tax adviser should recom­
mend an intentional disregard of the official IRS position only if his 
client is aware of the potential disagreement and the possible need 
to litigate.
One Court’s Interpretation Versus Another’s. Disagreements be­
tween courts on similar issues can be characterized as “horizontal” 
and “vertical.” Horizontal differences mean conflicting opinions is­
sued by courts at the same level of jurisdiction; vertical differences 
refer to conflicts between lower and higher courts. Horizontal dif­
ferences can occur between federal district courts, between the Tax 
Court and a district court, and between the several circuit courts. 
In such conflicts, the service is under no obligation to follow, on a 
nationwide basis, the precedent set by either court. Thus, a district 
court opinion favorable to the taxpayer would technically have prece­
dent value only for a taxpayer residing within the jurisdiction of 
that district court. Similarly, any circuit court opinion technically 
has precedent value only within the circuit where the decision 
originated because one circuit court is not bound to follow the 
precedent of another. If appealed, conflicting district court opinions, 
from district courts within the same circuit, are settled by the ap­
propriate circuit court. The Supreme Court, if it grants certiorari, 
settles conflicts between circuits. Prior to the time that a circuit 
court or the Supreme Court disposes of such opposing views, the tax 
adviser and his client should be fully aware of the risks involved 
when relying on a court decision that may subsequently be ap­
pealed and overturned.
An interesting example of conflict between courts involves em­
ployee expenses for transportation of the tools of one’s trade. Rely­
ing on Rev. Rul. 63-100,11 which allowed a musician an automobile 
expense deduction for the transportation of his musical instrument 
between his personal residence and his place of employment, a tax­
payer deducted his driving expenses because he transported a thirty- 
two-pound bag of tools to work each day. The Tax Court denied the 
deduction; however, the Second Circuit reversed and remanded the 
case to the Tax Court. On rehearing, the Tax Court allowed 25 per- 1
11 Rev. Rul. 63-100, 1963-1 CB 34.
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cent of the total driving expenses claimed by the taxpayer.12 Subse­
quently, in Fausner and in Hitt, two airline pilots, who were re­
quired by their employers and by government regulations to carry 
extensive flight gear, attempted to deduct transportation expenses 
between their home and the airport. In Fausner, the Tax Court felt 
constrained by the Sullivan decision since Fausner resided in the 
Second Circuit, and it allowed the deduction for the 1965 tax year.13 
However, because Hitt resided in the Fifth Circuit, the Tax Court, 
ruling on the same day, disregarded Sullivan and disallowed the 
deduction.14 Fausner’s returns for 1966 and 1967 were again chal­
lenged by the Internal Revenue Service on the same issue, and 
Fausner once more petitioned the Tax Court to rule on the matter. 
Although Fausner had resided in New York during 1966 and 1967, 
he had moved to Texas in 1968 and was thus petitioning from the 
Fifth Circuit in the latter years. In this instance, the Tax Court sus­
tained the service as it had done previously in Hitt,15 Fausner ap­
pealed to the Fifth Circuit and received an adverse ruling.16 At this 
point a conflict between the Second and the Fifth Circuit courts 
existed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on an appeal 
from Fausner.17 The Supreme Court finally settled the controversy 
by ruling against the taxpayer.18
The foregoing example demonstrates both horizontal and ver­
tical differences in judicial decisions. In horizontal differences, a 
taxpayer cannot rely on a decision rendered by another court at the 
same level of jurisdiction, because courts at the same level of juris­
diction simply are not bound by decisions of other courts at that 
same level. Vertical differences are harder to explain because lower 
courts generally are bound by decisions of higher courts. In the 
case of the Tax Court, however, even vertical differences may exist 
because the Tax Court has national jurisdiction. The Tax Court con­
12 Sullivan v. Commissioner, 368 F2d 1007 (CA-2, 1966) and 27 TCM 620 
(1971).
13 Fausner v. Commissioner, 66 TC 620 (1971).
14 Hitt v. Commissioner, 55 TC 628 (1971).
15 Fausner v. Commissioner, P-H TC Memo para. 71,277.
16Fausner v. Commissioner, 472 F2d 561 (CA-5, 1973).
17 Actually the conflict between the circuits involved another decision, in 
whioh the court held for the taxpayer (Tyne v. Commissioner, 385 F2d 40 
(CA-7, 1967)).
18 Fausner v. Commissioner, 93 S.Ct. 2820 (1973).
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siders itself bound by the decisions of the circuit courts of appeals 
only to the extent that taxpayers reside in the jurisdiction of a cir­
cuit court that has rendered a decision on that issue.
Since the Tax Court is not obligated to accept any circuit court 
opinion on a nationwide basis, it has ample opportunity to express 
its displeasure with a circuit court opinion by disregarding it in fact 
cases involving taxpayers from other circuits. Such a result can be 
demonstrated with two cases, in which the Tax Court arrived at 
opposing conclusions, involving two “50-50” stockholders in the 
same Subchapter S corporation where each taxpayer had sued on an 
identical issue. In both Doehring19 and Puckett,20 the issue to be 
decided revolved around whether or not the two taxpayers’ loan 
company had lost its Subchapter S status. The IRS had previously 
disallowed the election on the grounds that more than 20 percent 
of the corporation’s gross revenue was derived from interest (pas­
sive income). The taxpayers, relying on House v. Commissioner, 
453 F2d 982 (CA-5, 1972), argued that the ceiling did not apply 
to loan companies. The Tax Court ruled against the taxpayer in 
Doehring, stating that House did not apply since Doehring would 
be appealed to the Eighth Circuit. In Puckett, however, the Tax 
Court upheld the taxpayer’s contention, although disagreeing with 
it, since appeal would be to the Fifth Circuit in which House was 
controlling. The decision leaves both taxpayers in a precarious situ­
ation. If Doehring could win his case on appeal to the Eighth Cir­
cuit, then two circuit courts will have ruled for the taxpayer, mak­
ing the government’s position relatively weak. On the other hand, 
if the Eighth Circuit should rule for the government, then two cir­
cuit courts’ opposing decisions would increase the possibility that 
the Supreme Court may wish to grant certiorari to settle the con­
flicting opinions. At this point, either both will come out winners or 
both will end up losers.21 Thus, before beginning any appeals pro­
19 K. W. Doehring v. Commissioner, CCH Dec. No. 32, 762 (M), Sept. 10, 
1974, TC Memo 1974-234.
20P. E. Puckett v. Commissioner, CCH Dec. No. 32, 763 (M), Sept. 10, 1974, 
TC Memo 1974-235.
21 In the event that the Supreme Court rules against the taxpayer, the gov­
ernment may wish to appeal the Puckett decision provided this can be ac­
complished on a timely basis. Nevertheless, Puckett’s position in future 
years will have to comply with the Supreme Court decision.
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cedures, Doehring must consider the possibility of a loss that would 
reverse his fellow stockholder’s present favorable position.
One taxpayer recently tested the commissioner’s right to ignore 
established judicial precedent. In that case the IRS sent deficiency 
notices to two taxpayers claiming that certain distributions received 
from their corporation were dividends. Two stockholders challenged 
the deficiency assessment in the Tax Court. While taxpayer Divine’s 
suit was pending, the Tax Court ruled against taxpayer Luckman.22 
Upon appeal, however, the Seventh Circuit reversed the Tax Court.23 
The commissioner pressed on with the same position he had taken 
in Luckman and obtained another favorable ruling from the Tax 
Court in Divine.24 Taxpayer Divine then appealed to the Second 
Circuit Court, claiming that where the commissioner is relitigating 
an issue that he has previously lost and the facts are distinguishable 
only by virtue of the identity of the taxpayer, the commissioner 
should be barred from again bringing suit. Although the Second 
Circuit Court held for taxpayer Divine, it struck down his conten­
tion that the commissioner was prevented from bringing suit.25
The Facts Are Clear— the Law Is Incomplete
As explained earlier, whenever a statute is silent or imprecise on 
a particular tax question, a tax researcher must consult such other 
interpretive authorities as Treasury regulations, revenue rulings, or 
court decisions. In his search for interpretive material, a tax adviser 
soon discovers that finding authority with facts identical to his own 
will be the exception rather than the rule. In most circumstances, 
therefore, the ability to distinguish cases on the basis of facts be­
comes critical, for many times it is necessary to piece together sup­
port for the researcher’s position from several authorities.
An illustration of this third class of common tax problems follows. 
Assume that a client, an Austrian named Werner Hoppe, presents 
the following facts. Werner visited his brother, Klaus, who had 
immigrated to the United States six years ago and resides in Dallas, 
Texas. At the time of the visit, Werner was under contract to an 
Austrian soccer team and was expected to return to the team to
22 Sid Luckman, 50 TC 619 (1968).
23Luckman v. Commissioner, 418 F2d 381 (CA-7, 1969).
24 Harold S. Divine, 59 TC 152 (1972).
25 Divine v. Commissioner, 500 F2d 1041 (CA-2, 1974).
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begin play for the fall 1974 season. Werner’s brother Klaus had fallen 
in love with American football and had become an enthusiastic fan of 
the Dallas Cowboys. The Cowboys had recently lost their regular 
kicker, Toni Fritsch, to an injury; and a replacement, picked up on 
waivers, proved to be less than satisfactory. Knowing of Werner’s 
kicking ability, Klaus was convinced that Werner could help the 
Cowboys if given an opportunity. Klaus, therefore, contacted Toni 
Fritsch, who is also a former Austrian, and suggested a tryout. Klaus 
also took Werner to a Cowboy workout and introduced him to the 
kicking coach. As a result of the contact with Toni Fritsch and the 
visit with the kicking coach, Werner was given a tryout by the 
Cowboys, who were desperate for a good kicker. Werner’s perform­
ance was far superior to others at the tryout, and the Cowboys 
offered him the kicking job. Werner, however, was reluctant to 
accept the offer because he had planned to return to Austria in 
a few weeks to continue his soccer career. Considerable encour­
agement from Klaus and the Cowboy organization seemed to be 
in vain until the Cowboys, at Klaus’s suggestion, offered Werner 
a $40,000 bonus. At this point Werner overcame his reluctance 
and signed a contract, which Klaus cosigned as witness and inter­
preter. Economically speaking, the regular salary offered by the 
Cowboys was considerably more attractive than was Werner’s sal­
ary as a soccer player in Austria. Grateful to his brother for assist­
ing as an interpreter and negotiator, and for encouraging him to 
stay, Werner instructed the Cowboys to pay $15,000 of the negoti­
ated bonus directly to Klaus. Klaus reported the $15,000 as other 
income on his 1974 income tax return and paid the appropriate tax. 
After examining Werner’s 1974 tax return, the IRS made a defi­
ciency assessment claiming that the $15,000 paid to Klaus consti­
tuted income to Werner and should thus be included in his income 
under Section 61(a)(1). The IRS agent relied at least in part upon 
the authority of Richard A. Allen, 50 TC 466 (1968).
After determining the foregoing facts, the tax researcher decides 
that, according to the language of Treas. Regs. Sec. 1.61-2 (a )(1 ) , 
the total bonus payment should be included in Werner’s return. The 
regulations specify that, in general, wages, salaries, and bonuses are 
income to the recipient unless excluded by law. After additional 
research, the tax adviser locates the decision in Cecil Randolph 
Hundley, Jr., which appears to contain a similar fact situation.26 In
26 Cecil Randolph Hundley, Jr., 48 TC 339, acq. 1967-2 CB 2.
152
Hundley, to which the commissioner acquiesced, the taxpayer in­
cluded the bonus payments in his income, but he was allowed a 
business expense deduction for that portion of the bonus paid to his 
father. Before relying solely on the authority of Hundley, the tax 
adviser must be certain that the facts of Hundley are in effect sub­
stantially similar to Werner’s situation and that the expense of 
further negotiations with the IRS is warranted and based on a sound 
premise. Thus, the tax adviser will carefully compare the Allen and 
Hundley cases with the facts presented by Werner Hoppe. In doing 
this the adviser might prepare the following list of facts.
Allen
1. Professional base­
ball player received 
sizable bonus.
2. Taxpayer was 
amateur prior to 
signing contract.
3. Parent and ball­
playing minor child 
signed professional 
ball contract.
4. Some bonus pay­
ments were actually 
made to mother.
5. Mother knew little 
about baseball.
6. Mother was pas­
sive participant in 
negotiations for con­
tract and bonus.
7. No oral agreement 
existed.
Hoppe
1. Professional foot­
ball player received 
sizable bonus.
2. Taxpayer was 
professional soccer 
player prior to sign­
ing contract.
3. Ballplayer alone 
signed contract, but 
brother signed as 
witness and inter­
preter.
4. Some bonus pay­
ments were actually 
made to brother.
5. Brother had 
average knowledge 
of football.
6. Brother was an 
active participant in 
negotiations for con­
tract and bonus.
7. No oral agree­
ment existed.
Hundley
1. Professional base­
ball player received 
sizable bonus.
2. Taxpayer was 
amateur player be­
fore signing contract.
3. Parent and ball­
playing minor child 
signed professional 
ball contract.
4. Some bonus pay­
ments were actually 
made to father.
5. Father was 
knowledgeable in 
baseball and taught 
his son extensively.
6. Father handled 
most of the negoti­
ations for a contract 
and bonus.
7. Oral agreement 
existed on how to 
divide the bonus 
payments.
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Because Allen was decided for the government and Hundley for 
the taxpayer, it may be important to distinguish the two cases on the 
basis of facts. Utilizing a simple diagram technique, we begin with 
seven facts identified in each case.
Figure 5.1
Allen Hundley
Next the researcher should identify those issues that are very simi­
lar in both cases, and those that are more readily distinguishable.
Figure 5.2
Allen Hundley
The second diagram shows that facts one through four are “neutral” 
in that they are nearly identical in both cases, and that the impor­
tant facts, which perhaps swayed the outcome of the Hundley case 
in favor of the taxpayer, appear to be facts five through seven. Com­
paring Hundley with Hoppe produces the following result.
Figure 5.3
Hundley Hoppe
This diagram shows that Hoppe and Hundley agree in facts one, 
four, and six only. The following comparison of all three fact situ­
ations might provide additional insight for the tax adviser.
Figure 5.4
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This analysis shows that facts one and four are neutral in all 
three cases and perhaps should not be considered to have an impact 
upon the final outcome. Fact two, dealing with the professional 
status of Hoppe, which can be distinguished from both Allen and 
Hundley, might significantly bolster Hoppe’s claim for an ordinary 
and necessary business expense under Section 162. Hoppe has al­
ready established his business as a professional athlete; fact three, 
the signing of the contract by Hoppe alone (again distinguished 
from Allen and Hundley), seems to support the fact that Klaus was 
needed in the negotiations as an interpreter, the capacity in which 
he signed the contract. Facts five and six, which indicate the degree 
of expertise exhibited by the respective relatives of each ballplayer 
and the role played by the relatives in the contract negotiations, 
seem to be of much greater significance. In Hundley’s and Hoppe’s 
cases both relatives took active roles in negotiating final contracts. 
In Hundley, the father was knowledgeable about baseball and con­
tract negotiations. Hoppe’s situation is certainly similar. Klaus ex­
hibited an ability to negotiate by recommending that a bonus be 
offered, and he displayed his expertise as an interpreter. The final 
fact—number seven—in which Allen and Hoppe are distinguished 
from Hundley, appears to be a liability to Hoppe’s position and 
weakens his case considerably.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates a situation in which the 
statute is incomplete and a taxpayer and his adviser must rely on 
equally incomplete interpretive materials. Careful analysis indicates 
that previous interpretations appear to apply to some but not all 
the existing facts. Once a thorough examination of the facts and a 
review of the applicable authority have been completed, a decision 
must be made about the course of action. Possible risks must be 
evaluated and additional expenses must be estimated, before the 
decision to contest the deficiency assessment is made. Consultation 
with legal counsel concerning litigation hazards will assist the tax­
payer in deciding whether to carry the case beyond administrative 
procedures into the courts.
The Facts Are Clear— the Law Is Nonexistent
It is possible that a tax researcher may discover that his problem 
is not clearly covered by any statutory, administrative, or judicial 
authority. In such circumstances, the tax adviser has an opportunity 
to utilize whatever powers of creativity, logical reasoning, and per­
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suasion he possesses. Since the revenue agent making an examina­
tion likewise will have little authority to substantiate any proposed 
adjustment, it is up to the tax adviser to present a convincing argu­
ment in support of his client’s position. However, as stressed 
throughout this chapter, before the tax adviser proceeds with a 
course of action, the client should be advised of the possible risks 
and expenses associated with it. In these circumstances, the client 
may want to ask the IRS for a letter ruling before he reaches a final 
decision.
We have suggested that in all questionable situations the cost and 
risk factors be considered before reaching a conclusion. Risk should 
be interpreted as any possible adverse consequence that might oc­
cur as a result of a specific course of action adopted by the taxpayer. 
One must ask whether the questionable treatment of a particular 
item on the return will trigger an examination, and whether such 
an examination is likely to subject other items on the return to scru­
tiny and a possible proposed adjustment.27 Furthermore, proposed 
adjustments on one year’s tax return may lead to similar adjustments 
on a prior year’s return. Thus, in addition to developing a strong 
case against the IRS claims, potential risks must be considered in 
the final decision process in the treatment of all tax matters. At the 
same time one should not forget that the cost of disputing a tax 
liability is generally deductible. For the taxpayer in a high margi­
nal tax bracket, this may be a point in favor of continuing a dispute 
with the IRS.
Working With the Citator
In addition to its usefulness in locating appropriate authority, the 
citator can assist in the assessment process. Throughout this chapter 
we have observed how conflicting interpretations of the code by 
taxpayers, their tax advisers, the IRS, and the courts result in con­
siderable litigation. In the litigation process, court decisions some­
times are appealed and, subsequently, either affirmed or reversed by 
the appropriate appellate court. Furthermore, it should be apparent 
that, while a particular court decision may support a taxpayer’s
27 A questionable treatment should not be confused with an illegal treatment. 
The former refers to items supported by adequate authority which lend 
themselves to honest disagreement between taxpayers and IRS.
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position, subsequent decisions by the same court or by other courts 
may reverse a previous decision. It is imperative, therefore, that 
the researcher carefully investigate the judicial history of any de­
cision before placing much emphasis on it. The citator can assist 
the researcher in this evaluative process. Verifying the judicial his­
tory of a particular case can be accomplished effectively only 
through the P-H Citator; the CCH Citator simply does not include 
the information necessary to make this determination. To illustrate, 
let us return to exhibit 4.6, page 116. The entry in the CCH Citator 
for the Germantown Trust Co. case discloses that Germantown was 
cited in Automobile Club of Michigan, 353 US 180 (1957). Because 
the latter case was decided by the Supreme Court, it would be im­
portant to know which issue was involved and whether or not the 
Supreme Court upheld its earlier decision in Germantown Trust Co. 
Such information cannot be gleaned from the CCH Citator. As 
shown in exhibit 4.10, page 120, the P-H Citator lists information 
similar to that found in the CCH Citator. However, the symbol 
“n-1” precedes the Automobile Club citation, and similar symbols 
precede other cases in which Germantown was cited. The P-H sym­
bol explanation sheet (see exhibit 5.1, page 158), discloses that “n” 
denotes that Germantown was cited only in a dissenting opinion. 
The number “1” in connection with the symbol “n” refers the reader 
to the corresponding headnote number in the AFTR series, which 
identifies the issue involved. A further examination of cases in which 
Germantown was cited (exhibit 4.10) indicates that issue “3” is 
most frequently cited, that in one instance Germantown was “ex­
plained”; and that in another instance it was “distinguished.” (See 
exhibit 5.1 for an explanation of the terms explained and distin­
guished, as well as other interpretive symbols.)
How the P-H Citator can assist the researcher can be demon­
strated with the decision reached by the Supreme Court in Wilcox, 
327 US 404 (1946). In this decision the Supreme Court held that 
embezzled money does not constitute taxable income to the em­
bezzler. The Supreme Court overruled the Wilcox decision in James, 
366 US 213 (1961). The extract from the P-H Citator shown in ex­
hibit 5.2, page 159, reveals that Wilcox was cited on various issues 
in James and that in James the court overruled Wilcox on issues 
three, four, and nine. Thus, reliance on Wilcox, simply because it 
represented a Supreme Court decision, would be ill advised.
Before a researcher relies explicitly upon the authority of any
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Exhibit 5.1
Prentice-Hall Citator Symbols
Exhibit 5.2
Prentice-Hall Citator Extract
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particular judicial decision, he should take the few minutes it re­
quires to trace that case through the P-H Citator to be sure that 
subsequent developments did not render the case invalid for his 
purpose.
In addition to the P-H Citator, Shepard’s Citations, Inc., publishes 
a comprehensive legal citator that can assist tax researchers in trac­
ing the history and current status of any case.28 Since Shepard’s 
Citations includes almost all federal and state cases, the publication 
consists of numerous volumes, requiring extensive space. While it 
may not be economically feasible to include Shepard’s citator in a 
typical tax library, it can be found in nearly all law libraries and 
the tax researcher may wish to make use of it in unusual circum­
stances.
28 Shepard’s Citations (Colorado Springs, Colo.: Shepard’s Citations, Inc.)
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6
True ease in writing comes from art, 
not chance,
As those move easiest who have 
learned to dance. ALEXANDER POPE
Communicating 
Tax Research
Throughout this tax study we have used the terms tax researcher 
and tax adviser synonymously. If a distinction could be made be­
tween the two forms of practice, it would be based on the tax ad­
visers task of reporting the conclusion that has been so painstakingly 
pieced together. While some tax conclusions can be communicated 
orally, much of the information gathered by a tax researcher must 
eventually be placed in writing as either internal or external docu­
mentation. The task of writing introduces two major problems for 
the practitioner. First, the ability of some to write well is more 
often than not an acquired trait, the result of practice and more 
practice. Second, communicating the conclusions of tax research re­
quires the ability to perceive how much or how little to express. 
This task is complicated by the fact that highly technical solutions 
frequently must be distilled into layman’s language. Also, the tax 
adviser often must hedge on his solution because, as discussed in 
chapter 5, a definitive answer simply is not available in every case. 
In addition, the tax adviser must, to protect his own professional 
integrity, foresee potential future claims against him. Like writing 
skill, the ability to determine precisely what needs to be said usually
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can be improved through practice. In larger offices, every inexperi­
enced tax researcher should be given an early opportunity to pre­
sent much of his initial research in written form. A new researcher 
should also be assigned the responsibility of preparing draft copies 
of correspondence that will be subsequently reviewed by a super­
visor for weaknesses in writing style and technical presentation. Ex­
perience and assistance can mold a good researcher into a good 
advisor with a mastery of writing style and an ability to pinpoint 
the finer information required in tax documents.
The form in which a written tax communication appears is deter­
mined by the audience for which it is intended. Some documents 
are prepared for internal purposes, or firm use, only. Other docu­
ments, such as client letters, protest letters, and requests for rulings, 
are prepared for an external audience. In the following pages we 
will illustrate the appropriate formats and contents of some of the 
more frequently encountered communications. Of course, firm poli­
cies often dictate specific formats and procedures; nevertheless, 
certain basic features are universal to most tax communications.
Internal Communications
Within the accounting firm, the client file is the basic vehicle used 
to communicate specific client information between the various lev­
els of the professional staff. Pertinent information concerning each 
client’s unique facts is contained in the file in the form of memos 
and working papers.
Memo to the File
A memo to the file may be initiated as a result of any one of sev­
eral developments. Often such memos are the result of a client’s re­
quest—in person, over the telephone, or in a letter—for a solution to 
a tax problem. The importance of facts in tax research was explained 
in chapter 2; a memo to the file is commonly used to inform the re­
searcher of the underlying facts needed to identify issues, locate 
authorities, and reach solutions. In most large offices the initial con­
tact with the client occurs at the partner or manager level, while 
much of the actual research will be performed by a staffman. It is 
critical, therefore, that accurate information be communicated be­
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tween the various levels of the professional staff. A typical memor­
andum to the files may appear as follows.
October 30, 1975
TO: Files
FROM: Tom Partner
SUBJECT: Potential exchange of common voting stock for pre­
ferred nonvoting stock in Allemania Electronic, Inc.
Today Tim Dietz, financial vice-president of Electric Supply Co., 
called to request information concerning the tax consequences of a 
proposed recapitalization in Allemania Electronic, Inc., an 85 per­
cent-owned subsidiary. Allemania was acquired by Electric on 
June 1, 1971, and has been carried in the financial statements as a 
temporary investment on the equity basis. The auditors of Electric 
(Meyerson, Gamer, and Leavitt) are now insisting that continued 
association with Allemania would require the inclusion of the sub­
sidiary in Electric’s financial statements on a fully consolidated 
basis. The directors of Allemania are not in favor of such a dis­
closure and have suggested that Allemania exchange sufficient com­
mon voting stock for preferred nonvoting stock to reduce Electric’s 
ownership in the form of voting stock from 85 percent to 50 per­
cent or below. The board hopes, through the reduction of owner­
ship in voting stock, that inclusion of Allemania on a consolidated 
financial basis with Electric can be avoided. At the present time 
Electric and Allemania join in the filing of a consolidated tax re­
turn on a May 31, fiscal-year basis. Responsibility for preparation 
and filing of the return rests with Electric’s internal tax department, 
which we review on an annual basis. Tim Dietz requested that our 
report reach him prior to Electric’s next board meeting, scheduled 
for November 22, and he requested that we contact him person­
ally for additional information.
The information contained in the above memo should be sufficient 
for the researcher to begin his work. Furthermore, the memo com­
municates a specific deadline and indicates that the client is willing 
to supplement this information with additional facts if necessary.
A less formal procedure is often followed when a long-established 
client calls the tax adviser for an immediate answer to a routine tax 
question on a well-defined, uncontroversial topic. If the tax adviser 
gives an oral reply, he should place the conversation in writing, thus 
creating a record for the files. Such a record serves as protection
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against subsequent confusion or misinterpretation that may jeopar­
dize the tax adviser’s professional integrity, and it can serve as a 
basis for billing the client.1
Leaving Tracks
Once the necessary information has been recorded in a memo to 
the files, the researcher may begin his task of identifying questions 
and seeking solutions. Supporting documents for his conclusions, 
such as excerpts from or references to specific portions of the In­
ternal Revenue Code, Treasury regulations, revenue rulings, court 
decisions, tax service editorial opinions, and periodicals, should be 
put in the files. All questions and conclusions should be appropri­
ately cross-indexed to facilitate subsequent retrieval of the informa­
tion. Pertinent information in supporting documents should be high­
lighted to avoid unnecessary reading. Examples of the content and 
organization of a client’s file are presented in chapter 7.
Because time is the most important commodity any tax adviser 
has for sale, a well-organized client file is of the utmost importance; 
it can eliminate duplication of effort. Supervisory review of a staff 
person’s research can be accomplished quickly, and additional time 
is saved if and when it becomes necessary to refer to a client’s file 
months, or even years, after the initial work was performed. Such a 
delayed reference to a file may be required because of subsequent 
IRS audits, preparation of protests, and/or the need to solve another 
client’s similar tax problem. Because promotions, transfers, and staff 
turnover are common occurrences in accounting firms, well-organ­
ized files can be of significant help in familiarizing new staff mem­
bers with client problems.
1The question of whether oral advice should be confirmed in writing arises 
frequently. The AICPA subcommittee on responsibilities in tax practice 
makes the following recommendation: “Although oral advice may serve a cli­
ent’s needs appropriately in routine matters or in well-defined areas, written 
communications are recommended in important, unusual or complicated 
transactions. In the judgment of the CPA, oral advice may be followed by a 
written confirmation to the client. A written record will limit misunder­
standings and provide a basis for future discussions, reference, planning and 
implementation of suggestions.” AICPA, Statement on Responsibilities in 
Tax Practice No. 8, “Advice to Clients” (New York: American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, 1970).
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Another time-saving device used by practitioners is the tax sub­
ject file. To prepare such a system, members of the practitioner’s 
tax staff contribute tax problems together with documented conclu­
sions, which are then pooled and arranged on a subject basis. In a 
multioffice firm such files are duplicated, in some instances on 
microfilm, and made available to each office. A subject file can elimi­
nate many hours of duplicative research.
External Communications
A tax practitioner’s written communication to an external audi­
ence takes on added significance because it demonstrates profes­
sional expertise, renders professional advice, and exposes profes­
sional reputation. Perhaps the most frequently encountered external 
document in a CPA’s tax practice is the client letter. Communica­
tion with the Internal Revenue Service on behalf of a client to pro­
test a deficiency assessment or to request a ruling for a proposed 
transaction are also quite common.
Client Letters
In a client letter the tax adviser expresses his professional opinion 
to those who pay for his services. The significance of a client let­
ter can perhaps best be expressed as follows:
Tax opinion letters are emerging as a new work product for tax 
professionals. Anyone who has written such a letter knows why he 
said what he said and has reasons for discussing certain items in 
more or less detail. It is no easy task to balance the proper degree 
of necessary technicality with everyday English, trying all the while 
to foresee any misunderstanding that could arise and to write only 
what is meant. The ability to write good tax opinion letters has be­
come one of the finer attributes of the tax practitioner.2
The detailed format of client letters may vary from one firm to 
another. Most good client letters, however, have several things in 
common.
2W. J. DeFillips, “Developing a Tax Department in a Growing Organization,” 
Journal of Advisers Accountancy, June 1974, p. 64.
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Style. Like a good speaker, a good writer must know his audience 
before he begins. Because tax clients vary greatly in their own tax 
expertise, it is important to consider the technical sophistication of 
a client or his staff when composing a tax opinion letter. The style 
of a letter may range from a highly sophisticated format, which in­
cludes numerous technical explanations and citations, to a simple 
composition that utilizes only laymen’s terms. In many situations, 
of course, the best solution lies somewhere between the two ex­
tremes.
Format and Content. Regardless of the degree of technical sophis­
tication, a well-drafted client letter follows a well-planned format. 
It should begin with an enumeration of the facts upon which the 
tax adviser’s research is based. In conjunction with a statement of 
the facts, a statement of caution (see “Disclaimer Statements,” page 
168) should be included to warn the client that the research con­
clusions stated are valid only for the specified facts. Next, the let­
ter should state the important tax questions implicit in the previously 
identified facts. Finally, the tax practitioner should list his con­
clusions and the authority for those conclusions. An example of ap­
propriate form and typical content of a client letter is shown in 
chapter 7. Additional examples can be examined in the AICPA’s 
Tax Study No. 4, Tax Practice Management, by William L. Raby.3
A client letter may identify areas of controversy (or questions 
that are not authoritatively resolved) that might be disputed by the 
Internal Revenue Service. Some highly qualified tax advisers seri­
ously question the wisdom of including any discussion of disputable 
points in a client letter because that letter may end up in the pos­
session of a revenue agent at a most inopportune time. Furthermore, 
by authority of Section 7602, the IRS has the right to examine all 
relevant books, papers, and records containing information relating 
to the business of a taxpayer liable for federal taxes. Tax account­
ants are well aware that documents in their possession, relating to 
the computation of a client’s federal tax liability, are not considered 
privileged communication. A recent study disclosed that in only 
fourteen out of thirty-two federal tax cases in which the question
3 William L. Raby, Tax Study No. 4, Tax Practice Management (New York: 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1974).
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of privileged communication was litigated did the courts grant a 
privilege to certain tax-related communications. All of those granted 
were either under an attorney-client or Fifth Amendment privilege— 
never under an accountant-client privilege.4 The accountant in tax 
practice is thus faced with a dilemma. If a client letter discloses 
both the strengths and weaknesses of the client’s tax posture, ex­
posure of the letter to a revenue agent may considerably weaken 
the client’s position and even assist the revenue agent in preparing 
his case. On the other hand, if the potential weaknesses of the posi­
tion are not clearly communicated to the client, the tax adviser ex­
poses himself to potential legal liability for inappropriate advice. 
Although many advisers do not agree, we believe that client letters 
should contain comprehensive information, including some reference 
to the more vulnerable factors which could expose the client to 
potential challenge by the IRS. In our opinion, full disclosure and 
self-protection against claims by clients, which may endanger the 
professional reputation of all tax practitioners, is more important 
than the risk of an IRS challenge. Any disclosure of weaknesses 
must be carefully worded, and the client should be cautioned in ad­
vance to control possession of the letter. .
The issue of privileged communication is most frequently raised 
in connection with tax fraud cases, and, in the long run, a tax prac­
titioner will do his practice more good by preserving his profes­
sional reputation than by protecting those few clients who may be 
guilty of tax fraud. In situations where a CPA suspects that fraud 
may be involved, he should immediately refer the client to an attor­
ney for all further work. If the attorney believes that the accountant 
may be of assistance, he may reengage the accountant and thereby 
possibly extend his privilege to the accountant’s workpapers.5
4 Walter V. Arnold, “Privileged Communications for the Tax Accountant” (un­
published professional report, the University of Texas at Austin, 1974). Al­
though fifteen states plus Puerto Rico have enacted accountant-client privi­
leged communication statutes, they are without authority in federal matters.
5 See Marvin J. Garbis and William H. Burke, “Fifth Amendment Protection 
of the Accountant’s W orkpapers in Tax Fraud Investigations,” Taxes, Janu­
ary, 1969, p. 20. See also Gaylord A. Jentz, “Accountant Privileged Com­
munications: Is It a Dying Concept Under the New Federal Rules of Evi­
dence?” American Business Law Journal, Fall 1973, pp. 149-60.
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Disclaimer Statements. Tax advisers deal with two basically dif­
ferent situations. In the case of after-the-fact advice, the tax practi­
tioner must assure himself that he understands all of the facts neces­
sary to reach a valid conclusion. Incomplete or inaccurate facts 
may lead the adviser to an erroneous, conclusion. In planning situ­
ations, where many of the facts are still “controllable,” the tax ad­
viser must assure himself that he fully understands the client’s ob­
jective and any operational constraints on achieving that objective. 
Furthermore, planning situations frequently involve lengthy time 
periods during which changes in the tax laws may occur, thus pos­
sibly changing the recommended course of action. Statement No. 
8, issued by the AICPA responsibilities in tax practice subcommittee, 
noted some of the problems associated with new developments in 
tax matters.
The CPA may assist clients in implementing procedures or plans 
associated with the advice offered. During this active participation, 
the CPA continues to advise and should review and revise such 
advice as warranted by new developments and factors affecting the 
transaction.
Sometimes the CPA is requested to provide tax advice but does 
not assist in implementing the plans adopted. While developments 
such as legislative or administrative changes or further judicial in­
terpretations may affect the advice previously provided, the CPA 
cannot be expected to communicate later developments that affect 
such advice unless he undertakes this obligation by specific agree­
ment with his client. Thus, the communication of significant devel­
opments affecting previous advice should be considered extraordi­
nary service rather than an implied obligation in the normal CPA- 
client relationship.6
On the advisability of including some type of disclaimer state­
ment in a client letter, the same subcommittee stated:
Experience in the accounting and other professions indicates that 
clients understand that advice reflects professional judgment based 
on an existing situation. Experience has also shown that clients
6 AICPA, Statement on Responsibilities in Tax Practice No. 8.
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customarily realize that subsequent developments could affect 
previous professional advice. Some CPAs use precautionary lan­
guage to the effect that their advice is based on facts as stated and 
authorities which are subject to change. Although routine use of 
such precautionary language seems unnecessary based on accepted 
business norms and professional relationships, the CPA may follow 
this procedure in situations he deems appropriate.7
In summary, the AICPA subcommittee concludes that a dis­
claimer statement is not required. The authors of this study, how­
ever, are of the opinion that client letters generally should contain 
disclaimer statements as a matter of policy. In our opinion, the 
client letter should include a brief restatement of the important 
facts, a statement to the effect that all conclusions stated in the let­
ter are based on those specific facts, and a warning to the client of 
the dangers implicit in any changes or inaccuracies in those facts. 
In the case of tax-planning engagements, we also recommend that 
the tax practitioner include a warning that future changes in the 
law could jeopardize the planned end results. An example of such 
a disclaimer statement in client letters appears in chapter 7.
Protest Letters
Another external document commonly prepared by the tax prac­
titioner is the “protest” of a client’s tax deficiency as assessed by 
the Internal Revenue Service. Although written protests are not re­
quired for a district conference if the proposed tax deficiency does 
not exceed $2,500, prospects of an appeal to the appellate division 
often dictate the early preparation of a written protest. The Internal 
Revenue Service suggests that a protest include the following in­
formation:
1. A statement that you want to appeal the findings of the examin­
ing officer to the District Conference Staff or to the Appellate Divi­
sion, as the case may be.
2. Your name and address (the residence address of individuals;
7 Ibid.
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the address of the principal office or place of business of corpora­
tions ).
3. The date and symbols on the letter transmitting the proposed 
adjustments and findings you are protesting.
4. The taxable years, periods, or returns involved.
5. An itemized schedule of adjustments of findings with which you 
do not agree.
6. A statement of facts supporting your position in contested fac­
tual issues. This statement and all major evidence submitted with the 
protest is to be declared true under penalties of perjury. This may 
be done by adding to the protest the following declaration, signed 
by the taxpayer as an individual or by an authorized officer of a cor­
poration:
Under the penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined 
the statement of facts presented in this protest and in any accom­
panying schedules and statements and, to the best of my knowl­
edge and belief, they are true, correct, and complete.
7. Instead of the declaration required in 6 above, if your representa­
tive prepares or files the protest, he may substitute a declaration 
stating:
(a) Whether he prepared the protest and accompanying docu­
ments, and
(b) Whether he knows personally that the statements of fact 
contained in the protest and accompanying documents are 
true and correct.
8. A statement outlining the law or other authority upon which you 
rely. This statement is not required in offer in compromise cases 
based solely on doubt of collectibility.8
In principle, the body of a protest follows the format of a client 
letter in that the protest specifies important facts, delineates con­
tested findings, and lists the authority supporting the taxpayer’s po­
sition. An example of a typical protest letter follows.
8 Internal Revenue Service Publication No. 5, "Right of Appeal and Preparing
Protests for Unagreed Cases—Income, Estate, Gift, and Excise and Employ­
ment Taxes” (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975).
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July 14, 1975
District Director of
Internal Revenue 
Federal Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Re: Intermountain Stove, Inc. 
1408 State Street 
Moroni, Utah 84646
Corporate income taxes for 
the year ended 12/31/73
Sir:
Reference is made to your letter of May 23, 1975 (Reference— 
B:S:59-A:FS:rs), which transmitted a copy of your examining of­
ficer’s report dated May 8, 1975, covering his examination of Inter­
mountain Stove, Inc.’s corporate income tax return for the year 
ended December 31, 1973. In the report, the examining officer rec­
ommended adjustments to the taxable income (loss) in the follow­
ing amount:
Amount of
Tax Year Increase in Income Reported
December 31, 1973 $42,000
PROTEST AGAINST ADJUSTMENT
Your letter granted the taxpayer a period of thirty days from the 
date thereof within which to protest the recommendations of the 
examining officer, which period was subsequently extended to July 
22, 1975, by your letter dated June 6, 1975, a copy of which is at­
tached. This protest is accordingly being filed within such period, 
as extended.
The taxpayer respectfully protests against the proposed adjust­
ment stated below.
FINDINGS TO WHICH TAXPAYER 
TAKES EXCEPTION
Exception is now taken to the following item:
Disallowance of the following expenses of 
Intermountain Stove, Inc.
Description Year Amount
Professional Fees December 31, 1973 $42,000
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GROUNDS UPON WHICH TAXPAYER RELIES
The taxpayer submits the following information to support its 
contentions:
Expenses of Intermountain Stove, Inc.
Your examining officer contends that fees paid in the amount of 
$42,000 in connection with the employment of certain individuals 
who were experienced in various phases of the production and sale 
of cast iron stoves should be considered as the acquisition costs of 
assets in connection with expansion of operations and establishment 
of a new cast iron stove division.
Taxpayer contends, for reasons set forth below, that the exam­
ining officer’s position is untenable on the facts and in law and that 
such costs are clearly deductible as ordinary and necessary expenses 
incurred in its trade or business, deductible in accordance with Sec­
tion 162 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Facts concerning the operations of Intermountain Stove, Inc.
Intermountain Stove, Inc. (ISI) is a manufacturer of campers. 
As a result of the fuel crisis, orders in 1973 declined and ISI decided, 
in addition to their camper operation, to again produce wood and 
coal burning stoves, a product ISI had manufactured until the end 
of World War II and for which a strong demand suddenly devel­
oped. To begin immediate operation in a new stove division, ISI 
contracted with a consulting firm to locate personnel with experi­
ence in the production and marketing of cast iron stoves. The fee 
paid for such services during 1973 amounted to $42,000.
Discussion of authorities
Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides—
There shall be allowed as a deduction all of the ordinary and neces­
sary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on 
any trade or business.. . .
To contend, as the examining officer does, that assets were acquired 
with the employment of the newly acquired employees is not with­
in the usual interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code.
There were no employment contracts purchased, as may some­
times be found in the hiring of professional athletes; the employees 
were free to sever their employment relationships at any time, and, 
in fact, certain of these specific individuals have done so. The ex-
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amining officer’s position was considered in David J. Primuth, 
54 TC 374, in which the court stated—
It might be argued that the payment of an employment fee is capi­
tal in nature and hence not currently deductible. Presumably under 
this view the fee would be deductible when the related employment 
is terminated. However, the difficulty with this view is to conjure 
up a capital asset which had been purchased. Certainly the expense 
was not related to the purchase or sale of a capital asset. . . . Cer­
tainly in the ordinary affairs of life common understanding would 
clearly encompass the fee paid to the employment agency herein 
as ‘ordinary and necessary expenses in carrying on any trade or 
business’ (Section 162) within the usual, ordinary and everyday 
meaning of the term.
Your examining officer is here attempting to disallow deductions 
for amounts paid to outside consultants in a situation where the ex­
penses would clearly be deductible if the work had been performed 
by the company’s own staff. No such distinction should be made. 
The corporation employed the expertise of a knowledgeable con­
sultant to assist in the location of personnel with specific back­
ground and experience. The payment of fees for such assistance 
may be compared with the direct payroll and overhead costs of 
operating an “in-house” personnel department.
The examining officer apparently believes that such costs should 
be capitalized primarily because they might be nonrecurring in na­
ture. This is not the test as to whether an expense is ordinary and 
necessary. As the Supreme Court stated in Helvering v. Welch, 290 
US 111, 3 USTC 1164: “Ordinary in this context does not mean that 
the payments must be habitual or normal in the sense that the same 
taxpayer may make them often.” The fees are ordinary and neces­
sary because it is the common experience in the business com­
munity that payments are made for assistance in the procurement 
of personnel. This is emphasized by the Court in Primuth by the 
following statement:
“Fees” must be deemed ordinary and necessary from every realistic 
point of view in today’s marketplace where corporate executives 
change employers with a notable degree of frequency.
These expenditures, if paid by the individual employees and re­
imbursed by the employer, would have been clearly deductible by 
both the employee and employer, with the employee having an off­
setting amount of income for the reimbursement. See Rev. Rul. 60- 
233, 1960-1 CB 57, Rev. Rul. 66-4, 1966-1 CB 233. The expense is no
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less deductible when paid directly by the corporation.
It is, therefore, contended that the disallowance made by the ex­
amining officer was in error.
REQUEST FOR CONFERENCE
An oral hearing is requested before the conference staff of the 
district director’s office.
STATEMENT WITH RESPECT TO PREPARATION9
The attached protest was prepared by the undersigned on the basis 
of information available to him. All statements contained therein 
are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.
Signature of Tax Practitioner
Requests for Rulings and Determination Letters
Frequently tax practitioners find it necessary to seek a ruling 
from the IRS to fix the tax consequences of a client’s anticipated 
business transaction or to settle a disagreement with a revenue agent 
during an examination. The general procedures with respect to the 
issuance of advance rulings (before-the-fact) and determination 
letters (after-the-fact) are outlined in Rev. Proc. 72-3, 1972-1 CB 
698, in which the IRS announced that a careful adherence to the 
specified requirements will minimize needless delays in processing 
requests for rulings and for determination letters. In addition to 
Rev. Proc. 72-3, the IRS has on occasion issued procedures that gov­
ern ruling requests dealing with specific topics. For example, 
Rev. Proc. 73-10 suggests specific guidelines for ruling requests in­
volving Section 351. Similarly, Rev. Proc. 74-17 delineates require­
ments for ruling requests concerning the classification of organiza­
tions, for example, partnerships versus associations.
Requests for rulings, which are addressed to the national office 
of the IRS, generally take the following format.
9 It is assumed that an appropriate power of attorney has been filed with the 
IRS. Otherwise, a power of attorney must be attached to the protest.
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November 15, 1975
Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
Washington, D.C. 20224 
Attention: T:PS:T
Re: Allemania Electronic, Inc. 
(I.D. 73-2113112)
1403 South State Street 
Austin, Texas 78712 
Request for Ruling under 
Section 306 to fix status 
of nonvoting preferred 
stock to be issued under 
Section 368 (a) (1) (E ) in 
exchange for voting com­
mon stock.
Dear Sir:
Allemania Electronic, Inc. is a Texas corporation with 10,000 
shares of common voting stock issued and outstanding. Of this is­
sue, 8,500 shares are owned by Electric Supply Co., while the re­
maining shares are owned by several minority interests. Electric and 
Allemania join in the filing of a consolidated tax return on a calen­
dar year basis. A plan has been proposed under which Allemania 
will exchange 3,500 shares of its common voting stock now held by 
Electric for 3,500 shares of preferred nonvoting stock. The proposed 
exchange should constitute a recapitalization to which Section 
3 6 8 (a )(1 )(E ) applies. A ruling is respectfully requested as to 
whether or not the proposed issue of preferred nonvoting stock 
would constitute “Section 306 stock.”
FACTS
Electric Supply Co. acquired 85 percent of Allemania’s common 
voting stock on June 1, 1971. Since that time Electric has included 
Allemania’s stock as a temporary investment on its audited financial 
statements. Considerable pressure is now being exerted by Electric’s 
auditors to include Allemania as a fully consolidated subsidiary 
on its audited statement or to dispose of the investment. Since Alle­
mania is a supplier of needed components to Electric, divesture is 
out of the question. On the other hand, inclusion on a fully con­
solidated basis is out of the question since the board of directors
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fears a negative effect upon Electric’s stock prices. Allemania has 
therefore adopted a plan to exchange 3,500 shares of voting com­
mon stock for an equal number of nonvoting preferred stock, thus 
making it possible to continue to show Allemania on Electric’s aud­
ited financial statements as a line-item investment since ownership 
in voting stock does not exceed 50 percent.
DISCUSSION OF AUTHORITIES
Internal Revenue Code, Section 306 (c)(1)(B )(ii)  seems to im­
ply that the preferred stock to be issued would be tainted as Sec­
tion 306 stock. Similar thoughts are expressed in Rev. Rul. 59-84, 
Rev. Rul. 66-332, and Rev. Rul. 70-199. However, given the nature of 
the transaction contemplated by Allemania, there also appears to be 
substantial authority for arguing that the newly issued preferred 
stock should not be Section 306 stock. Since, after the proposed ex­
change of common for preferred, the percentage interest in Elec­
tric’s voting stock would be substantially reduced, the preferred 
stock should not be Section 306 stock. This position seems to be sup­
ported by Rev. Rul. 59-84, where one of the shareholders reduced his 
proportionate interest in the common stock of the distributor cor­
poration from 55.8 percent to 0 percent. In that instance the In­
ternal Revenue Service ruled that since the shareholder’s percentage 
interest in the common stock was substantially reduced by the re­
capitalization, Section 306 did not apply to the newly issued pre­
ferred stock.
BUSINESS PURPOSE
Taxpayer also contends that avoidance of income taxes is not a 
reason for the proposed recapitalization, but that recapitalization is 
motivated entirely by a valid business purpose. The business pur­
pose in this instance is the avoidance of the negative impact upon 
stock prices that Electric contends will result if Allemania is in­
cluded as a fully consolidated subsidiary on Electric’s audited fi­
nancial statements.
REQUEST FOR RULING
It is respectfully requested that the commissioner rule that the 
proposed issuance of preferred nonvoting stock in exchange for com­
mon voting stock under Section 3 6 8 (a)(1 )(E ) does not qualify 
the newly issued preferred stock as Section 306 stock.
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STATEMENT W ITH RESPECT TO CONTENT
The statements contained in this request for ruling are true and 
correct to the best of the knowledge of the undersigned and are 
made under the penalties of perjury.
Allemania Electronic, Inc.
By___________________________________
Vice President and Treasurer
STATEMENT WITH RESPECT TO PREPARATION
The attached request for ruling was prepared by the undersigned 
on the basis of information made available to him. All statements 
contained therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge 
and belief.
Signature of Tax Practitioner
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These examples are the school of mankind, 
and they will learn at no other.
EDMUND BURKE
Tax Research in the 
“Closed-Fact” Case: 
An Example
The preparation of a well-organized working-paper file cannot be 
overemphasized because it proves that research efforts have been 
thorough, are logically correct, and are adequately documented. The 
elements of this chapter comprise a sample client file. The formats of 
files utilized in practice vary substantially among firms; the new tax 
accountant who uses this tax study as a guide for his own research 
efforts should be prepared to modify this illustration to conform to 
the format used by his employer. It is hoped that the general format 
suggested here would be approved by most experienced tax ad­
visers, although any employer might disagree with any of several 
specifics. The sample is based on a relatively simple incorporation 
transaction. Because the tax problems illustrated are relatively sim­
ple, the supporting file would be considered excessive by most ad­
visers; the cost of preparing such an elaborate file would be too 
great to justify. In this case, the reader should concentrate more on 
general working paper content and arrangement than on the sub­
stantive tax issues illustrated; although, in more complex problems 
this kind of detail would be appropriate.
Throughout this chapter it is assumed that the client has con­
tacted the accountant after all aspects of the incorporation trans­
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action were completed. In other words, the accountant’s task in this 
engagement is restricted to compliance-related tax research. We 
have combined the information for two clients into one file; that is, 
that of the new corporate entity and that of its president and major 
stockholder. In practice, however, two separate files would be main­
tained. Finally, in practice a file would very likely include a sub­
stantial number of photocopies of excerpts from the Internal Rev­
enue Code, Treasury regulations, revenue rulings, judicial deci­
sions, commercial tax services, and other reference works. We have 
attempted to simulate a real file by combining script and ordinary 
type. Anything in script type would be handwritten in a real file. 
Anything enclosed by a tint block represents material that would be 
photocopied in a real file.
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Red E. Ink/Ready, I n c .
Tax F i le 
December  1975
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R. U. Partner & Company
Certified Public Accountants 
2010 Professional Tower 
Calum City, USA 00001
December 23, 1975
Mr. Red E. Ink, President
Ready, Incorporated
120 Publisher Lane
Calum City, USA 00002
Dear Mr. Ink:
This letter confirms the oral agreement of December 17, 1975, in which 
our firm agreed to undertake the preparation of federal income tax returns 
for you and Ready, Inc., for the next year. The letter also reports the pre­
liminary results of our investigation into the tax consequences of the incorpo­
ration of your printing business last March. We are pleased to be of service 
to you and anticipate that our relationship will prove to be mutually benefi­
cial. Please feel free to call upon me at any time.
Before stating the preliminary results of our investigation into the tax 
consequences of your incorporation transaction, I would like to restate 
briefly all of the important facts as we understand them. Please review this 
statement of facts very carefully. Our conclusions depend upon a complete 
and accurate understanding of all of the facts. If any of the following state­
ments is either incorrect or incomplete, please call it to my attention im­
mediately, no matter how small or insignificant the difference may appear to 
be.
Our conclusions are based upon an understanding that on March 1, 1975, 
you exchanged all of the assets and liabilities of the printing business, which 
you had operated for the prior twelve years as a sole proprietorship, for 1,000 
shares of common stock in Ready, Inc., a newly formed corporation. The 
assets that you transferred to Ready, Inc., consisted of $20,000 cash; $10,000 
(estimated market value) supplies on hand; $50,000 (face value) trade receiv­
ables; and $60,000 (book value) equipment. The equipment, purchased new 
in 1971 for $100,000, had been depreciated on a double-declining-balance 
method for the past four years. An investment credit was claimed in 1971 on 
the purchase of the equipment. The liabilities assumed by Ready, Inc., 
consisted of the $40,000 mortgage remaining from the original equipment 
purchase in 1971 and current trade payables of $10,000. We further under­
stand that Ready, Inc., plans to continue to occupy the building leased by 
you on October 1, 1973, from Branden Properties, until the expiration of
(d r a f t )
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that lease on September 30, 1977. Finally, we understand that Ready, Inc., 
has issued only 1,000 shares of common stock and that you retain 980 of those 
shares; that your wife, Neva, holds ten shares; and that Tom Books, the 
corporate secretary-treasurer, holds the remaining ten shares. The shares 
held by Mrs. Ink and Mr. Books were given to them by you, as a gift, on 
March 1, 1975.
Assuming that the preceding paragraph represents a complete and accu­
rate statement of all of the facts pertinent to your incorporation transaction, 
we anticipate reporting that event as a wholly nontaxable transaction. In 
other words, neither you (individually) nor your corporation will report any 
taxable income or loss solely because of your incorporation of the printing 
business. Furthermore, no amount of investment credit will have to be 
recaptured. However, in the future Ready, Inc., will be restricted to a 150 
percent declining-balance depreciation deduction on the equipment trans­
ferred. The trade receivables collected by Ready, Inc., after March 1, 1975, 
will be reported as the taxable income of the corporate entity; collections 
made between January 1, 1975, and February 28, 1975, will be considered 
part of your personal taxable income for 1975.
If Ready, Inc.’s tax return is audited, there is a possibility that the Internal 
Revenue Service may challenge the corporation’s right to deduct the $10,000 
in trade payables it assumed from your proprietorship. If you so desire, I 
would be pleased to explain this matter in detail. Perhaps it would be desira­
ble for Mr. Bent, you, and me to meet and review this potential problem 
prior to our filing the corporate tax return.*
If you wish to report the first corporate taxable income on a cash-method 
fiscal-year basis, ending February 29, 1976, it is imperative that you have 
Mr. Tom Books keep the corporation’s regular financial accounts on that 
same basis. If he desires any help in maintaining those records, we will be 
happy to assist him. It will be necessary for us to have access to your personal 
financial records no later than March 1, 1975, and to your corporate records 
no later than April 15, 1975, if the two federal income tax returns are to be 
completed and filed on a timely basis.
Finally, may I suggest that we plan to have at least one more meeting in my 
office sometime prior to February 28, 1976, to discuss possible tax-planning 
opportunities available to you in the new corporation. Among other consid-
*Some advisors would delete this paragraph and handle the matter orally.
(d r a f t ) 
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erations, we should jointly review the possibility that you may want to make 
a Subchapter S election, and that you may need to structure executive com­
pensation arrangements carefully and may wish to institute a pension plan. It 
may be desirable to discuss these opportunities at the same time that we 
meet with Mr. Bent to consider the question of deducting the $10,000 in 
trade payables, as noted earlier. Please telephone me to arrange an ap­
pointment if you would like to do this shortly after the holidays.
Thank you again for selecting our firm for tax assistance. It is very impor­
tant that some of the material in this letter be kept confidential and we 
strongly recommend that you carefully control access to it at all times. If you 
have any questions about any of the matters discussed, feel free to request a 
more detailed explanation or drop by and review the complete files, which 
are available in my office. If I should not be available, my assistant, Fred 
Senior, would be happy to help you. We look forward to serving you in the 
future.
Sincerely yours,
Robert U. Partner
( dr a f t )  
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December 17, 1975
MEMO TO FILE
FROM: R. U. Partner
SUBJECT: Ready, Inc.—Tax Engagement
Mr. Red E. Ink (President) and Mr. Tom Books (Secretary-Treasurer) this 
morning engaged our firm to prepare and file annual federal income tax 
returns for Ready, Inc. In addition, Mr. Ink has requested that we prepare 
his individual tax returns annually. During an interview in my office, the 
following information pertinent to the first year’s tax returns was obtained.
On March 1, 1975, Red E. Ink incorporated the sole proprietorship print­
ing business that he has for twelve years previously operated as Red’s Print 
Shop. Mr. Ink had two primary business reasons for incorporating: (1) he 
desired to limit his personal financial liability in his growing business and (2) 
he wanted access to credit, which is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain 
as an individual because of the prevailing interest rates and the state usury 
laws. In the incorporation transaction, Red transferred all of the assets and 
liabilities of his former proprietorship to Ready, Inc., a newly formed corpo­
ration, in exchange for 1,000 shares of common stock. After receiving the 
1,000 shares, Red gave ten shares to his wife, Neva, who was named corpo­
rate vice president, and another ten shares to Tom Books, an unrelated and 
long-time employee who was named the corporate secretary-treasurer. Red 
stated that these two transfers were intended as gifts and not as compensa­
tion for any prior services.
Tom Books provided me with a copy of the balance sheet he prepared for 
Red’s Print Shop just prior to the incorporation. It appears as follows:
Red’s Print Shop 
Balance Sheet 
February 28, 1975 
Assets
Cash $ 20,000
Supplies on hand 10,000
Trade receivables 50,000
Equipment (net) 60,000
Total Assets $140,000
A -1 (RUP 1 2 / 1 7 / 7 5 )
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Liabilities & Equity
Trade payables $ 10,000
Mortgage payable 40,000
Total liabilities $50,000
Red E. Ink, capital 90,000
Total Liabilities & Equity $140,000
The balance sheet was prepared at the request of Mr. Hal Bent, who 
served as legal counsel to Mr. Ink during the incorporation of his business. 
Incidentally, Mr. Bent recommended to Mr. Ink that he engage our firm for 
the preparation and filing of the federal tax returns. Hal Bent is retained as 
corporate counsel for Ready, Inc., as well as personal attorney for Mr. and 
Mrs. Red E. Ink.
During our interview Mr. Ink stated that he has always reported his 
personal income on a calendar-year, cash basis. It is his intention to report 
the corporation’s taxable income on a cash basis in the future. He plans, 
however, to have the corporate (taxable) fiscal year run from March 1 to 
February 28/29.
The $40,000 mortgage payable represents the balance payable on equip­
ment that was purchased for $100,000 in 1971. This equipment has been 
depreciated on a double-declining-balance method since then. Investment 
credit was claimed when the equipment was purchased (new). The $60,000 
shown on the balance sheet is book value. Red and Tom estimate that the fair 
market value of the equipment transferred was approximately $75,000 at the 
time of the incorporation transaction. The trade payables represent the un­
paid balances for supplies, utilities, employees’ wages, etc. as of the end of 
February 1975. All of these accounts were paid by Ready, Inc., within sixty 
days following incorporation. Tom has agreed to provide us with Ready, 
Inc.’s income statement and year-end balance sheet by no later than March 
30, 1976. Mr. Ink will provide us with additional details concerning his 
personal tax return in early February.
I have assigned Fred E. Senior the responsibility of investigating all tax 
consequences associated with the initial incorporation of Ready, Inc. He is 
immediately to begin preparation of our file, which will be utilized early next 
year in connection with the completion of the tax returns for these two new 
clients. All preliminary research should be completed by Fred and reviewed 
by me before December 31, 1975. I have also asked Fred to prepare a draft 
of a client letter confirming this new engagement and stating our preliminary 
findings on the tax consequences of the incorporation transaction.
A-2 (RUP 1 2 / 1 7 / 7 5 )
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MEMO TO FILE
FROM: Fred E. Senior
SUBJECT: Additional Information on Ready, Inc., Tax Engagement
After reviewing Mr. Partner’s file memo of December 17, 1975, and sub­
sequently undertaking limited initial research into the tax questions perti­
nent to filing the Red E. Ink/Ready, Inc., federal income tax returns, I 
determined that additional information should be obtained. Specifically, I 
observed that the February 28, 1975, balance sheet included no real prop­
erty, and I believed that it was necessary for several reasons to confirm all of 
the facts pertinent to this client’s real estate arrangements. Accordingly, 
with R. U.’s approval, I telephoned Tom Books today and obtained the 
following additional information.
Tom explained that Red had signed a forty-eight-month lease with Bran- 
den Properties, Inc., on October 1, 1973, and that Ready, Inc., had con­
tinued to occupy the same premises and had paid all monthly rentals due 
under this lease ($6,000 per month) since March 1, 1975. It is Tom’s opinion 
that Red probably will construct his own building once this lease expires, but 
that he probably will not try to get out of the present lease before its expira­
tion on September 30, 1977. Tom said that the lease agreement calls for a 
two-month penalty payment (i.e., a $12,000 payment) if either party should 
break the lease prior to its expiration. According to this agreement, 
whichever party breaks the lease must pay the other the sum stipulated. 
Tom further stated that the present lease “really is not a particularly good 
one.” In late 1973 it appeared to Red that office space in Calum City was 
going to be scarce and he thought that the lease then negotiated was a wholly 
reasonable one. By the spring of 1975, however, the available office space 
exceeded the demand. Tom suggested (and based on his square-footage 
estimates, I agree) that this same lease could now be negotiated for about 
$5,500 per month. The penalty for breaking the lease would just about equal 
the saving that could be obtained by renegotiating a new lease today. Under 
the circumstances, Red has elected to continue with the old lease for the 
present. This option allows him time to decide whether to build or purchase 
another building sometime prior to 1977.
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Sum m ar y  o f  Q u e s t i o n s  I n v e s t i g a t e d  
De c e m b e r  19 7 5
7 . Wa s  R e d  E . I n k ' s  Mar c h  1 , 1 9 7 5 , e x c h a n g e  
o f  a l l  o f  t h e  as s e t s  a n d  l i a b i l i t i e s  o f  
R e d 's  Pr i n t  S h o p  f o r  1 ,0 0 0  s h a t e s  o f  com ­
m on  s t o c k  o f  R e a d y ,  I n c . ,  a  t a x -fre e  
t r a n s f e r  u n d e r  S e c .  3 5 1 ?
C oncl us i o n : y e s ;  al l  o f  t h e  re q u i re m e n t s  
o f  S e c .  351  w e r e  s a t i s f i e d .
Col l a t e ria l  Q u e s t i o n : I s  t h e re  a n y  re a s o n ­
a b l e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  l i a b i l i t i e s  a s ­
s u m ed  b y  R e a d y ,  I n c . ,  m i g h t  e x c e e d  t h e  
a d j u s t e d  b a s i s  o f  t h e  a s s e t s  t r a n s f e rre d  
s o  t h a t  t h e  e x c e p t i o n  ( t o  S e c .  3 5 1 ) p ro ­
v i d e d  i n  S e c .  3 5 7 ( c )  m i g h t  d e m a n d  t h e  
re c o g n i t i o n  o f  s om e g a i n  i n  t h i s  i n c o r p o ­
r a t i o n  t r a n s a c t i o n ?
More  s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  w h a t  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  
b u i l d i n g  l e a s e  (i f  a n y )  m u s t  b e  d e e m e d  t o  
c o n s t i t u t e  a  " l i a b i l i t y "  f o r  t h e  p u rt p o s e  
o f  a p p l y i ng  S e c . .  3 5 7 ( c ) ?
C o n c l u s i o n : I n  our  o p i n i o n  t h e  p o s s i b i l ­
i t y  t h a t  t h e  I RS c o u l d  s u c c e s s f u l l y  s u s ­
t a i n  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  t h e  l i a b i l i t i e s  
a s s u m e d  b y  R e a d y ,  I n c . ,  e x c e e d e d  t h e  a d ­
j u s t e d  b a s i s  o f  t h e  a s s e t s  t r a n s f e r r e d  i s  
m o s t  u n l i k e l y .  We b e l i e v e  t h a t  n o  p a r t  
o f  t h e  l e a s e  s h o u l d  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  a  
" l i a b i l i t y ' '  f o r  p u r p o s e s  o f  S e c . 3 5 7 ( c ) .
2 .  I s  t h e  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  $ 6 0 ,0 0 0  i n  t r a d e  
r e c e i v a b l e s  t r a n s f e r r e d  b y  R e d  E . I n k  t o  
R e a d y ,  I n c . ,  a n d  c o l l e c t e d  b y  t h e  l a t t e r ,  
p r o p e r l y  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  b e  t h e  t a x a b l e  i n ­
c o m e  o f  Mr . I n k  ( i n d i v i d u a l l y )  o r  t h a t  o f  
R e a d y ,  I n c .  ( t h e  Cor p o r a t i o n )  ?
C o n c l u s i o n : R e a s o n a b l e  a u t h o r i t y  n o w  e x ­
i s t s  t o  j u s t i f y  t r e a t i n g  t h e  t r a d e  r e ­
c e i v a b l e s  c o l l e c t e d  a f t e r  i n c o r p o r a t i o n  
a s  t h e  t a x a b l e  i n c o m e  o f  R e a d y ,  I n c .
C -1  & 2
S e e  W.P .  
A - 3
C -2  t h r u
C -7
S e e  C -7  
6 8
W.P .  R e f .
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W .P . Ref.
3 . M u s t  R e d  E . I n k  r e c a p t u r e  a n y  p o r t i o n  ( o r  
al l  o f  t h e  i n v e s t m e n t  c r e d i t  c l a i m e d  i n  
19 7 1 b e c a u s e  o f  h i s  t r a n s f e r  o f  t h e  r e ­
l a t e d  e q u i p m e n t  t o  R e a d y ,  I n c . ,  o n  
3 / 7 / 7 5 ?
C o n c l u s i o n : No r e c a p t u r e  i s  r e q u i r e d .
4 .  Wh a t  i s  M r. I n k ' s  t a x  b a s i s  i n  t h e  9 80  
s h a r e s  o f  R e a d y ,  I n c . ,  com m on s t o c k  
w h i c h  h e  r e t a i n e d ?
C o n c l u s i o n : I n  o u r  o p i n i o n ,  M r. I n k ’s  
b a s i s  i n  9 8 0  s h a r e s  i s  $ 3 9 , 2 0 0 .
S e e  C - 8 
& 9
S e e  C -1 0  
t h r u  C- 11
B -2  (FES 1 2 / 1 8 / 7 5 )
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W o r k in g  P a p e r s  
D e c e m b e r  1 9 7 5
Q u e s t i o n  1 :  W a s  t h e  i n c o r p o r a t i o n  o f  R e d ' s  
P r in t S h o p  on  3 /1 /7 5  a  ta x - fr e e  tra n sa c tio n ?
W .P . Ref.
C o n c l u s i o n :  Y e s ;  a l l  o f  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  S e c .  
3 5 1  w e r e  s a t i s f i e d  i n  t h i s  t r a n s a c t i o n .  
S e c .  5 5 1 ,  I R C  1 9 5 4 ,  r e a d s  a s  f o l l o w s :
Fo r  f a c t s ,  s e e  
W .P .  A - 1
r e q u i r e s  
80% (R e d  
g o t  100%; 
k e p t  98%)
SEC. 351. TRANSFER TO CORPORATION CON­
TROLLED BY TRANSFEROR.
(a) General Rule.—No gain or loss shall be recognized if 
property is transferred to a corporation (including, in the 
case of transfers made on or before June 30, 1967, an 
investment company) by one or more persons solely in
exchang for stock or securities in such corporation and 
immediately after th e exchange such person or persons are 
in control (as defined in section 368(c)) of the corporation. 
For purposes of this section, stock or securities issued for 
services shall not be considered as issued in return for 
property.
(b) Receipt of Property.—If subsection (a) would apply to 
an exchange but for the fact that there is received, in 
addition to the stock or securities permitted to be received 
under subsection (a), other property or money, then—
(1) gain (if any) to such recipient shall be recognized, 
but not in excess of—
(A) the amount of money received, plus
(B) the fair market value of such other property 
received; and
(2) no loss to such recipient shall be recognized.
(c) Special Rule.—In determining control, for purposes of 
this section, the fact that any corporate transferor distri­
butes part or all of the stock which it receives in the ex­
change to its shareholders shall not be taken into account.
(d) Application of June 30, 1967, Date.—For purposes of 
this section, if, in connection with the transaction, a reg­
istration statement is required to be filed with the Se­
curities and Exchange Commission, a transfer of property 
to an investment company shall be treated as made on or 
before June 30, 1967, only if—
(1) such transfer is made on or before such date,
t h e  r u l e
N/A
(n o  
b o o t  
r e c ' d  
b y  M r. 
I n k )
N/A
M/A
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(2) the registration statement was filed with the Se­
curities and Exchange Commission before January 1, 
1967, and the aggregate issue price of the stock and 
securities of the investment company which are issued 
in the transaction does not exceed the aggregate 
amount therefore specified in the registration state­
ment as of the close of December 31, 1966, and
(3) the transfer of property to the investment company 
in the transaction includes only property deposited be­
fore May 1, 1967.
(e) Cross References.—
(1) For special rule where another party to the ex­
change assumes a liability, or acquires property subject 
to a liability, see section 357.
(2) For the basis of stock, securities, or property re­
ceived in an exchange to which this section applies, see 
sections 358 and 362.
(3) For special rule in the case of an exchange described 
in this section but which results in a gift, see section 
2501 and following.
(4) For special rule in the case of an exchange described 
in this section but which has the effect of the payment 
of compensation by the corporation or by a transferor, 
see section 61(a) (1).
W/A
S e e   W. P .  
C -2  t o  7
S e e  W. P .  
10 & 11
W/A
W/A
B e c a u s e  M t. I n k  h a d  1 0 0 % - c o n t r o l  i mm ed i ­
a t e l y  a f t e r  t h e  e x c h a n g e  ( 9 8% e v e n  a f t e r  
gi f t s ) ,  a n d  b e c a u s e  n o  " b o o t "  w a s  r e ­
c e i v e d ,  t h i s  i s  a  t a x - f r e e  e x c h a n g e .  I n  
r e  l i a b i l i t i es , s e e  # 2 ,  b e l ow) .
Qu es t i o n  2 :
C oncl us i o n :
Coul d  t h e  l i ab i l i t i e s  as s u m e d  b y  R e a d y ,  
I n c . ,  e x c e e d  t h e  a d j u s t e d  b a s i s  o f  t h e  
as s e t s  t r a n s f e r r e d  s o  t h a t  t h e  e x c e p t i o n  
of S e c .  3 5 7 ( e )  m i g h t  r e q u i r e  t h e  r e c o g ­
n i t i o n  of s o m e  g a i n ?
No ;  s e e  b e l ow  f o r  r e a s o n s . S e c .  357  
r e a d s  a s  f ol l o w s :
SEC. 357. ASSUMPTION OF LIABILITY.
(a) General Rule.—Except as provided in subsections (b)
and (c), if—
C -2  (FES  1 2 / 1 8 / 7 5 )
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W .P . R e f .
See
bel ow
(1) the taxpayer receives property which would be 
permitted to be received under section 351, 361, 371, 
or 374 without the recognition of gain if it were the sole 
consideration, and
(2) as part of the consideration, another party to the 
exchange assumes a liability of the taxpayer, or ac­
quires from the taxpayer property subject to a liability,
then such assumption or acquisition shall not be treated as 
money or other property, and shall not prevent the ex­
change from being within the provisions of section 351, 
361, 371, or 374, as the case may be.
(b) Tax Avoidance Purpose.—
(1) In general.—If, taking into consideration the nature 
of the liability and the circumstances in the light of 
which the arrangement for the assumption or acquisi­
tion was made, it appears that the principal purpose of 
the taxpayer with respect to the assumption or acquisi­
tion described in subsection (a)—
(A) was a purpose to avoid Federal income tax on 
the exchange, or
(B) if not such purpose, was not a bona fide busi­
ness purpose,
then such assumption or acquisition (in the total 
amount of the liability assumed or acquired pursuant to 
such exchange) shall, for purposes of section 351, 361, 
371, or 374 (as the case may be), be considered as 
money received by the taxpayer on the exchange.
(2) Burden of proof.—In any suit or proceeding where 
the burden is on the taxpayer to prove such assumption 
or acquisition is not to be treated as money received by 
the taxpayer, such burden shall not be considered as 
sustained unless the taxpayer sustains such burden by 
the clear preponderance of the evidence.
(c) Liabilities in Excess of Basis.—
(1) In general.—In the case of an exchange—
(A) to which section 351 applies, or
(B) to which section 361 applies by reason of a plan 
of reorganization within the meaning of section 
368(a) (1) (D),
if the sum of the amount of the liabilities assumed, plus 
the amount of the liabilities to which the property is 
subject, exceeds the total of the adjusted basis of the 
property transferred pursuant to such exchange, then
C -3  (FES 1 2 / 1 8 / 7 5 )
th e  r u l e.
 N/A
  N/A
QUEST ION:
woul d  t h e  
l e a s e  c o n ­
s t i t u t e  a  
" l i a b i l ­
i t y "  fo r  
t h i s  p u r ­
p o s e?
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S e e  b e l ow such excess shall be considered as a gain from the sale 
or exchange of a capital asset or of property which is not 
a capital asset, as the case may be.
(2) Exceptions.—Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any 
exchange to which—
(A) subsection (b) (1) of this section applies, or
(B) section 371 or 374 applies.
N /A
P e r  R . U. Pa r t n e r ' s  Memo t o  F i l e
( 1 2 / 1 7 / 7 5 ) ,  p .  2 ,  t h e  a s s e t s  t r a n s f er r e d  S e e  W .P . 
t o  R e a d y ,  I n c . ,  b y  R e d  E . I n k  w er e  a s  
fo l l o w s  :
s e e
n o t e s
b e l ow
A s s e t FMV B a s t s
C a s h $ 2 0 ,0 0 0 $ 2 0 ,0 0 0
( 1 ) S u p p l i e s 1 0 ,0 0 0 - 0 -
(2 ) T r a d e  r e c e i v a b l e s 5 0 ,0 0 0 - 0 -
(3 ) E q u ip m e n t 7 5 ,0 0 0 6 0 ,0 0 0
T o t a l  B a s t s  of a A s s e t s  $ 80 , 0 0 0
FOOTNOTES:
( 1 ) I n  r es p o n s e  t o  m y t e l e p h o n e  i n q u i r y
of t o d a y ,  Tom B o o k s co n fi r m e d  t h a t  Mr .
I n k  h a s  a l w a y s  e x p e n s e d  a l l  s u p p l i e s  f a r
t a x  p u r p o s e s  w h e n  p a i d .
(2 )  Mr . I n k  h a s  a lw a y s  r e p o r t e d  h a s t a x ­
a b le ,  i n c o me o n  a  c a s h  b a s i s .     
(3 )  Va l u e  e s t i m a t e d ;  a d j u s t e d  b a s i s i s
b o o k  v a l u e .  W .P . A -1                                         W.P. A-1
L i a b i l i t i e s  a s s u m e d  b y  R e a d y ,  I n c . ,  w er e
M o r tg a g e  P a y a b l e  $ 4 0 ,0 0 0
NOTE: T h e  IR S  t s  l i k e l y  t o  c o n t e n d  t h a t
t h e  $ 1 0 ,0 0 0  i n  t r a d e  p a y a b l e s  a l s o  r e p r e ­
s e n t s  a  l i a b i l i t y  a s s u m e d  b y  R e a d y ,  I n c .
We w o u l d  d i s p u t e  t h a t  c o n c l u s i o n  (s e e
b e l o w ) . I t  i s  a l s o  c o n c e i v a b l e ,  t h o u g h
u n l i k e l y ,  t h a t  t h e  IR S  w o u l d  a l s o  i n c l u d e  
C -4  ( FES 1 2 / 1 3 / 7 5 )
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s o m e  p o r t i o n  o r  a l l  o f  t h e  r e m a in d e r  o f  
t h e  l e a s e  p a y m e n t s  w i t h i n  t h e  m ea ni ng  o f  
a  " l i a b i l i t y "  a s  u s e d  i n  S e c . 3 5 7 ( e ) .  We 
m o s t  c e r t a i n l y  w o u l d  c o n t e s t  t h a t  c o n t e n ­
t i o n  i f  r a i s e d  b y  t h e  I R S .
T h e r e  i s  n o  a u t h o rt i t y  w h i c h  c o n c l u s i v e l y  
d e f i n e s  t h e  w or d  " l i a b i l i t y "  f o r  t a x  p u r ­
p o s e s .  T h e  C o d e  d o e s  n o t  a n d  t h e  s e v e r a l  
j u d i c i a l  d e c i s i o n s  i n  p o i n t  c o n f l i c t .  I n  
T e s t o r  v .  C o m m is s io n e r ,  3 2 7  F 2 d  7 8 8  (C A -7 , 
1 9 6 4 ) , P e t e r  R a i c h , 46  TC 6 0 4  ( 1 9 6 6 ) ,  
a n d  Wi l f o r d  E . T h a t c h e r , 61 TC 4 ( 1 9 7 3 ) ,  
t h e  a c c o u n t s  p a y a b l e  o f  a  c a s h  b a s i s  t a x ­
p a y e r  w er e  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  b e  l i a b i l i t i e s  
f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  a p p l y i n g  IR C  S e e .
3 5 7 ( e ) . W h i l e  t h e  c o u r t  i n  R a i c h  n e v e r  
e x p l i c i t l y  d i s c u s s e d  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n a l  
p r o b l e m ,  t h e  m a jo r i t y  o p i n i o n  i n  T h a t c h e r  
a s s u m e s  " t h a t  C o n g r e s s  i n t e n d e d  t h e  t e r m 
l i a b i l i t y  t o  h a v e  i t s  o r d i n a r y  m e a n in g . "  
W h i l e  t h e  " o r d i n a r y "  m e a n in g  o f  t h e  w or d  
w a s  h e l d  b y  t h a t  c o u n t  t o  i n c l u d e  t h e  a c ­
c o u n t s  p a y a b l e  o f  a  cas h  bas i s  t a x p a y e r , 
i t  is  n o t  a t  a l l  a p p a r e n t  t h a t  f u t u r e  
p a y m e n t s  u n d e r  a n  u n e x p i r e d  l e a s e  o r e  t o  
b e  t o  c o n s t r u e d .  B i t t k e r  a n d  E u s t i c e ,  
Fe d e r a l  I n c o m e  T a x a t i o n  o f  Cor p o r a t i o n s
a n d  S h a r e h o l d e r s ,  3 d  e d . , p p .  1 4 - 1 3 6 ,
s u g g e s t  a  c o n t r ar y  c o n c l u s i o n ,  a t  l e a s t  
s o f a r  as  l e a s e  p a y m e n t s  m i g h t  b e  i n ­
v o l v e d  i n  r e o r g a n i z a t i o n s .
Fur t h e r m or e ,  i n  B o n g i o v a n n i  v .  C o m m is­
s i o n e r ,  4 7 0  F2 d  9 2 1 (C A -2 , 1 9 7 2 ) r e v ’ g  
TC Memo De c . 3 1 , 0 2 7 ,  t h e  w or d  " l i a b i l i t y "  
i s  d e f i n e d  t o  i n c l u d e  o n l y  t a x  l i a b i l i ­
t i e s — i .  e . , " l e i n s  i n  e x c e s s  o f  t a x  
c o s t s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  mor t g a g e s  e n c u m b e r i n g  
p r o p e r t y  t r a n s f e r r e d  i n  a  S e c t i o n  351  
t r a n s a c t i o n " — a n d  e x c l u d e s  t h o s e  l i a b i l i ­
t i e s  w h i c h  d o  n o t  f a l l  w i t h i n  t h a t  nar r ow  
d e f i n i t i o n .  I n  f i n d i n g  t h a t  a c c o u n t s  
p a y a b l e  o f  a  c a s h  b a s i s  t a x p a y e r  wer e  n o t  
l i a b i l i t i e s  f o r  p u r p o s e s  o f  S e c . 3 5 7 ( e ) , 
t h e  c o u r t  i n  B o n g i o v a n n i  r e l i e d  u p o n  p r e ­
C -5  (F E S 1 2 / 1 8 / 7 5 )
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c i s e l y  t h e  s am e S e n a t e  R e p o r t  a s  t h a t  
m e n t i o n e d  i n  T h a t c h e r , T e s t o r , a n d  R a i c h , 
b u t  w i t h  a n  o p p o s i t e  c o n c l u s i o n .  J u d g e  
Q ueal y ,  w ho  wr o t e  t h e  o r i g i n a l  o p i n i o n  i n  
B o n g i o v a n n i  (TC  Memo 1 9 7 1 - 2 6 2 )  v i g o r ous l y  
d i s s e n t e d  t o  t h e  m a jo r i t y  o p i n i o n  i n  
T h a t c h e r , a r g u in g  t h a t  t h e  S e c o n d  C ir c u i t  
C o u r t  h a d  c o r r e ct l y  r e v e r s e d  h i s  p r i o r  
o p i n i o n .  B e c a u s e  t h e  S e v e n t h  C i n c u i t  
o p i n i o n  i n  T e s t o r  c o n f l i c t s  w i t h  t h a t  of 
t h e  S e c o n d  C i r c u i t  t n  B o n g i o v a n n i , t h e  
S u p r e m e  C our t  m ay h a v e  t o  r e s o l v e  t h i s  
d i s p u t e .
At  t h i s  d a t e  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  S e c o n d  
C ir c u i t  w ou l d  c o n s i d e r  n e i t h e r  I n k ' s  
$ 1 0 ,0 0 0  i n  t r a d e  p a y a b l e s  n o r  t h e  p a y ­
m e n t s  o n  t h e  u n e x p i r e d  l e a s e  a s  a  l i a b i l­
i t y . N e i t h e r  t h e  S e v e n t h  C ir c u i t  n o r  a n y  
o t h e r  c o u r t  h a s  r ul e d  o n  t h e  l e a s e - p a y ­
m e n ts  i s s u e .
For  a c c o u n t i n g  pur p o s e s ,  tw o  t y p e s  o f  
l e a s e s  a r e  d i s t i n g u i s h e d .  T h e  o p e r a t i ng  
l e a s e  c o n v e y s  n o  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  t o  t h e  
l e s s e e .  T h e  l e s s o r  r e t a i n s  fu l l  t i t l e  
a n d  t h e  l e s s e e  m er e l y  p a y s  r e n t  f o r  u s i n g  
t h e  p r o p e r t y .  T h e  f i n a n c i n g  l e a s e  i s  
c o n s i d e r e d  t o  b e  t h e  e q u i v a l e n t  of a  
s a l e .  I n  t h a t  k i n d  of l e a s e  t h e  l es s e e  
c a n ,  a t  t h e  t e r m i n a t i o n  of t h e  l e a s e ,  o b ­
t a i n  t i t l e  t o  t h e  p r o p e r t y  b y  p a y i n g  a  
n o m in a l  a m o u n t .
I n  t h i s  c o n t e x t  t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  o f  a  f i ­
n a n c i n g  l e a s e  m i g h t  w el l  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  
b e  a  l i a b i l i t y  w i t h i n  t h e  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  
i n t e n t  o f  S e c .  3 5 7 ( c ) .  S u c h  s e c u r e d  
t r a n s a c t i o n s  w er e  u s e d  i n  t h e  C o m m i t t e e  
R e p o r t s  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of t h e  
s e c t i o n .  (S ee . S .  R e p t .  1 6 2 2 ,  t o  a c c o m ­
p a n y  H .R .  8 3 0 0 ,  P . Law 5 9 1 ,  8 3 d  C o n g . ,  
2 d  se s s . ,  1 9 5 4 ,  p .  2 7 0 ;  H . R e p t .  1337  
(s a m e  l a w ) ,  p .  A 1 2 9 . )  I n  a n  o p e r a t i ng  
l e a s e — l i k e  R e d  E . In k ' s - - t h e  r e n t a l  p a y ­
C -6  (FES 1 2 / 1 8 / 7 5 )
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m en t s  c a n  o n l y  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  b e  p a y ­
m e n t s  f o r  t h e  c u r r e n t  u s e  o f  p r o p e r t y .  
C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  w e  w o u l d  r e j e c t  a n y  a t t e m p t  
b y  t h e  IR S  t o  t r e a t  t h e s e  l e a s e  p a y m e n t s  
a s  a  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  p u r p o s e s  o f  
S e c .  3 5 7 ( c ) .
G i v e n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  I n k ' s  l e a s e  w i t h  
B r a n d e n  P r o p e r t i e s  d o e s  c a l l  f o r  a  m a n d a ­
t o r y  $ 1 2 ,0 0 0  p a y m e n t  i n  t h e  e v e n t  t h e  
l e a s e  i s  b r o k e n ,  a n d  g i v e n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
t h i s  l e a s e  c o u l d  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a  s l i g h t l y  
" u n f a v o r a b l e "  o n e  a s  o f   3 / 1/ 7 5 ,  t h e  I RS  
j u s t  m i g h t  c o n t e n d  t h a t  $ 1 2 ,0 0 0  [ o f  t h e  
r e m a i n i n g  $ 1 8 6 , 0 0 0 ) d o e s  r e p r e s e n t  a  l i a ­
b i l i t y  a s s u m e d  b y  Re a d y ,  I n c .  N o t e ,  h o w ­
e v e r ,  t h a t  e v e n  i f  b o t h  t h e  t r a d e  p a y ­
a b l e s  o f  $ 1 0 ,0 0 0  a n d  t h e  l e a s e  o f  $ 1 2 ,0 0 0  
w e r e  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  b e  l i a b i l i t i e s ,  t h e  
$ 8 0 ,0 0 0  I n  b a s i s  t r a n s f e r r e d  w o u l d  s t i l l  
e x c e e d  t h e  s u m  o f  a n y  l i a b i l i t i e s  a s s u m e d  
b y  P e a d y ,  I n c .  I t  i s  o n l y  i f  t h e  e n t i r e  
b a l a n c e  o f  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  l e a s e  p a y m e n t s  
i s  d e e m e d  t o  b e  a  l i a b i l i t y  t h a t  
S e c .  3 5 7 ( c )  c a n  b e  m a d e  t o  a p p l y .  B a s e d  
o n  a l l  o f  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  c o n s i d e r e d  
h e r e ,  w e  w o u l d  s t r o n g l y  r e s i s t  a n y  s u c h  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i f  r a i s e d  b y  t h e  I RS  o n  
a u d i t .
F o r  f u r t h e r  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  S e c . 3 5 7 ( c )  
p r o b l e m ,  s e e  " S e c .  3 5 7 ( c )  a n d  T h e  C a sh  
B a s i s  T a x p a y e r , " 115 Uni v .  P e n n .  Law  R e v . 
1 1 5 4  ( 1 9 6 7 ) ;  " T h e  F r u s t r a t i o n s  i n  S e c t i o n  
3 5 7 ( c ) , "  25 T a x  Law Re v i ew  2 2 7  ( 1 9 7 0 ) .
S ee
W .P . A - 3
Q u e st i o n  3 :
Concl u s io n:
A r e  c o l l e c t i o n s  o f  t h e  t r a d e  r ec ei v a b l e s
tra n s fe rre d  b y  Mr . I n k  t o  R e a d y ,  I n c . . ,  o n  
3 / 1/ 7 5  t o  be c o n s i der e d  t h e  t a x a b l e  i n ­
com e of Mr . I n k  or  o f  R e a d y ,  I n c . ?
For  many year s , i n r e l i ance on the
" as s i g n m e n t - o f - i n c o m e "  d o c t r i n e ,  t h e  
c o u r t s h a v e  h e l d  t h a t  a n  i n d i v i d u a l
C -7  (FES 1 2 / 1 8 / 7 5 )
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Q u e s t i o n  4 :
C o n c l u s i o n :
t r a ns f er o r ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  c o n t r o l l e d  
c o r p o r a t e  t r a n s f e r e e ,  w a s  t a x a b l e  o n  t h e  
i n c h o a t e  i n c o m e  i t e m s  t r a n s f er r e d  i n  a  
S e c .  3 5 1 t r a n s a c t i o n .  B ro w n  v .  C o m m is­
s i o n e r  1 1 5 F 2 d  3 3 7  (C A -2 , 7 9 4 0 ) ;  Cl i n t o n  
Da v i d s o n , 4 3  BTA 5 7 6  [ 1 9 4 1 ) ;  a n d  A d o l p h  
Wei n b e r g ,  4 4  TC 2 3 3  [ 1 9 6 5 )  a f f ’ d  p e r  
c u r ia m  3 8 6  F 2 d  836  (C A -9 , 19 6 7 ) .
The t a x  c o u r t  w a s  f i n a l l y  p e r s u a d e d ,  h o w ­
e v e r ,  t o  al l ow  t h e  ca s h  b a s i s  t a x p a y e r  t o  
t r a n s f e r  a c c o u n t s  r e c e i v a b l e  t a x  f r e e  u n ­
d er  S e c .  3 5 1 .  T hom as  B r i g g s , TC Memo 
1 9 5 6 - 0 8 6 .  S i n c e  B r i g g s  tw o  a d d i t i o n a l  
c a s e s ,  H e m p t B r o s .  I n c , v .  U S , 3 5 4  F. 
S u p p .  1 1 72 [DC P a . , 19 7 3 )  a n d  Di v i n e ,  J r .  
v .  U S, 1 9 6 2 - 2  USTC 8 5 ,  592  [WD T e n n . ,
1962 )  h a v e  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  a s s i g n m e n t - o f -  
i n c o m e  d o c t r i n e  i s  i n a p p l i c a b l e  i n  s u c h  
s i t u a t i o n s . B i t t k e r  a n d  E u s t i c e  ( 3 d  e d . )  
al s o  n o te  t h a t  t h e  i m p l i c i t  h o l d i n g  of 
P e t e r  R a i c h ,  46  TC 6 0 4  ( 1 9 6 6 ) i s  t h a t  r e ­
c e i v a b l e s  t r a n s f e r r e d  w oul d  n o t  h a v e  b e e n  
r e c o g n i z e d  b u t  f o r  S e c .  3 5 7 ( c ) . [ B i t t k e r  
a n d  E u s t i c e ,  3 d  e d . , p .  3 - 5 9 . )  U n d e r  t h e  
f a c t  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  of I n k ' s  c a s e ,  t h e r e  
s e e m s  t o  b e  s uff i c i e n t  a u t h o r i t y  t o  a r g u e  
t h a t  a n y  r e c e i v a b l e s  c o l e c t e d  b y  R e a d y ,  
I n c . ,  s h o u l d  b e  t r e a t e d  a s  t h e  t a x a b l e  
i n c o m e  of t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  a n d  n o t  t h a t  of 
M r. I n k  i n d i v i d u a l l y .
M u s t  M r. I n k  r e c a p t u r e  a n y  of t h e  i n v e s t ­
m e n t  c r e d i t  cl a im e d  i n  1971 b e c a u s e  o f  
h i s  t r a n s f e r  of t h e  e q u i p m e n t  t o  R e a d y ,  
I n c . ,  i n  1 9 7 5 ?
N o— Al l  c o n d i t i o n s  of T r e a s .  R e g s .
S e c . 1 .4 7 -3 ( f ) ( 1) are s a t i s f i e d .  The 
p e r t i n e n t  r e g u l a t i o n  r e a d s  a s  f o l l o w s :
C -8  [ FES 1 2 / 1 8 / 7 5 )
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OK h e r e  
( s a m e  
bus . )
OK h e r e  
( 9 8% r e ­
t a i n e d )
OK h e r e  
( a l l  
p r o p .  
t r a n s f .  )
OK h e r e  
(s ee  W.P. 
E -3)
N/A
TREAS. REGS. SEC. 1.47-3(f)
(f) Mere change in form of conducting a trade or
business.—
(1) General rule.
(i) Notwithstanding the provision of § 1.47-2, re­
lating to “disposition” and “cessation,” paragraph
(a) of § 1.47-1 shall not apply to section 38 prop­
erty which is disposed of, or otherwise ceases to be 
section 38 property with respect to the taxpayer, 
before the close of the estimated useful life which 
was taken into account in computing the taxpayer's 
qualified investment by reason of a mere change in 
the form of conducting the trade or business in 
which such section 38 property is used provided 
that the conditions set forth in subdivision (ii) of 
this subparagraph are satisfied.
(ii) The conditions referred to in subdivision (i) of 
this subparagraph are as follows:
(a) The section 38 property described in sub­
division (i) of this subparagraph is retained as 
section 38 property in the same trade or busi­
ness,
(b) The transferor (or in a case where the trans­
feror is a partnership, estate, trust, or electing 
small business corporation, the partner, ben­
eficiary, or shareholder) of such section 38 
property retains a substantial interest in such 
trade or business.
(c) Substantially all the assets (whether or not 
section 38 property) necessary to operate such 
trade or business are transferred to the trans­
feree to whom such section 38 property is 
transferred, and
(d) The basis of such section 38 property in the 
hands of the transferee is determined in whole 
or in part by reference to the basis of such sec­
tion 38 property in the hands of the transferor.
This subparagraph shall not apply to the transfer of 
section 38 property if paragraph (e) of this section, 
relating to transactions to which section 381 ap­
plies, applies with respect to such transfer.
the
r ul e.
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W.P. Ref .
Ques t i o n  5 :
C oncl u s i o n :
W h a t  i s  Mr . I n k ' s  t a x  b a s i s  i n  t h e  9 8 0  
s h a r es of R e a d y ,  I n c . ,  s t o c k  t h a t  he  
r e t a i n e d  a f t e r  t h e  3 / 1 / 7 5  i n c o r p o r a t i o n ?
IR C  S e c . 358  d e t e r m i n e s  t h e  a d j u s t e d  
b a s i s o f  s t o c k s  a n d  s e c u r i t ies  r e c e i v e d  
i n  a  S e c . 351 t r a n s a c t i o n .  I t  r e a d s  a s  
f o l l ow s :
h e r e ,
$ 8 0 ,0 0 0
SEC. 358. BASIS TO DISTRIBUTEES.
(a) General Rule:—In the case of an exchange to which 
section 351, 354, 355, 356, 361, or 371 (b) applies—
(1) Nonrecognition property.—The basis of the prop­
erty permitted to be received under such section with­
out the recognition of gain or loss shall be the same as 
that of the property exchanged—
(A) decreased by—
S e e  W.P.
C -4
- 4 0 , 0 0 0
NONE
S e e
S e c .
3 5 8 ( d )
( b u t  s e e  
W. P . c - 6  
t h ru  C -7  
f o r  p o s ­
s i b l e
IR S  v i ew )
N/A
(i) the fair market value of any other property 
(except money) received by the taxpayer,
(ii) the amount of any money received by the 
taxpayer, and
(iii) The amount of loss to the taxpayer which 
was recognized on such exchange, and
N/A
(B) increased by—
(i) the amount which was treated as a dividend, 
and
(ii) the amount of gain to the taxpayer which 
was recognized on such exchange (not includ­
ing any portion of such gain which was treated 
as a dividend).
N/A
N/A
(2) Other property.—The basis of any other property 
(except money) received by the taxpayer shall be its fair 
market value.
(b) Allocation of Basis.—
(1) In general.— Under regulations prescribed by the 
Secretary or his delegate, the basis determined under 
subsection (a)(1) shall be allocated among the proper­
ties permitted to be received without the recognition of 
gain or loss.
C -1 0  (FE S  1 2 / 1 8 / 7 5 )
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Sec.. 358 c on’t . (Red E. Ink)
W.P . Ref .
 
N/A.  
 
N/A
For
r e s ul t  
r e f e r  
t o  S e c .    
3 5 8 ( a ) ( 1 ) 
( A ) ( i i ) ,  
a b o v e .
N/A
(2) Special rule for section 355.—In the case of an ex­
change to which section 355 (or so much of section 356 
as relates to section 355) applies, then in making the 
allocation under paragraph (1) of this subsection, there 
shall be taken into account not only the property so 
permitted to be received without the recognition of 
gain or loss, but also the stock or securities (if any) of 
the distributing corporation which are retained, and 
the allocation of basis shall be made among all such 
properties.
(c) Section 355 Transactions Which Are Not Exchanges. — 
For purposes of this section, a distribution to which sec­
tion 355 (or so much of section 356 as relates to section 
355) applies shall be treated as an exchange, and for such 
purposes the stock and securities of the distributing corpo­
ration which are retained shall be treated as surrendered, 
and received back, in the exchange.
(d) Assumption of Liability.—Where, as part of the con­
sideration to the taxpayer, another party to the exchange 
assumed a liability of the taxpayer or acquired from the 
taxpayer property subject to a liability, such assumption or 
acquisition (in the amount of the liability) shall, for pur­
poses of this section, be treated as money received by the 
taxpayer on the exchange.
(e) Exception.—This section shall not apply to property 
acquired by a corporation by the exchange of its stock or 
securities (or the stock or securities of a corporation which 
is in control of the acquiring corporation) as consideration 
in whole or in part for the transfer of the property to it.
A c c o r d i n g  t o  S e c . 3 5 8 ( a ) ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  M r. 
I n k ’s  b a s i s  i n  t h e  1 ,0 0 0  s h a r e s  h e  i n i ­
t i a l l y  r e c e i v e d  w o u l d  b e  $ 4 0 ,0 0 0  ( i . e . ,  
$ 8 0 ,0 0 0  b a s i s  t r a n s f e r r e d  l e s s  $ 4 0 ,0 0 0  
l i a b i l i t i e s  a s s u m e d  b y  R e a d y ,  I n c . ) .  S e e  
a g a i n  W. P .  C -4  t h r u  C -6  ( o r  a  d i s c u s s i o n  
o f  t h e  m e a n in g  of  t h e  w o r d  " l i a b i l i t i e s . "
B e c a u s e  M r. I n k  g a v e  t e n  s h a r e s  t o  M r s .  
I n k  a n d  t e n  s h a r e s  t o  M r . B o o k s ,  t h e  
b a s i s  i n  h i s  r e m a i n i n g  9 8 0  s h a r e s  w o u l d  
b e  $ 3 9 ,  200  ( i . e . ,  98% o f  $ 4 0 , 0 0 0 ) .  E a c h  
d o n e e  w o u l d  h a v e  a  b a s i s  o f  $ 4 0 0  i n  t h e  
t e n  s h a r e s  r e c e i v e d  p e r  S e c .  1 0 1 5 .
C -1 1  ( FES 1 2 / 1 8 / 7 5 )
S e e  a g a i n  
W .P . C -4  
t h r u C -7  
f o r  m e a n ­
i ng  o f  
”l i a b . ”
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R e a d y ,  I n c .  ( C o r p o r a t e  A c c t . )  
S u m m a ry  o f  Q u e s t i o n s  I n v e s t i g a t e d  
D e c e m b e r  19 7 5
1. M u s t  R e a d y ,  I n c . ,  r e p o r t  a n y  t a x a b l e  i n ­
c o m e  i n  i t s  f i r s t  t a x  y e a r  b e c a u s e  o f  i t s  
e x c h a n g e  o f  p r e v i o u s l y  u n i s s u e d  s t o c k  f o r  
t h e  a s s e t s  o f  R e d ’s  P r i n t  S h o p ?  
C o n c l u s i o n : N o . ( S e e .  1 0 3 2 . )
2 .  C an  R e a d y ,  I n c . ,  c l a i m  a  t a x  d e d u c t i o n  
u n d e r  S e c .  162 f o r  t h e  $ 1 0 ,0 0 0  e x p e n d e d  
w i t h i n  s i x t y  d a y s  f o l l o w i n g  i n c o r p o r a t i o n  
i n  p a y m e n t  o f  t h e  t r a d e  p a y a b l e s  i t  a s ­
s u m e d  f r o m  R e d ’s  P r i n t  S h o p ?
C o n c l u s i o n : T h e  o f f i c e r s  o f  R e a d y ,  I n c . ,  
s h o u l d  b e  a l e r t e d  t o  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  
t h e  IR S  m i g h t  s u c c e s s f u l l y  c h a l l e n g e  t h e  
p r o p r i e t y  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  d e d u c t i n g  
t h e  $ 1 0 ,0 0 0  e x p e n d e d  i n  p a y m e n t  o f  t h o s e  
a c c o u n t s .
3 . I s  t h e  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  t r a d e  r e c e i v a b l e s  
t r a n s f e r r e d  b y  M r. I n k  t o  R e a d y ,  I n c . ,  
a n d  c o l l e c t e d  b y  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  a f t e r  
t h e  i n c o r p o r a t i o n ,  p r o p e r l y  d e e m e d  t o  b e  
t h e  t a x a b l e  i n c o m e  o f  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ?
C o n c l u s i o n : S u f f i c i e n t  a u t h o r i t y  e x i s t s  
t o  j u s t i f y  t r e a t i n g  t h e  r e c e i v a b l e s  c o l ­
l e c t e d  a s  t h e  t a x a b l e  i n c o m e  o f  R e a d y ,
I n c .
4 .  Wh a t  i s  R e a d y ,  I n c . ’ s ,  a d j u s t e d  t a x  b a s i s  
i n  t h e  v a r i o u s  a s s e t s  i t  r e c e i v e d  f r o m  
R e d  E . I n k  o n  3 / 1 / 7 5 ?
S e e  E - 1
S e e  E -1  & 2
S e e  a g a i n  
C -7  & 8
C onclusion:
C a sh  $ 2 0 ,0 0 0
S u p p l i e s  - 0 -
R e c e i v a b l e s  - 0 -
E q u i p m e n t  6 0 ,0 0 0
S e e  E -3
D- 1 (FE S  12 / 19 / 7 5 )
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(R ead y , I n c . )
5 .  Wh a t  i s  t h e  m a x im u m  d e p r e c i a t i o n  m e th o d  
t h a t  R e a d y ,  I n c . ,  c a n  u t i l i z e  r e l a t i v e  t o  
t h e  e q u i p m e n t  a c q u i r e d  f r o m  R e d  E . I n k  o n  
3 / 7 / 7 5 ?
C o n c l u s i o n : 150 p e r c e n t  d e c l i n i n g - b a l a n c e  
d e p r e c i a t i o n  a s s u m i n g  t h e  e q u i p m e n t  h a s  a  
r e m a i n i n g  u s e f u l  l i f e  o f  t h r e e  y e a r s  o r  
l o n g e r .
6 .  M u s t  R e a d y ,  I n c . ,  o b t a i n  t h e  c o m m i s s i o n ­
e r ’s  a p p r o v a l  t o  f i l e  i t s  f i r s t  t a x  r e ­
t u r n  o n  a  F e b r u a r y  2 8 /2 9  f i s c a l - y e a r ,  
c a s h - m e t h o d  b a s i s ?
C o n c l u s i o n : N o; no  s p e c i a l  p e r m i s s i o n  i s  
r e q u i r e d  s o  l o n g  a s  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  f i n a n ­
c i a l  r e c o r d s  a r e  m a i n t a i n e d  o n  t h i s  s a m e  
b a s i s .
S e e  E -3
S e e  E -4  
& 5
D- 2  (FES  12 / 19 /7 5 )
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R e a d y ,  I n c .  ( C o r p o r a t e  A c c o u n t )  
W o r k in g  P a p e r s  
D e c e m b e r  1 975 W .P . R e f .
Q u e s t i o n  1 : M u s t  R e a d y ,  I n c . ,  r e p o r t  a n y  t a x a b l e  i n ­
co m e  i n  i t s  f i r s t  t a x  y e a r  b e c a u s e  o f  i t s  
e x c h a n g e  o f  p r e v i o u s l y  u n i s s u e d  s t o c k  f o r  
t h e  a s s e t s  o f  R e d ’s  P r i n t  S h o p  o n  3 / 1/ 7 5 ?
C o n c l u s i o n : N o; s e e  C o d e  S e c .  1032  b e l o w .
SEC. 1032. EXCHANGE OF STOCK FOR PROPERTY.
(a) Nonrecognition of Gain or Loss.—No gain or loss shall 
be recognized to a corporation on the receipt of money or 
other property in exchange for stock (including treasury 
stock) of such corporation.
(b) Basis.—For basis of property acquired by a corpora­
tion in certain exchanges for its stock, see section 362.
Q u e s t i o n  2 : C an R e a d y ,  I n c . ,  c l a i m  a  t a x  d e d u c t i o n
u n d e r  IR C  S e c . 162 f o r  t h e  $ 1 0 ,0 0 0  i t  e x ­
p e n d e d  w i t h i n  s i x t y  d a y s  f o l l o w i n g  i n c o r ­
p o r a t i o n  i n  p a y m e n t  o f  t h e  t r a d e  a c c o u n t s  
i t  a s s u m e d  f r o m  R e d ’s  P r i n t  S h o p ?
C o n c l u s i o n : G e n e r a l l y  t h e  c o u r t s  h a v e  d e n i e d  a  d e d u c ­
t i o n  f o r  o r d i n a r y  ( S e c .  16 2 ) e x p e n s e s  i n ­
c u r r e d  b y  t h e  t r a n s f e r o r  b u t  p a i d  b y  t h e  
c o r p o r a t e  t r a n s f e r e e  f o l l o w i n g  a  S e c .  351  
i n c o r p o r a t i o n .  A s  r e c e n t l y  a s  19 7 2  t h e  
T a x  C o u r t  d e c l a r e d :
It is well settled that an expenditure of a preceding owner 
of property which has accrued but which is paid by one 
acquiring that property is a part of the cost of acquiring 
that property, irrespective of what would be the tax 
character of the expenditure to the prior owner. Such 
payment becomes part of the basis of the property ac­
quired and may not be deducted when paid by the ac­
quired of that property.
( M. B u t e n  and. S o n s , I n c . ,  TC Memo 1 9 7 2 - 0 4 4 . )
t h e
r u l e
F o r  f a c t s ,  
s e e
W .P. A -1
E - 1 ( FES 1 2 / 1 9 / 7 5 )
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T h u s  t h e  T a x  C o u r t  i n  B u t e n  i n d i c a t e s  
t h a t  a  d e f i n i t e  u n i f o r m i t y  o f  a p p l i c a t i o n  
e x i s t s  i n  t h i s  a r e a .  D e s p i t e  t h e  s i g n i f ­
i c a n t  n u m b e r  o f  c a s e s  s u p p o r t i n g  t h a t  
c o n c l u s i o n ,  h o w e v e r ,  i t  m a y  b e  s i g n i f i ­
c a n t  t h a t  i n  P e t e r  R a i c h , 46  TC 6 0 4  
( 1 9 6 6 ) ,  t h e  p a r t i e s  s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t  t h e  
a c c o u n t s  p a y a b l e  w e r e  d e d u c t i b l e  b y  t h e  
t r a n s f e r e e  c o r p o r a t i o n .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  i n  
B o n g i o v a n n i ,  4 7 0  F 2 d  921  ( C A - 2 ,  1 9 7 2 ) t h e  
S e c o n d  C i r c u i t  C o u r t  i n  1 972  n o t e d  t h a t  
" w h e r e  t h e  a c q u i r i n g  c o r p o r a t i o n  i s  o n  a n  
a c c r u a l  b a s i s ,  s u c h  a c c o u n t s  a r e  a l s o  d e ­
d u c t i b l e  i n  i t s  i n i t i a l  p e r i o d . "  ( N o t e :  
R e a d y ,  I n c . ,  w i l l  b e  a  c a s h - b a s i s  t a x p a y ­
e r .  ) P e r h a p s  t h e  m o s t  s i g n i f i c a n t  a r g u ­
m e n t  f a v o r i n g  d e d u c t i b i l i t y  w a s  p r e ­
s e n t e d  i n  US v .  S m i t h , 4 1 8  F 2d  589  ( C A - 5 ,  
1 9 6 9 ) . T h e r e  t h e  c o u r t  n o t e d  t h a t  " I f  
t h i s  f a c t u a l  i n q u i r y  r e v e a l s  a  p r i m a r y  
p u r p o s e  o t h e r  t h a n  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  p r o p e r ­
t y ,  t h e  c o u r t  m a y p r o p e r l y  a l l o w  a  d e d u c ­
t i o n  t o  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  i f  a l l  t h e  r e ­
q u i r e m e n t s  o f  T i t l e  26  USC, S e c .  1 6 2 , a r e  
m e t . . . . "  I n  I n k ' s  i n c o r p o r a t i o n  i t  i s  
a r g u a b l e  t h a t  t h e  l i a b i l i t i e s  o f  R e d 's  
P r i n t  S h o p  w e r e  a s s u m e d  b y  R e a d y ,  I n c . ,  
s o l e l y  f o r  b u s i n e s s  c o n v e n i e n c e  r e a s o n s  
a n d  n o t  f o r  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  p r o p e r t y .  
I f  R e d ’s  d e c i s i o n  t o  t r a n s f e r  t h e s e  l i a ­
b i l i t i e s  c a n  b e  d e m o n s t r a t e d  t o  h a v e  b e e n  
m o t i v a t e d  b y  t h i s  c r i t e r i o n ,  t h e  r e a s o n ­
i n g  i n  S m i t h  m i g h t  s u p p o r t  R e a d y ,  I n c . ’s ,  
c l a i m  f o r  d e d u c t i b i l i t y .  G i v e n  t h e  
w e i g h t  o f  c o n t r a r y  a u t h o r i t y ,  h o w e v e r ,  
t h e  o f f i c e r s  o f  R e a d y ,  I n c . ,  s h o u l d  b e  
a l e r t e d  t o  a  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a n  IR S  c h a l ­
l e n g e .  S e e  M a g r u d e r  v .  S u p p l e e ,
316  US 394  ( 1 9 4 2 ) ;  H o l d c r a f t  T r a n s p o r t a ­
t i o n  C o . ,  153  F 2 d  3 2 3  (CA - 8 ,  1 9 4 6 ) ;
H a d e n  C o . v .  C o m m i s s i o n e r , 165 F 2d  5 8 8  
( C A - 5 ,  1 9 4 8 ) a n d  A t h o l  M fg .  C o . ,
54  F 2 d  230  (C A -1 ,  1 9 3 1 ) .
E -2  ( FES 1 2 / 1 9 / 7 5 )
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Q u e s t i o n  3 :
C o n c l u s i o n :
Q u e s t i o n  4 :
Conclu s ion:
A r e  c o l l e c t i o n s  f r o m  t h e  $ 5 0 ,0 0 0  i n  t r a d e  
a c c o u n t s  r e c e i v a b l e  t r a n s f e r r e d  b y  M r.
I n k  t o  R e a d y ,  I n c . ,  o n  3 / 1 / 7 5  t o  b e  c o n ­
s i d e r e d  t h e  t a x a b l e  i n c o m e  o f  M r. I n k  o r  
o f  R e a d y ,  I n c . ?
O f R e a d y ,  I n c . ;  s e e  a g a i n  W .P . C -7  8 8
W h a t  i s  R e a d y ,  I n c . ’s  a d j u s t e d  t a x  b a s i s  
i n  t h e  v a r i o u s  a s s e t s  i t  r e c e i v e d  fr o m  
M r. I n k  o n  3 / 1 / 7 5 ?
T h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  a s s e t s  r e c e i v e d  b y  a  
c o r p o r a t e  t r a n s f e r e e  i n  a  S e c .  351 t r a n s ­
a c t i o n  a r e  d e t e r m i n e d  b y  S e c .  3 6 2 ( a )  
w h i c h  r e a d s  a s  f o l l o w s :
t h e  r u l e
SEC. 362. BASIS TO CORPORATIONS.
(a) Property Acquired by Issuance of Stock or as Paid-In 
Surplus.—If property was acquired on or after June 22, 
1954, by a corporation—
(1) in connection with a transaction to which section 
351 (relating to transfer of property to corporation con­
trolled by transferor) applies, or
(2) as paid-in surplus or as a contribution to capital,
then the basis shall be the same as it would be in the hands 
of the transferor, increased in the amount of gain recog­
nized to the transferor on such transfer.
A c c o r d i n g l y ,  R e a d y ,  I n c . ’s ,  a d j u s t e d  t a x  
b a s i s  o f  a s s e t s  r e c e i v e d  i s  a s  f o l l o w s :
S e e  W .P .. 
A -1
Q u e s t i o n  5 :
Cash. $ 2 0 ,0 0 0
S u p p l i e s  - 0 -
T r a d e  r e c e i v a b l e s  - 0 -
E q u i p m e n t  6 0 ,0 0 0
W h a t  i s  t h e  m a x im u m  d e p r e c i a t i o n  m e th o d  
t h a t  R e a d y ,  I n c . ,  c a n  u t i l i z e  i n  d e p r e c i ­
a t i n g  t h e  e q u i p m e n t  a c q u i r e d  f r o m  Mr . I n k  
o n  3 / 1/ 7 5 ?
E-3 (FE5 72/79/75)
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( R e a d y ,  I n c . )
W .P . R e f .
C o n c l u s i o n : B e c a u s e  S e c .  381 d o e s  n o t  a p p l y  t o  S e c .
351 t r a n s f e r s , a l l  p r o p e r t y  r e c e i v e d  b y  
R e a d y ,  I n c . ,  i s  d e e m e d  t o  b e  u s e d  p r o p ­
e r t y .  S u c h  p r o p e r t y  c a n  n o t  b e  d e p r e c i ­
a t e d  u n d e r  a n y  o f  t h e  r a p i d  m e th o d s  
g r a n t e d  o n l y  t o  o r i g i n a l  u s e r s  i n  
S e c .  1 6 7 ( b ) ( 2 ) ,  ( 3 ) ,  o r  ( 4 ) .  S e e  R e v .  
R u l .  6 7 - 2 8 6 ,  1 9 6 7 - 2  CB 1 0 1 .  H o w e v e r ,  a c ­
c o r d i n g  t o  R e v .  R u l .  5 7 - 3 5 2 ,  1 9 5 7 -2  CB 
1 5 0 , a s  m o d i f i e d  b y  R e v .  R u l .  5 7 - 2 4 8 ,  
1 9 6 7 -2  CB 9 8 ,  s u c h  p r o p e r t y  c a n  b e  d e ­
p r e c i a t e d  b y  a  d e c l i n i n g  b a l a n c e  m e th o d  
n o t  t o  e x c e e d  150 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  
s t r a i g h t - l i n e  r a t e ,  i f  t h e  u s e d  t a n g i b l e  
p r o p e r t y  h a s  a n  e s t i m a t e d  r e m a i n i n g  l i f e  
o f  t h r e e  y e a r s  o r  l o n g e r .
Q u e s t i o n  6 : M u s t  R e a d y ,  I n c . ,  o b t a i n  t h e  c o m m i s s i o n ­
e r ' s  a p p r o v a l  t o  f i l e  i t s  f i r s t  t a x  r e ­
t u r n  o n  a  M a rc h  1 f i s c a l - y e a r ,  c a s h -  
b a s i s ?
C o n c l u s i o n :  S e e  b e l o w  T r e a s .  R e g s .  S e c . 1 . 4 4 1 -  
1 ( b ) ( 3 ) .
C o n f i r m e d  
b y  p h o n e  
w i t h
Tom B o o k s  
1 2 / 1 9 / 75
TREAS. REG. SEC. 1.441-l(b)(3)
(3) A new taxpayer in his first return may adopt any taxable 
year which meets the requirements of section 441 and this 
section without obtaining prior approval. The first taxable 
year of a new taxpayer must be adopted on or before the 
time prescribed by law (not including extensions) for the 
filing of the return for such taxable year. However, for 
rules applicable to the adoption of a taxable year by a 
partnership, see paragraph (b)(2) of § 1.442-1, section 
706(b), and paragraph (b) of § 1.706-1. For rules applicable 
to the taxable year of a member of an affiliated group 
which makes a consolidated return, see § 1.1502-76 and 
paragraph (d) of 1.442-1.
S e e  a l s o  T r e a s .  R e g s .  S e c .  1 . 4 4 1 - 1 ( e ) .
E - 4  (F E S 1 2 / 1 9 / 7 5 )
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TREAS. REG. SEC. 1.441-1(e)
(e) Fiscal year.
(1) The term “fiscal year” means—
(i) A period of 12 months ending on the last day of 
any month other than December, or
(ii) The 52-53-week annual accounting period, if 
such period has been elected by the taxpayer.
(2) A fiscal year will be recognized only if it is estab­
lished as the annual accounting period of the taxpayer 
and only if the books of the taxpayer are kept in accord­
ance with such fiscal year.
S e e  c l i e n t
l e t t e r
r e m i n d e r
T h e  c o u r t s  h a v e  h e l d  t h a t  a  c o r p o r a t e  
t r a n s f e r e e  i s  a  s e p a r a t e  t a x p a y e r  f r o m  
t h a t  o f  i t s  t r a n s f e r o r .  S i d  v .  E zo  
P r o d u c t s  C o . ,  37 TC 385  ( 1 9 6 1 ) ;  A k r o n .,  
C ant o n ,  a n d  Y o u n g s t o w n  R a i l r o a d  C o . ,
22 TC 6 4 8  ( 1 9 5 5 ) ;  a n d  T e x t i l e  A p r o n  C o . 
21 TC 147  ( 1 9 5 3 ) .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  i f  
R e a d y ,  I n c . ,  w i l l  k e e p  i t s  f i n a n c i a l  
b o o k s  o n  t h e  s a m e  b a s i s  a s  i t  d e s i r e s  t o  
r e p o r t  i t s  t a x a b l e  i n c o m e ,  n o  s p e c i a l  
p e r m i s s i o n  i s  r e q u i r e d .
E -5  (F ES 1 2 / 1 9 / 7 5 )
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R e d  E . I n k / R e a d y ,  I n c .
S u g g e s t i o n s  f o r  C l i e n t ’s  F u t u r e  C o n s i d e r a t i o n  
D e c e m b e r  1975
I f  M r. I n k  d e s i r e s  a n y  a s s i s t a n c e  i n  f u t u r e  t a x  p l a n n i n g  
w e  s h o u l d  d i s c u s s  w i t h  h i m ,  i n  t h e  n e a r  f u t u r e ,  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  m a t t e r s  :
1 . S u b  c h a p t e r  S  E l e c t i o n —
a .  T h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  u n d e r  w h i c h  t h i s  w o u l d  
b e  d e s i r a b l e /  u n d e s i r a b l e .
b .  W hen  t h e  d e c i s i o n  m u s t  b e  m a d e .  ( B e tw e e n  
2 /1  a n d  3 / 3 1 . )
c .  N e e d  f o r  e v e r y  s h a r e h o l d e r ’s  a p p r o v a l .  
( P o s s i b l y  g e t  b u y - o u t  a g r e e m e n t s . )
2 .  E x e c u t i v e  c o m p e n s a t i o n  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  —
a .  G r o u p - t e r m  l i f e  i n s u r a n c e  ( S e c .  7 9 ( a ) ) .
b .  H e a l t h  a n d  a c c i d e n t  i n s u r a n c e  ( S e c .  1 0 6 ) .
c .  D e a th  b e n e f i t s  ( S e c .  1 0 1 ) .
d .  T r a v e l  a n d  e n t e r t a i n m e n t  ( r e q u i r e m e n t s  a n d  
a d v a n t a g e s ) .
3 .  P e n s i o n  P la n s  ( c o s t s  a n d  b e n e f i t s ) .
4 .  F u t u r e  C o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  C a p i t a l .
a .  C o n s i d e r  a d v a n t a g e s  o f  s e c u r i t i e s .
b .  S e c .  1 2 4 4  i f  a d d i t i o n a l  s t o c k  i s  i s s u e d .
5 .  C o u ld  85  p e r c e n t  d i v i d e n d - r e c e i v e d  d e d u c t i o n  
b e  u s e d  e f f e c t i v e l y ?
F- 1  (PES 1 2 / 2 3 / 7 5 )
209
8
It is too well settled to need citation of authorities 
that it is no offense nor is it reprehensible to avoid the 
attachment of taxes. One may employ all lawful means 
to minimize taxes.
JUDGE WALTER A. HUXMAN
Research Methodology 
for Tax Planning
This final chapter examines the research methodology appropriate 
to tax planning. It considers (1) the general role of tax planning in 
the CPA firm and (2) the technical differences between research 
methodologies for tax planning and tax compliance.
A recent survey by an AICPA committee contains several impli­
cations about the role of tax practice in the CPA firm.1 First, the 
survey clearly establishes the fact that tax practice represents an im­
portant source of revenue for the CPA (tax work accounts for be­
tween 21 and 40 percent of the total billings in nearly 46 percent 
of the responding firms). Second, although return preparation ac­
counts for the largest portion of the tax work revenues, consultation 
and planning ranks second—ahead of representation before govern­
ment bodies. Third, the larger practice units tend to generate a 
larger proportion of their total tax work revenues from consultation 
and planning than do the smaller practice units. Fourth, most of 
the respondents anticipated that consultation and planning would 
account for a greater proportion of future tax work fees. All of this 
suggests, of course, that the CPA who limits his tax practice to
1 Jerome P. Solan and Don J. Summa, “Profile of the CPA in Tax Practice, 
Tax Adviser, June 1972, pp. 324-28.
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compliance work is not taking full advantage of his opportunities. 
An expansion-oriented CPA is likely to discover that tax-planning 
work is a latent source of major growth. The continuing relation­
ship that a CPA has with his client ordinarily provides him with 
sufficient knowledge of facts to make tax-planning proposals with 
minimal additional input from the client.
As we noted in chapter 2, a final tax liability depends upon three 
variables: the facts, the law, and an administrative process. A 
change in any one of those variables is likely to change a client’s 
tax liability. To devise a tax plan which relies for its success upon 
an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code is usually unrealistic. 
Very few taxpayers wield that much influence and, even if they 
did, the response of Congress in tax matters typically is unpre­
dictable and slow. Attempts to change the administrative process 
would be equally ineffective and for similar reasons. Good tax plan­
ning always gives adequate consideration to the administrative proc­
ess, but it does not rely upon changes in that process for its success. 
Thus, tax plans generally must be based on the existing law and 
administrative processes because only the facts are readily modi­
fied. The ultimate significance of those facts stems, of course, from 
existing options already in the code.
Tax-Planning Considerations
The fundamental problems encountered in tax planning might be 
compared to those inherent in, say, a decision to transport an object 
from New York City to Atlanta. Momentarily ignoring operational 
constraints, there appear to be an almost unlimited number of ways 
to achieve the objective. That is, the object could be shipped by a 
commercial carrier (with air, rail, ship, or surface carrier possibil­
ities); it might be personally delivered; or a friend might deliver 
it. However, only a few transportation methods are realistic because 
of various operational constraints such as time (the object must be 
delivered before 9 a.m . on M onday m orning), cost ( th e  object m ust 
be shipped in the most inexpensive manner possible), and/or bulk 
(the object may be so large as to exclude all but a few possibilities). 
The transportation decision can be managed successfully only if 
the decision-maker (1) knows which options actually exist and (2) 
understands the constraints. A tax problem has very similar boun­
daries.
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Statutory Options
The Internal Revenue Code already contains many options from 
which a taxpayer must select alternative courses of action. For ex­
ample, a taxpayer generally can choose to operate his business as a 
sole proprietorship, a partnership, or a corporation. By exercising 
any option, a taxpayer automatically causes several different por­
tions of the code to apply to his business operations, any one of 
which may create a drastically different tax result. In addition to 
selecting a basic business form, a taxpayer may also have an oppor­
tunity to select a tax year, choose certain accounting methods, de­
termine whether the entity selected should be a “foreign” or “do­
mestic” one, choose between a “taxable” and “nontaxable” incor­
poration transaction, or decide whether or not to capitalize certain 
expenditures. Selecting the most advantageous combination of sta­
tutory tax options is obviously a difficult task, depending impor­
tantly upon the decision-maker’s knowledge of the very existence 
of those options.
Client Constraints
In addition to understanding all of the options implicit in the 
Internal Revenue Code, a tax planner must also understand the ob­
jectives and operational constraints inherent in his client’s activities. 
Those objectives and constraints typically are a combination of per­
sonal, financial, legal, and social considerations. For example, such 
personal objectives as a desire to maximize wealth, to control the 
distribution of property after death, to drive a competitor out of 
business, or to retire with minimal financial concerns may dictate 
certain actions. Personal objectives are often constrained by finan­
cial and legal obstacles. A tax planner can understand a client’s 
objectives only if that client is willing to confide in the adviser; 
therefore, it is absolutely essential that mutual trust and openness 
exist between the client and the tax adviser before a tax-planning 
engagement is undertaken.
Because tax plans often necessarily involve very significant finan­
cial and legal implications, much tax planning is better achieved 
through a team effort than through individual work. For example, 
in an estate planning engagement, it is not unusual to include the 
taxpayer’s attorney, his insurance agent, and a trust officer, as well 
as his CPA on the tax-planning team. By combining the special ex­
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pertise of several individuals, the client is better served, and more 
importantly, the team approach generally protects the client from 
the danger of “secondary infection” that is, from the danger of 
putting into operation a plan which may succeed from a tax stand­
point but which may have undesirable legal or financial conse­
quences.
Creativity
Even if a tax adviser knows all of the pertinent code provisions 
and fully understands all of his client’s objectives and constraints, 
the optimal tax plan may not be obvious. An optimal plan depends 
on the creative resources of the planner. Using all of his knowledge, 
he must test tentative solutions in a methodical process that rejects 
some alternatives and suggests others. Without a systematic method 
of considering and rejecting the many alternatives, the tax planner 
is likely to overlook the very alternative he seeks. As suggested 
earlier in this study, one common reason for overlooking a good 
alternative is simply the tax adviser’s failure to think long and/or 
hard enough about the problem. There appears to be a tendency 
to rush to the books or to another person for help, hoping that the 
best solution will automatically surface, when what is really needed 
is more creative thought on the subject. The thinking process is 
often stimulated by ideas found in books or suggested by other 
persons. Our recommendation is not that books and consultants be 
avoided, but rather that the ideas obtained from these sources be 
given an opportunity to mature in . quiet contemplation.
Tax-Planning Aids
Books
Tax library materials can help generate successful tax-planning 
ideas. Many practical ideas are contained in AICPA Tax Study No. 
4, Tax Practice Management, by William L. Raby.2 In addition to 
the “tax-planning ideas” portion of a client file (suggested in chap­
2William L. Raby, Tax Study No. 4, Tax Practice Management (New York: 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1974).
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ter 2 of this study), Raby recommends more complete “tax-plan­
ning surveys” and “year-end tax reviews” to better evaluate and 
anticipate business and estate-planning decisions. AICPA Tax Study 
No. 3, Guide to Federal Tax Elections, edited by Joel M. Forster, 
is a useful aid in locating many of the options that exist in the 
code.3
In addition to these two AICPA publications, most of the com­
mercial tax services include, in some form or another, tax-planning 
ideas intended to assist the CPA in his practice.4 For example, Pren­
tice-Hall’s service, Federal Taxes, contains a tax-savings-idea “in­
dex” consisting of four major classifications: (1) types of taxpayers, 
(2) income, (3) deductions and credits, and (4) miscellaneous. 
Subtopics within each classification refer the reader to editorial ex­
planations scattered throughout that tax service. In addition, Pren­
tice-Hall publishes a separate, two-volume Tax Ideas service.5 Vol­
ume one deals with everyday business and personal transactions; 
volume two concentrates on somewhat more complicated tax prob­
lems. This service features a transaction checklist of those tax mat­
ters that should be taken into account for any given transaction.
The Standard Federal Tax Reporter, published by Commerce 
Clearing House, contains a tax-planning section, organized on a 
topical basis, in its index volume. The editorial comments found 
there contain sufficient detail to handle the easier tax-planning prob­
lems and are cross-referenced to other CCH paragraphs that aid in 
the solution of the more difficult problems. Volume 5A of Federal 
Income, Gift and Estate Taxation, published by Matthew Bender, 
contains a “Planning Aids” section as well as a “tax calendar” for 
various types of taxpayers.
Although neither the Tax Coordinator, published by the Research 
Institute of America, nor the Tax Management Portfolios, published 
by the Bureau of National Affairs, contain tax-planning volumes
3 Joel M. Forster, ed., Tax Study No. 3, Guide to Federal Tax Elections (New 
York: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1971).
4 For additional details concerning the publishers of the several commercial 
tax services, see exhibit 4 .12 , p. 126.
5 Prentice-Hall also publishes a five-volume Estate Planning service; however, 
its content is not limited solely to tax ideas, but considers all facets of the 
estate planning function.
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per se, both include tax-planning recommendations throughout in 
the commentary on the tax issues to which they relate. Matthew 
Bender also publishes the three-volume Income Tax Techniques 
and the three-volume Estate Tax Techniques, both edited by the 
J. K. Lasser Tax Institute. The authors of these services are various 
practitioners who have tried to anticipate the difficulties in tax plan­
ning for clients.
Many other books, with varying degrees of sophistication, have 
been written on tax planning; it simply is not practical to mention 
each of them individually. Suffice it to note that readers should not 
be misled by all of the titles including the phrase tax planning. 
Many of these publications are intended for specific taxpayers and 
their unique tax problems, for example, tax planning for profes­
sionals, for real estate transactions, for closely held corporations, 
or for international operations. Topics covered in one publication 
are often duplicated in another. Before a practitioner decides to 
purchase such a book, he would be well advised to examine it in 
detail to make certain that it actually adds something to the ma­
terial already available in his library. Although many of these pub­
lications can be of material assistance in tax-planning work, there 
is no good substitute for the ability which comes only from years 
of experience.
Continuing Education
The extension of formal classroom instruction beyond the college 
campus during the past decade may be partially attributable to 
the institution of mandatory continuing education requirements for 
several professions, including the profession of accountancy. For 
tax practitioners, however, tax institutes provided continuing pro­
fessional instruction long before it became mandatory in any state.
Today, continuing education programs are a second major source 
of assistance in successful tax planning. Well-developed courses are 
readily available from national, state, and local professional so­
cieties, educational institutions, and private organizations. The 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants annually pub­
lishes a catalog describing most of the continuing education pro­
grams offered by the AICPA and the state CPA societies. The 1975- 
76 catalog includes a description of eighty-five different courses in 
taxation. The durations of the courses described there vary from
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“one-half day” to “six nights.” Costs of participation, when stated, 
vary from $25 to $170 per course. Most courses are scheduled dur­
ing the summer and fall, throughout the United States.
Information about other tax courses can frequently be found in 
tax periodicals. Some courses are directed to the beginner, others 
to an advanced audience. Some cover specific subjects; others are 
of general interest. Some are well developed and taught by highly 
qualified instructors; others have been hastily prepared and are 
poorly presented. Obviously the caveat “let the buyer beware” is 
applicable in the selection of any course.
Tree Diagrams
In tax-planning work, the alternatives that an adviser must con­
sider multiply quickly. After clearly identifying a general course 
of action (based on an understanding of the client’s objective and 
knowledge of the code), and before reaching a conclusion, an ad­
viser might consider structuring his problem in the form of a “tree 
diagram.” This technique is commonly utilized in management ser­
vices work.6 Such an exercise ensures a thorough and systematic 
consideration of each alternative because it focuses on the critical 
questions in a sequential manner. The branches of the tree derive 
from options existing in the code, any one of which can achieve the 
client’s objective. After ordering the options in this fashion, the ad­
viser should quantify the tax result implicit in each alternative. 
This quantification will facilitate discovery of many of the risks and 
constraints that, in turn, eliminate some alternatives and favor 
others. For an example of a tree diagram, see figure 8.1 (p. 221).
As noted above, a tax adviser cannot prepare a tree diagram for 
a tax problem until he fully understands his client’s objective and 
determines the tax rules applicable to each available method of 
achieving that objective. Knowledge of the client’s objective can 
come only from a complete and open discussion of the problem 
with the client. In an operational sense, objectives and constraints 
can only be determined in the same way in which facts are estab­
6 For further description of this technique in general see R. J. Ainslie and Alan 
A. Kenney, “Decision Tables—A Tool for Tax Practitioners,” Tax Adviser, June 
1972, pp. 336-45; see also Harley M. Courtney and Patricia C. Elliott, “Com­
puting for Tax Planning,” Tax Adviser, May 1974, pp. 288-97.
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lished in compliance engagements. Determination of the possible 
alternatives stems from a unique blend of prior experience, reading, 
and thinking about the problem. Ascertaining the tax outcome for 
each alternative is based on the same research techniques described 
in the earlier chapters of this study. In summary, then, the only 
major differences between the tax research methodologies applic­
able to compliance work and to planning work are in the adviser’s 
ability to identify possible alternatives and in his method for select­
ing the best of the several alternatives considered. In an attempt 
to focus on these aspects of tax planning, the following pages illus­
trate the process involved in a relatively simple planning engage­
ment. We will not examine in detail the procedures by which the 
tax adviser determines the tax result implicit in each option, since 
they are the same as those followed in a “closed-fact” situation.7
A Tax-Planning Example
To illustrate the procedures that might be utilized in a tax-plan­
ning engagement, assume that during 1972 a client, a recently re­
tired army general, purchased all 200 shares of outstanding stock 
in NNH Corporation for $200,000. NNH’s only asset at the time of 
this purchase consisted of seventy acres of unimproved (and unen­
cumbered) land with a tax basis of $90,000 and a fair market value 
of $200,000. Assume further that NNH has no current or accumu­
lated earnings and profits.
In 1974, the city council approved construction of a new down­
town expressway that would pass directly alongside the NNH prop­
erty. Consequently, the fair market value of that property increased 
to $300,000.
After discussions with several developers, the client decided to 
have NNH improve the property with streets, sewers, water mains, 
and so on, and to subdivide the property for sale to builders and 
prospective homeowners. The anticipated additional investment re­
quired is estimated to be $100,000; the client hopes that the addi­
7 For additional general background information, see Harry Z. Garian, Tax 
Study No. 1, Tax Guide for Incorporating A Closely Held Business and 
Stuart R. Josephs, Tax Study No. 2, Tax Planning Techniques for Indi­
viduals (New York: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 
1969 and 1971, respectively).
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tional improvements will increase the value of the land to $450,000 
within the next twelve months.
Early in 1975, the client begins to discuss with his tax adviser 
the potential tax implications of his proposed business venture. Be­
fore leaving the adviser’s office, the client makes it clear that he 
intends to make this his last business venture. He wants to make 
as large a profit as possible from this land deal and then invest the 
proceeds in a retirement annuity that, along with his military re­
tirement pay, will guarantee him and his wife a comfortable living 
for as long as they live. He asks the tax adviser to make recom­
mendations concerning the tax implications of his land development 
plans.
At this point the tax practitioner, using his experience and crea­
tivity, must identify alternative courses of action and recommend 
the one that achieves the client’s predetermined objectives with the 
least possible tax cost. Several approaches are available to the prac­
titioner. He can, for example, simply apply the client’s facts to his 
announced plans and determine the implicit tax result. This ap­
proach, however, would really not be considered tax planning; al­
though a tax adviser must often recommend against the plan orig­
inally proposed by a client, he generally attempts to recommend one 
or more alternatives that can achieve the most important client 
objectives in a tax-preferred manner.
In order to keep this example simple, we have assumed that
1. the client is married and files a joint return each year.
2. the client receives exactly $20,000 of ordinary taxable income 
each year in addition to that specifically attributable to this 
land development project.
3. the client does not qualify for income averaging.
4. the client sells all of the lots in one year.
5. the client personally invests the additional $100,000 necessary 
to make the land improvements (with no interest cost as­
sumed).
In an actual engagement, obviously, these constraints could only be 
determined through consultation with the client. In fact, many of 
the “constraints” assumed in this example would actually constitute 
important tax-planning alternatives. For example, the opportunity
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to spread the sale of lots over several years—either to qualify for 
capital gain treatment under the “safe harbor” rules of Section 1237 
or to obtain the benefit of lower marginal tax rates that necessarily 
accompany a lower annual (ordinary) income—is an obvious alter­
native to the solution suggested in this example. Another equally ob­
vious alternative would be to “bunch” the ordinary income in a 
single year in order to take advantage of income averaging oppor­
tunities available under Sections 1301-1305. As explained above, we 
have made assumptions that disqualify alternatives in order to keep 
the example simple. We have also assumed that the normal cor­
porate tax rate is 22 percent on all corporate taxable income, and the 
surtax rate is 26 percent on all income over $25,000.
Given these assumptions, it appears that two major issues con­
front the client. First, there is a prospect of double taxation because 
the land is currently held by a corporate entity, and the client 
wants to put all of the proceeds from this venture into a private 
annuity after completion of the project. Second, there is a chance 
that some of the gain on the sale of the land could be converted 
from ordinary income into capital gain. The tree diagram in figure 
8.1 outlines eleven possible alternatives. The diagram helps to high­
light the constraints under which these alternatives must be pur­
sued. Other alternatives have been rejected on the premise that the 
client has specifically ruled out those possibilities. For example, 
one obvious alternative would have been for the client to sell his 
NNH stock for $300,000. The diagram assumes that the client wants 
to develop the property and sell the lots; that is, he has rejected 
the option of selling out and settling for a smaller profit.
Without detailing the procedures used to determine the tax re­
sult implicit in each of the eleven branches of this diagram, we 
will simply note the general tax consequence inherent in that 
branch. In order to facilitate communication, each branch has been 
designated by a combination of letters and numbers. Thus, the 
branch appearing at the top of the diagram can be readily identified 
as Option A ( l) ( a ) ( i ) ;  the second option from the top as Option 
A ( l) (a ) ( i i ) ,  and so forth.
Liquidation Under Section 331, A fter Developing the
Property hu t Before Sale of Lots—Options A (1)(a)(i) and (ii)
Although the land probably would not qualify as either a capital 
asset (Section 1221) or as a Section 1231 asset, the liquidation of
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the corporation and distribution of the property might be treated as 
full payment in exchange for the stock (Section 331). If so, because 
the stock was held for more than six months, the gain would qualify 
as a long-term capital gain. However, although the client originally 
did not intend to use the corporation with a view to collapsing it 
to convert ordinary income into capital gains, the IRS might at­
tempt to invoke Section 341, which would convert the capital gain 
on liquidation into ordinary income. The two possible tax results 
can be computed as follows.
Personal Tax
If Sec. 341 is 
not invoked
Collapsibility
Status
If Sec. 341 
is invoked
$ 20,000 Ordinary taxable income $ 20,000
150,000 Surrender of stock 150,000
(FMV $450,000 -  cost 
$200,000 — improvements 
$100,000)
(75,000) Long-term capital gain deduction —
$ 95,000 Total taxable income $170,000
$ 42,180 Tax liability $ 90,380
Under this alternative, the subsequent sale of the lots would not 
create any additional tax liability because the client’s new basis in 
the lots would be $450,000 (assuming the fair market value re­
mained firm at $450,000). Also, under Section 336 the corporation 
would not recognize gain as a result of the liquidation.
Liquidation Under Section 333, After Developing the
Property hut Before Sale of Lots—Option A(l)(b)
If the liquidation is executed under Section 333, no gain will
be recognized at the time of the liquidation and, according to Sec­
tion 334 (c), the basis in the developed land distributed w ould be 
$300,000, the same as the basis of the stock surrendered. (This 
again assumes that the client contributed the additional $100,000 to 
NNH to make the land improvements.) The character of the land 
to the taxpayer would be the same as that to the corporation before 
liquidation; that is, it would be neither a capital asset nor a Section 
1231 asset. No gain would be recognized to the corporation upon 
liquidation (Section 336). Thus the tax liability would be as follows.
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Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income $ 20,000
Sale of lots (FMV $450,000 -  cost $200,000
— improvements $100,000) 150,000
Taxable income $170,000
Tax liability $ 90,380
Liquidation Under Section 331, A fter D eveloping the
Property and A fter Sale of Lots—Option A(2)(a)
In the event the corporation sells the developed property before a
liquidation is effected under Section 331, it will be required to re­
port the income from the sale of the lots. Undoubtedly the income 
would be treated as ordinary income since the property was con­
siderably improved and Section 1237, which potentially allows cap­
ital gain treatment on the sale of developed land, is not applicable 
to corporations. Subsequently, the distribution of the cash in liqui­
dation to the sole shareholder would be treated as in full payment 
in exchange for the stock, and the client would thus realize capital 
gain treatment (Section 331). The tax consequence would be de­
termined as follows.
Corporate Tax
Sale of improved land $450,000
Basis of land (cost $90,000 +  improvements
$100,000) 190,000
Ordinary corporate income $260,000
Corporate tax liability $118,300
Personal Tax
Cash distributed in liquidation ($450,000 — 
corporate tax $118,300) $331,700
Basis in stock (cost $200,000 +  improvements 
$100,000 ) 300,000
Capital gain on liquidation $ 31,700
Ordinary taxable income 20,000
Long-term capital gain deduction (15,850)
Total taxable income $ 35,850
Individual tax liability $ 10,277
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Liquidation Under Section 333, After Developing the
Property and After Sale of Lots—Option A(2)(b)
Because this alternative assumes a sale of all the property by the 
corporation prior to liquidation, the corporate tax liability will 
amount to $118,300 as in the previous option, leaving an after-tax 
cash distribution of $331,700.
Under the provisions of Section 333(e)(1), the amount of the 
gain that is not in excess of the taxpayer’s ratable share of earnings 
and profits will be recognized, and treated, as a dividend. Thus, 
since the client in our example is a 100 percent shareholder, his 
ratable share of earnings and profits will be $141,700 ($450,000 
minus $190,000 (basis) minus $118,300 (corporate tax)) and his 
recognizable gain on the Section 333 distribution will be $31,700 
($331,700 (cash received) minus $300,000 (basis)), all of which will 
be treated as a dividend. Thus, in addition to a corporate tax of 
$118,300, the client will be liable for the following personal income 
tax.
Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income $ 20,000
Dividend income 31,700
Taxable income $ 51,700
Tax liability $ 17,910
Liquidation Under Section 331, Before Developing the
Property and Then Accomplishing Development and Sale 
in a New Corporation—Option B(1)(a)(i)
Liquidating the corporation before land improvements have be­
gun would increase the basis of the property to $300,000. Under a 
Section 331 liquidation, the client would be treated as having ex­
changed his stock (a capital asset) for the property distributed 
to him.
FMV of land received $300,000
Basis of stock surrendered 200,000
Gain recognized $100,000
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Because the stock surrendered constitutes a Section 1221 capital 
asset, the client would report a capital gain. Thus, the total per­
sonal income tax due on the transaction would be computed as 
follows.
Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income $ 20,000
Capital gain on surrender of stock 100,000
Long-term capital gain deduction (50,000)
Taxable income $ 70,000
Individual tax liability $ 27,720
A subsequent tax-free transfer, under Section 351, to a new cor­
poration, plus investment of an additional $100,000 for the land 
development, would increase the basis of the property to $400,000. 
The new corporation would then incur a corporate tax liability upon 
sale of the land for $450,000.
Corporate Tax
Sale of improved land $450,000
Basis of land ($300,000 +  $100,000 investment) 400,000 
Ordinary corporate taxable income $ 50,000
Corporate tax Lability $ 17,500
This alternative offers two major problems, however. First, once 
the corporation has disposed of the land, a second corporate liqui­
dation must occur, creating an additional tax.
Cash distributed in liquidation ($450,000 — 
corporate tax $17,500) $432,500
Basis in stock (basis from Section 351 transfer 
$300,000 +  improvements $100,000 ) 400,000
Gain on corporate liquidation $ 32,500
Therefore, according to this alternative, if all transactions occur in 
the same tax year, the personal tax Lability would increase, as 
follows.
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Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income $ 20,000
Capital gain on first corporate liquidation 100,000
Capital gain on second corporate liquidation 32,500
Long-term capital gain deduction (66,250)
Taxable income $ 86,250
Individual tax liability $ 36,965
The second and more serious problem associated with this al­
ternative is the risk associated with the liquidation-reincorporation 
process. It appears highly likely that the IRS could invoke the ju­
dicial doctrines of "business purpose” or “step transaction” and 
thereby ignore the first liquidation entirely. That action would cre­
ate the same tax result as is described in Option A(2)(a).
Liquidation Under Section 331, Before Developing the
Property and Then Accomplishing Development and Sale 
as a Sole Proprietor—Option B(1)(a)(ii)
The tax consequences as a result of the liquidation will, of course, 
produce the same result as in the previous alternative: the prop­
erty basis will increase to $300,000 and the client will recognize a 
$100,000 long-term capital gain. The subsequent development costs 
will add an additional $100,000 to the $300,000 basis. The sale of 
the land for $450,000 will thus create a $50,000 recognizable gain 
that would probably constitute ordinary income. The client’s tax 
liability would be as follows.
Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income $ 20,000
Ordinary gain on sale of land ($450,000 — basis
$400,000 ) 50,000
Gain on corporate liquidation 100,000
Long-term capital gain deduction (50,000)
Taxable income $120,000
Individual tax liability $ 55,620*
*Utilizing “alternative” long-term capital gain tax
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Although this alternative appears to have a desirable tax result, 
it exposes the client to a substantial financial risk in that the land 
development would take place outside of a corporate entity. If a 
major, unforeseen liability should arise during the development 
process, all of the client’s assets would be available to settle credi­
tors’ claims. This financial risk, and the cost of possible insurance 
to cover the risk, would have to be assessed carefully in making a 
selection. Because the illustration is already sufficiently complicated, 
and because the added complication would add little if anything 
to the point of the illustration, we have simply ignored this factor 
in the remainder of the illustration. Unfortunately, the practitioner 
cannot dispose of problems so easily.
Liquidation Under Section 331, Before Developing
the Property and Then Accomplishing Development and 
Sale Through a Broker—Option B(1)(b)
The tax consequences here are similar to those in the previous 
alternative. However, the critical question to be decided is whether 
development and sale by an independent real estate broker would 
cause the final gain on the sale of the property to be treated as a 
capital gain, rather than as ordinary income. In addition, the broker’s 
fees would be likely to reduce the anticipated return from the de­
velopment. In order to simplify the solution, we have ignored this 
probable additional cost for the purposes of the illustration. Accord­
ingly, the tax computation could be made as follows.
Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income $ 20,000
Gain on liquidation of corporation 100,000
Gain on sale of improved land 50,000
Long-term capital gain deduction (75,000)
Taxable income $ 95,000
Individual tax liability $ 42,180
Whether the client would be able to sustain his claim for capital 
gain treatment on the sale of the property through an independent 
broker is questionable. There is some judicial authority to support 
such a position; however, the consensus of available judicial au­
thority does not. Adoption of this course of action would appear to 
invite litigation. In addition, this alternative might once again in- 
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clude a substantial financial risk because it requires development 
of the land outside the corporate entity.
Liquidation Under Section 333, Before Developing the
Property and Then Accomplishing Development and Sale 
Through a New Corporation—Option B(2)(a)(i)
Under a Section 333 liquidation, no gain would be recognized 
either to the corporation or to the client. The land distributed in 
the liquidation would assume the basis of the stock surrendered, in 
this instance $200,000. Subsequent transfer of the land to a new 
corporation for purposes of development would be tax free under 
Section 351. The basis of $200,000 plus $100,000 of additional in­
vestment to accomplish the development would increase the cor­
porate basis in the property to $300,000. The sale of the land by 
the corporation would result in ordinary income as follows.
Corporate Tax
Sales price of land $450,000
Corporation’s basis in land 300,000
Ordinary corporate taxable income $150,000
Corporate tax liability $ 65,500
The subsequent liquidation of the new corporation would create 
the following gain.
Cash distributed (sales price $450,000 — 
corporate tax $65,500) $384,500
Basis of stock surrendered 300,000
Gain on corporate liquidation $ 84,500
Thus, the client’s total personal tax liability would be computed as 
follows.
Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income $ 20,000
Gain on corporate liquidation 84,500
Long-term capital gain deduction (42,250)
Taxable income $ 62,250
Individual tax liability $ 23,493
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As was true in Option B (1)(a)(i), an adviser would again have 
to question how the IRS would view a liquidation followed by an 
immediate reincorporation and a subsequent liquidation and hav­
ing no obvious business purpose other than converting ordinary in­
come into capital gain. This alternative, therefore, appears to be 
highly questionable and full of litigation potential.
Liquidation Under Section 333, Before Developing the
Property and Then Accomplishing Development as a
Sole Proprietor—Option B(2)(a)(ii)
As mentioned in the explanation of the previous option, no
taxable gain would occur with a Section 333 liquidation. The 
client would surrender his stock and transfer his basis of $200,000 
from the stock to the land received in distribution. The subsequent 
land improvements would increase the basis of the land to $300,000. 
The sale of the land would undoubtedly result in ordinary income 
in the amount of $150,000 ($450,000 -  $300,000). Thus the client’s 
tax liability would be determined as follows.
Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income $ 20,000
Ordinary income from sale of lots 150,000
Taxable income $170,000
Individual tax liability $ 90,380
This alternative also involves the extra financial risk of developing 
the land outside the safety of a corporate entity.
Liquidation Under Section 333, Before Developing the
Property and Then Accomplishing Development Through 
an Independent Broker—Option B(2)(b)
As in the two previous alternatives, this option transfers the land 
from the corporation to the client through liquidation and transfers 
the $200,000 basis in the stock to the land. The additional develop­
ment costs of $100,000 can again be added to the basis of the land. 
The same critical questions encountered under Option B(l)(b) are 
crucial to the tax result in this alternative. If, as a result of sale 
through a broker, capital gain treatment can be justified, the follow­
ing tax cost would be incurred.
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Personal Tax
Ordinary taxable income $ 20,000
Capital gain on sale of land ($450,000 — basis
$300,000) 150,000
Long-term capital gain deduction (75,000)
Taxable income $ 95,000
Individual tax liability $ 42,180
Summary
By adding the results of the foregoing computations to figure 8.2, 
opposite, we can readily observe some very interesting results. Three 
alternatives—A (1) (a) (ii), B (1)(b ), and B (2 )(b )—each produce 
an equally low tax liability ($42,180). However, each of these al­
ternatives involves a rather high risk. If the alternatives are carried 
out as proposed, they are likely to be challenged by the IRS and, in 
at least two instances, may result in rather sizable deficiency as­
sessments. That is, both Option A (1)(a )( ii)  and B (2 )(b ), if chal­
lenged during an audit, could result in a deficiency assessment of 
$48,200. For instance, if Option A (1)(a )( ii)  were found to involve 
a collapsible corporation, the tax liability would amount to $90,380, 
not including possible penalties. Similarly, if capital gain treatment 
were to be denied on Option B (2) (b ), the revised tax liability would 
be $90,380, not including any penalties. Although Option B (1)(b) 
appears to be much more appealing taxwise, it involves the added 
financial risk common to all noncorporate operations. In the latter 
alternative, even if challenged successfully, the deficiency assess­
ment would amount to only $13,440 (excluding penalties).
Another highly uncertain result is implicit in Option B ( 1)(a )( i) .  
If a revenue agent proposes to collapse the two liquidations into one 
and if we consider only the second liquidation as a valid one, the 
tax result would involve a liquidation after corporate development 
of the land with a potential tax liability of $128,577, or a deficiency 
assessment of $74,112, without penalties.
Taking into consideration only the tax factors, alternatives 
B (1) (b ) and B ( 1) (a ) (ii) appear to be the most attractive options. 
Option B (1)(b ), as already noted, projects a possible tax liability 
of $42,180, with a potential deficiency assessment of $13,400, for 
a likely tax cost of $55,620. Option B ( 1) (a ) ( ii), which requires
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immediate liquidation of the corporation and assumes the develop­
ment and sale of the land by your client as a sole proprietor, offers 
the least litigation risk. The total tax would amount to $55,620, the 
same as the maximum projected under B (1) (b). Nevertheless, both 
of these alternatives include the financial risk of operating without 
the liability protection of a corporation, and the latter option prob­
ably involves additional costs for the broker’s services. As noted 
earlier, in an actual planning engagement, both of these costs would 
have to be estimated and added to our illustration before a recom­
mendation could be made to the client.8
Once all of the reasonable alternatives have been researched and 
their tax results determined, a tax adviser should recommend a 
course of action to his client. In some circumstances, the client may 
elect to ignore tax results and base his decision on other considera­
tions. In the final analysis, only the client can determine which al­
ternative is best for him. The qualified tax adviser will, however, 
give his client all of the information needed to make an intelligent 
decision; in most instances, the adviser’s recommendation will be 
accepted by the client.
This example demonstrates a systematic approach to the research 
of alternative courses of action available to a taxpayer. This tax­
planning process represents a serial rearrangement of facts over 
which a client can still exercise control. Such a systematic creation 
and evaluation of alternative strategies is the key to profitable tax 
planning.
Tax-Planning Communications
Practitioners should recognize distinct differences between com­
municating research conclusions in a tax compliance problem and 
making recommendations in a tax-planning engagement. In tax 
compliance work, the facts and the law pertinent to the solution are 
generally fixed. Therefore, once the appropriate statute and all re­
lated authorities have been identified and evaluated, the researcher
8 In such an engagement, much of the computational work could be adapted 
to a computer program, which would include calculations for income aver­
aging, the maximum tax on earned income, and so forth. Obviously com­
puters can eliminate many hours of labor in planning engagements, often at 
minimal cost through time-sharing arrangements.
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generally can offer his conclusion to the client with reasonable cer­
tainty that it is “correct.”
Reaching an optimal conclusion in a tax-planning engagement is 
much less certain. The “facts” are merely preliminary proposals 
based on many estimates and assumptions. Furthermore, the enact­
ment of a proposed plan is not fixed in time. It may occur next week, 
next month, or two years hence. Consequently, at the time the plan 
is finally executed, even the tax statutes upon which it is based may 
have changed and the tax alternative originally recommended may 
no longer be the preferred one. Because of these uncertainties, the 
tax adviser should prepare for his client a written memorandum 
containing a statement of the assumptions and the recommended 
plan of action, qualified as follows:
1. A statement should be included emphasizing the fact that un­
less the plan is actually implemented as originally assumed, 
the tax results may be substantially altered.
2. It should be stressed that the recommendations are based on 
current tax authority and that possible delays in implementa­
tion may change the result because of changes in the law dur­
ing the interim period.
The foregoing recommendations generally concur with the opin­
ion expressed in the AICPA’s Statement of Responsibilities in Tax 
Practice No. 8, as quoted on page 168. Although the AICPA com­
mittee did not recommend routine use of such precautionary lan­
guage, tax advisers should seriously consider the adoption of such 
standard “disclaimer” statements in most tax-planning engagements.
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